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I. INTRODUCTION
Margaret Jane Radin, through a series of highly original
law review articles published over the last decade,1 has emerged
as one of our leading property theorists, one who surely will
have lasting influence. Radin's project is the legal recognition of
the role that identification with objects plays in the development
of personhood. Radin labels this a theory of "property for per-
sonhood."2 The essence of her theory is that we identify so
closely with certain objects of personal property that we cannot
distinguish our property from our selfhood.3 Consequently,
1. The most important of these articles-and the ones I analyze here-
are: Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter
Radin, Cross Currents]; Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HAnv.
L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]; Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 957 (1982) [hereinafter Ra-
din, Property and Personhood].
.2. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 966.
3. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text (describing Radin's view
that property bound up with personhood is personal property).
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human flourishing requires the recognition of certain legal
rights that protect these objects of personal property.4
Radin's insights are vitally important to the development of
a truly feminist jurisprudence. Radin protects and dignifies the
feminine side of personhood as object by arguing that the objects
that literally constitute the female body should be market-ina-
lienable.5 Her theory of property for personhood disrupts mar-
ket alienations and allows the feminine self to enjoy herself as
object as means to her own ends. Her implicit image of personal
property is the female body, which must chastely be protected
from violation in market intercourse.
The power of Radin's account for feminism is apparent. It is
for this reason that I write to bring forth the philosophical and
psychoanalytical implications embedded in her work.6 My anal-
ysis of Radin's work reveals an intrinsic dark side to her theory
of property for personhood. In this Article, I argue that her the-
ory is necessarily incomplete because she claims that it accounts
for the development of personhood within community, yet she
provides no account of community (i.e., intersubjectivity). I con-
tend that it is never enough for feminists to disrupt misogyny by
exposing the masculine fiction of subjectivity. To speak and live
in a community, we need this fiction. Even in denial and con-
demnation, we recognize masculine subjectivity and silence our-
selves in feminine objectivity. Nor is it possible merely to add
the feminine narrative to the masculine fiction. Rather, we
must write a new feminist myth that supersedes, rather than
simply negates or modifies, the masculine fiction. To add the
feminine to property law and thereby develop a truly humanis-
tic, yet gendered, 7 jurisprudence, we should return to and recon-
sider the property theory of Georg W. F. Hegel and its rewriting
in Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical theory of sexuated posi-
4. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's theory
that personal property requires greater protection than other, fungible types of
property).
5. For instance, she proposes legal limitations on prostitution, surrogate
motherhood, and the sale of body parts. See infra note 92 and accompanying
text (describing Radin's position on the market-alienability of female sexual
and reproductive activities).
6. Steven Schnably began this project in a recent essay. See generally
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory
of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. Ruv. 347 (1993) [hereinafter Schnably,
Property and Pragmatism] (criticizing Radin's treatment of power and conflict).




tions. By doing so, we may be able to complete Radin's project-
developing a feminist critique of property law.
A. THE DESIRE OF M IS THE DESIRE OF THE OTHR
Hegel and Lacan argued that subjectivity is intersubjectiv-
ity mediated through the exchange of the object of desire.8 For
Hegel, this function is performed by property.9 For Lacan, it is
performed by the Feminine.' 0
This means that for a person to attain subjectivity and the
capacity for freedom as self-actualization, he" needs to be recog-
nized and desired by another subject whom he recognizes and
desires as fully and equally human.' 2 Hegel's person is a pas-
sionate rights-seeking creature. In the act of exchanging prop-
8. See infra notes 298-328, 398-420 and accompanying text (describing
the Hegelian and Lacanian theories of subjectivity and objects of desire).
9. See infra notes 320-328 and accompanying text (describing the aliena-
tion of the object of property as enabling intersubjectivity).
10. See infra notes 398-402 and accompanying text (describing the role of
the Feminine as the object of desire in Lacanian theory). I explore the similari-
ties between Hegel's theory of property and Lacan's theory of sexuality in
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: The Feminine and Property in
Psychoanalysis and the Law, 15 CAR.ozo L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (manu-
script on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces].
Contemporary American usage obscures the parallelism between property
and sexuality. We use the word property to refer to both the legal regime of
exchange and the object exchanged. In psychoanalysis, the psychic regime of
exchange is sexuality and the object exchanged is the Phallic Mother. See infra
notes 398-420 and accompanying text (describing Lacan's psychoanalytic theory
regarding subjectivity and the Phallic Mother).
11. According to Lacan, subjectivity in our society is the masculine, hence
my use of the masculine pronoun. Even an anatomical woman takes on the
masculine position when she speaks or otherwise attains subjectivity. See infra
notes 403-413 and accompanying text (describing the Lacanian view of sexu-
ated positions).
12. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDozo
L. Rav. 1199 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, The Dialectics of Contract]. Rosen-
feld observes:
The struggle for recognition is part of the dialectic of self-conscious-
ness. Self-consciousness for Hegel is desire....
Indeed, once it is understood that the aim of desire is the preserva-
tion of self-consciousness, then it seems logical to conclude, as Hegel
does, that self-consciousness can only achieve satisfaction in another
self-consciousness. If desire seeks to maintain identity, then self-con-
sciousness must seek an object which provides it with recognition. And
the only object which can provide sustained recognition to a self-con-
sciousness is another self-consciousness.
Id. at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
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erty,13 Hegel's abstract person 14 recognizes others as subjects
deserving of rights, so that they in turn can recognize him as a
legal subject capable of bearing rights.15 Lacan rewrote this in-
sight of Hegel as "man's desire is the desire of the Other."16 The
myth of the exchange of the Phallic Woman 17 as the object of
desire allows Lacan's infant to recognize others as desiring sub-
jects and, therefore, to become a psychoanalytic subject capable
of being desired.' 8 To both Hegel and Lacan, this moment of the
constitution of the subject through intersubjective exchange is
simultaneously the constituting moment of law.19
13. See infra notes 326-329 and accompanying text (describing contractual
exchanges).
14. Hegel, like Kant, began his philosophical consideration with a notion of
the person that is totally abstract and negative, having no individual character-
istics or content. Unlike the Kantian construct, however, the Hegelian person
logically develops increasingly more complex and adequate forms of personal-
ity. See infra notes 228-231, 249-258 and accompanying text (describing the
development of Hegel's abstract person in light of Radin's criticisms).
15. In the development of the Hegelian person, the logical first step is be-
coming a "subject"-a legal person recognized by the community as capable of
bearing rights and according rights to others. See infra notes 326-329 and ac-
companying text (describing the recognition of the person as a subject). As
Avineri observes, "Property is ... for Hegel a moment in man's struggle for
recognition." SHLOMo AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 89
(1972) [hereinafter AvINRIu, MODERN STATE].
16. JACQUES LACAN, Ecrrs: A SELECTION 264 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977)
[hereinafter LACAN, ECaRTs]. A full explication of Lacan's complex and paradox-
ical notion of the Other (with a capital "0") is beyond the scope of this Article.
It refers to the concept of otherness as radical alterity, as well as to specific
others that occupy this position. See generally BICE BENEvENuTO & ROGER KEN-
NEDY, THE WORKS OF JACQUEs LACAN: AN INTRODUCTION (1986) [hereinafter
BENEVENUTo & KENNEDY, WORKS OF LACAN) (analyzing Lacan's Other); see also
infra notes 387-391 and accompanying text (describing the infant's first encoun-
ter with the Mother as Other).
17. In Lacanian psychoanalysis the "Phallus" is the technical term for the
Symbolic object of desire and is sometimes identified with The Woman (i.e., the
Feminine, as opposed to empirical women, or femininity). The symbolic (i.e.,
linguistic) concept of the Phallus is conflated in the psyche with the penis. See
infra notes 385-406 and accompanying text (describing the logic of Lacan's the-
ory of sexuated positions).
18. See infra notes 414-420 and accompanying text (describing mythical ex-
change of women as source of subjectivity).
19. See infra notes 326-328, 418-419 and accompanying text (describing
Hegers theory of intersubjective exchange and Lacan's theory of the moment of
recognition of others). By "law" I am referring, in the case of Hegel, to law as
Recht, abstract right. "Positive law," law as Gesetz, is not written until the
higher stage of development that Hegel calls civil society. GEORG W.F. HEGEL,
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 136 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) [hereinafter
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox)]. In Lacan, "law" is law as prohibition
(i.e., the incest taboo) that is the "condition sine qua non of speech." JACQUES
LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LAcAN: BOOK VII, THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOA-
19941
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Property, as explicated by Hegel, and sexuality, as expli-
cated by Lacan, are triune in nature.20 Both property and sexu-
ality require two persons driven by a passionate, erotic desire to
recognize and be recognized by each other. But, these relations
must be mediated by a desired object. To Hegel, the mediator is
an external object.2 1 To Lacan, it is the Phallus.2 2 These
mediators first individuate persons, so that they become recog-
nizable, and then introduce them to each other as subjects
through intersubjective exchange. We only desire the object of
desire derivatively as a means of achieving our true desire-the
desire of the Other.
The triune nature of property, as conceptualized through in-
tersubjective exchange, is in danger of becoming lost in contem-
porary legal scholarship. 23 Generations of legal scholars have
repeated Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's faux pas that property
NALYSIS 1959-1960 69 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Dennis Porter trans., 1992)
[hereinafter LACAN, SEmNAR VII.
In this Article, I primarily use the Knox translation of Philosophy of Right
that Margaret Jane Radin uses and is probably the most familiar to American
readers. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 948 (citing
Knox translation). Unfortunately, Knox is notorious not only for his use of awk-
ward sentence structure but also for paraphrasing, rather than translating,
some of Hegel's more difficult passages. H.B. Nisbet, Translator's Preface to
GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT Xxxviii-xxxix (Al-
len W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT (NISBET)]. Consequently, I often refer to the more recent Nisbet
translation or to Nisbees helpful translator's notes.
20. A more sophisticated analysis would say that the ostensibly triune sys-
tems of Hegel and Lacan are actually quadratic in nature-there is always an
unsublated, repressed, ghostly fourth that haunts intersubjectivity and media-
tion. See SLAvoJ ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A
POLITICAL FACTOR 179-82 (1991) [hereinafter ZIZEK, FOR TnEY KNow NOT
WHAT THEY Do] (discussing interpretions of Hegel's system as quadratic). At
this point in my analysis, however, it is not necessary to address this subtlety.
Rather, I merely wish to emphasize that both property and sexuality are medi-
ated relations. They require not only two subjects, but a third object to serve as
mediator.
21. See infra notes 308-319 and accompanying text (describing how posses-
sion, use, and alienation of objects of property mediate relations).
22. See infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text (describing Phallus as
desired object).
23. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Femi-
nist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property (work in progress 1994) (manu-
script on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix] (explaining
ways in which the triune, mediated nature of property is denied in contempo-
rary jurisprudence and collapsed into a binary unmediated function between
property owners or an owner and physical object).
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rights do not require a res, or object, at all.24 Property, under
Hohfeld, becomes totally disembodied and disaggregated-
merely a "bundle of sticks."25
Radin, in contradistinction, centers her analysis of property
on the relationship between a single subject and an object. Her
dichotomy of property rights-personal property versus fungible
property-is defined in terms of the nature of the owning sub-
ject's relationship with the object owned.26 According to Radin,
we identify with objects of personal property so closely that we
cannot distinguish our property from our selfhood.27 In other
words, we do not desire the object of personal property deriva-
tively to be desired by others, but primarily as a form of narcis-
sistic auto-eroticism.
Consequently, if Hohfeld's zeal to emphasize the intersub-
jective aspect of property caused him to lose sight of its objective
aspect, Radin's insistence on its objective aspect may result in
the opposite-she risks losing sight of the intersubjective as-
pect. As community is intersubjective, it requires both an inter-
subjective and objective account of property. Consequently, a
wholly objective account of property inadequately promotes Ra-
din's stated "pragmatic" goal28 of developing a theory of the indi-
vidual within community.
24. See WESLEY N. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS AP.
PLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 75, 78, 85 (W. Cook ed., 1919) [hereinafter
HoHFELD, FUNDAmENAL LEGAL CONCEPnONS].
25. See Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053, 1055-63
(1989) (discussing development of bundle of sticks metaphor). Hohfeld himself
did not use the expression. Id. at 1059. Some commentators have argued, how-
ever, that Hohfeld's vocabulary of legal conceptions served as the tool that ena-
bled the development of the theory of disaggregated property that this
metaphor suggests. Id. at 1055-63; Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of
Property [hereinafter Grey, Disintegration of Property], in PROPERTY: NoMos
XXII 69, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter
NoMos XXII]; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325,
359-67 (1980) [hereinafter Vandevelde, The New Property].
26. See infra notes 135-148 and accompanying text (presenting Radin's
theory of property rights).
27. See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's view
of the person being bound up with certain forms of property).




B. RADiN'S THEORY AS AN ATTEMPTED REWRITING OF
PROPERTY FROM THE FEMININE POSITION
In this Article, I suggest two possible interpretations of Ra-
din's theory. First, it could be seen as a rewriting of property
law from the position of the Feminine.29 It is I, not Radin, who
has chosen to describe her theory in the potentially divisive lan-
guage of sexual difference. I do not argue that Radin either in-
tentionally or consciously is attempting to write a "feminine"
theory of property. What I do suggest is that both Radin's self-
described "intuition" as to the nature of proper object relations
and mainstream "Hohfeldian" property law theory contain strik-
ing similarities to the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory of sexu-
ated positions.
According to Lacan, to become an adult, every human must
take on the fictional role or position of either having the Phallic
object of desire, which is exchanged with others (i.e., the position
of the masculine), or of being'the Phallic object of desire (i.e., the
position of the feminine).30 Hohfeld identified with the (mascu-
line) legal subject who claims to be so alienated from, and indif-
ferent to, the (feminine) object of property that he denies its (or
her) reality.31 The intersubjective act of exchange, not the object
29. By referring to feminine and masculine positions, I am not referring to
the theory of woman's different voice, feminine perspectivity theory, or biologi-
cally determinate sexual difference. I am referring to Lacanian psychoanalytic
theory, which attempts to recognize empirical and contingent sexual diversity
while avoiding gender essentialism. Lacanian theory interests me precisely be-
cause it posits that, on the one hand, sexuation is not inevitably tied to anatomy
and each of us takes on either sexuated position from time to time. On the
other hand, we conflate the sexual positions with the anatomical sexes so that
most of us, as an empirical matter, take on the position assigned to our genita-
lia. That is, sexuality is a fiction, but it is a fiction that functions. See infra
notes 402-408 and accompanying text (noting role of anatomy in sexuation).
I have criticized "different voice" feminist legal theory extensively else-
where because it reduces jurisprudence to empiricism and gender loyalty; I also
find its description of sexual difference to be unrealistic as an empirical matter
and unconvincing as a theoretical matter. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction
from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70
TFx. L. REv. 109, 120-47 (1991) [hereinafter Schroeder, Abduction from the Se-
raglio]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Ste-
reotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1144-
45 (1990) [hereinafter Schroeder, Feminism Historicized]. I have also sug-
gested, however, that "different voice" feminism should be congratulated for at-
tempting to valorize the feminine and for recognizing that persons who are in
different positions are likely to abduct (i.e., formulate) different initial hypothe-
ses. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra, at 200-07.
30. LAcAN, Ecmrs, supra note 16, at 281-91.
31. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (describing Hohfeld's view
that wife's consortium and daughter's safety are property-like rights).
[Vol. 79:55
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of exchange itself, is his property. Hohfeld insisted that the res
does not exist,3 2 in the same way as the Lacanian subject needs
to insist that "Woman does not exist."3 3
Radin, in contradistinction, recognizes a (feminine) self who
so identifies with the (feminine) object of property that it is im-
possible for her to distinguish her property from her per-
sonhood.34 Alienation of the object identified with the person is,
therefore, perceived as alienation of personhood. To achieve
feminine personhood as her own end, and not the means to the
ends of another subject, the Radinian person refuses to surren-
der herself to the economy of intersubjective exchange. Rather,
she seeks to dedicate the object of property to her sole enjoy-
ment. This is reminiscent of the Lacanian concept of feminine
jouissance, or enjoyment, whereby the person who takes on the
position of the feminine temporarily transcends the Symbolic
realm of intersubjective exchange and thereby momentarily
overcomes the subject/object distinction.35
Under this interpretation, Radin's project appears to hold
out the potential of becoming what I have called elsewhere "an
abduction from the seraglio," in the sense of a hypothesis or act
of imagination from the feminine positiorn3 6 Radin seeks to give
32. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (describing Hohfeld's focus on
the relational aspect of property law).
33. See infra note 398 (noting that this infamous quotation actually mis-
quotes Lacan).
34. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (describing property as
"bound up" with personhood).
35. See infra notes 422-425 and accompanying text (describingjouissance
as feminine enjoyment).
36. This expression is a pun on the title of the Mozart opera, The Seduction
from the Seraglio, which I have used elsewhere to analyze different trends in
feminist scholarship. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 29, at
110-15; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 148. The term
"abduction" has two meanings that at first blush seem wildly disparate. The
more familiar use is kidnapping for sexual purposes-the original form of rape
recognized in Western European law. See Schroeder, Abduction from the Sera-
glio, supra note 29, at 110 n.2 (describing the Medieval European definition of
abduction). But, it is also the term for the logic of imagination. See id. at 115
(discussing philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce's definition of abduction as the
logic of the imaginitive process).
The seraglio was the harem of the Turkish sultan. I have used the seraglio,
a place of confinement of women for sexual purposes, as a metaphor for sexual
slavery-a form of rape. Alternately, the seraglio can stand for a feminine
world of women among women isolated from men. See id. at 110 n.1 (discussing
definitions of "seraglio").
In Mozart's opera, The Seduction from the Seraglio, the heroine, Con-
stanza, can only escape the seraglio in which the sultan has imprisoned her out
of love by submitting to abduction by another lover. That is, she does not suc-
1994]
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legal recognition to the role that identification with a body-like
object plays in the development of personhood. Radin seeks to
protect and dignify the feminine side of personhood as object.
She argues that those objects that literally constitute the female
body should be inalienable.3 7 She, therefore, proposes legal lim-
itations on prostitution, surrogate motherhood, and the sale of
body parts.38 She would also give enhanced constitutional and
other legal protection to other objects that are body-like in the
sense of being intimately identified with the self.39
Radin's concept of property for personhood seeks to allow
the feminine self to enjoy herself as object as means to her own
ends. As such, Radin's theory highlights the hole in the center
of the psychoanalytic fiction of masculine subjectivity, a hole
that Lacan not only recognized, but emphasized.40 By aggres-
sively identifying with, and taking on, the position of the femi-
nine object, while simultaneously insisting on rights from this
objective position, Radin denies the lie that the feminine exists
derivatively, to be silently and passively traded between men
seeking to become subjects.
cessfully escape masculine domination, but merely exchanges the identity of
her jailer. She is literally raped from rape.,
In Abduction from the Seraglio, I argue that the two dominant trends in
legal feminisms, different voice feminism and Catharine MacKinnon's suppos-
edly unmodified feminism, merely reinstate the masculinist status quo. Id. at
120-50. Like Mozart's doubly raped heroine, they seek to escape masculinism
,but in fact merely adopt another version of the status quo of masculine domi-
nance and feminine subordination-they are metaphorically raped from rape.
There is, however, an alternate meaning to my phrase. It can also suggest
an hypothesis created from the feminine position. An abduction from the sera-
glio would likely differ from an abduction from elsewhere. This is not to say
that men and women think differently and thus would develop different juris-
prudence, but that traditional jurisprudence may have a masculinist bias be-
cause it is based on hypotheses abducted by individuals favoring a masculine
perspective. Consequently, although I would never suggest that a theory like
Radin's should be accepted or rejected because it is an alternate theory told in a
woman's different voice, it should be given careful consideration insofar as it
might offer a new and different perspective that, when combined with the pre-
sumptively masculine perspective of mainstream jurisprudence, might enable
us to have a more complete understanding of legal relations.
37. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1921-36.
38. Id.
39. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 991-1015.
40. See generally SIAvoJ ZIZEK, TARRYING wrm THE NEGATIV: KANT,
HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (1994) [hereinafter Zizm, TARRYING
wrrH Tm NEGATIVE] (discussing emptiness at the heart of Hegel's and Lacan's
split subject); ZizEx, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20
(same).
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Radin's hypothesis, or abduction, of the importance of the
objective aspect of property also reveals the inadequacy of a
Hohfeldian subjective theory of property. Unfortunately, Ra-
din's theory is a simple negation of Hohfeld's. She, therefore,
risks making an error that is Hohfeld's mirror image. If Hohfeld
denies the objective side of property, Radin de-emphasizes and
disparages the intersubjective side. The rights of "personal
property" become exclusive possession and enjoyment, but not
alienation. As I shall explain, Radin's archetypical object of per-
sonal property is literally the female body, as opposed to an ab-
stract feminine position.41 The psychoanalytic model of Radin's
notion of inalienable "personal" property is, consequently, prop-
erty as chastity. But, whereas virginity can be integrity, it can
also be sterility, isolation, and loneliness. In her attempt to es-
cape imprisonment in the masculinist seraglio, Radin may be
immuring feminine property in a cloister, seemingly free of the
masculine fiction, but still segregated from the community.
Hegel argued, in Philosophy of Right, that complete human de-
velopment and freedom require community as well as individu-
ality.42 Lacan argued that the Symbolic order requires
masculine, desiring subjectivity mediated through the feminine
object of desire.43 Radin's theory of personhood seeks to describe
the individual within community,4 yet it currently has no ac-
count of community.
Radin's theory of property for personhood contains the con-
tradiction that, although it is intended to prevent the objectifica-
tion of women, 45 it is based on the identification of personhood,
generally, and feminine personhood, specifically, with objects.
She seeks to prevent the commodification of women,46 but she
does not recognize that psychoanalytically the feminine is not
merely defined as always already commodified. Rather, in psy-
41. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (comparing personal prop-
erty to the female body under Radin's theory).
42. See infra notes 249-259, 298-319 and accompanying text (discussing
Hegel's argument that the abstract will is an inadequate person who must be
developed through intersubjectivity).
43. See infra notes 381-419 and accompanying text (interpreting Lacan's
psychoanalytic theory).
44. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing Radin's focus
on persons within a particular community).
45. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 341, 345-46 (1991) ("Objectification, in the pejorative sense .... comes
about through commodification when our cultural rhetoric conceives of certain
attributes of the person as commodities that can be bought and sold.").
46. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1921; Radin, Cross Cur-
rents, supra note 1, at 1687.
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choanalytic theory, the Phallic Woman is herself the archetypi-
cal and primal commodity. 47 Lacan taught that to be conscious
and to speak is literarily, if not literally, to objectify the Femi-
nine. This means that the feminist task cannot be to prevent
the commodification and objectification of woman. It can only be
to search for a way to subjectify and decommodify ourselves as
women.
The problem with Radin's project is that the feminine myth
cannot be written within the masculine fiction. In the masculine
fiction, as written by Lacan, feminine enjoyment -jouissance-
must be silent by definition.48 To simply add the active femi-
nine object into this masculine fiction is not to modify the fiction,
but to negate it. But, simple negation is always a form of rein-
statement. It reflects the mirror image of the very concept that
it purports to criticize. On the one hand, even to identify the
feminine person with the object, as Radin does, is to admit the
masculine fiction and to deny feminine speech. On the other
hand, by insisting on speaking as a woman, one denies the objec-
tive position of the feminine, which is the very basis of the
fiction.
The fact that the feminine myth cannot be added to the
masculine fiction of property does not mean that we can merely
abandon either the fiction or the myth. Rather, we must write a
new feminist myth that neither merely negates nor modifies the
masculine fiction, but supersedes it. Radin ignores the implicit
insight of Hegelian property and Lacanian sexuality theory that
identification with other subjects through the exchange of non-
body-like objects is necessary in the development of subjectivity
as intersubjectivity. As a result, the Radinian person remains
47. That is, to Lacan, subjectivity (the position of the masculine) is created
through the fiction of the possession and exchange of the Phallic Mother. See
Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10. In developing this theory,
Lacan was initially deeply influenced by the structuralist anthropology of
Claude Levi-Strauss, which located the origins of culture in the actual exchange
of woman among kinship groups. CLAUDE Lmu-STRAuss, STRUmuRAL Anrimo-
POLOGY 61 (C. Jacobson & B. Schoepf trans., 1963); JANE GALLOP, READING LA-
CAN 15 (1985) [hereinafter GALLOP, READING LAcAN]. As his theory developed,
Lacan moved further away from the empirical, the biological, and the natural
and emphasized the purely fictional, symbolic, and impossible nature of sexual-
ity and subjectivity. See Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II [hereinafter Rose, In-
troduction II] to JACQUES LACAN AND TmE ECOLE FREUDIENNE, FEMININE
SExuALrry (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans.,
1982) [hereinafter LAcAN, FEmINIE SExuAl=] (describing development of La-
can's work).
48. See infra notes 422-425 and accompanying text (stating thatjouissance
from the position of the feminine is that which is beyond language).
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bound up with things, whereas the Hegelian/Lacanian subject
longs to become bound to other persons.
The intersubjective aspect of property is crucial for an un-
derstanding of the creation of community. It is also central to
the development of a law of what Radin calls "fungible" prop-
erty. By merely trying to add the dignity of the feminine posi-
tion of objectivity to the existing law of property, she is left
without an account of community or intersubjectivity. In her at-
tempt to rewrite the fiction of property, Radin ends up telling
the same old story. The feminine person merely identifies with
her object of personal property, which she enjoys in her virgin
solitude. The feminine remains the passive Phallic object of de-
sire-she can only claim the right to refuse her suitors, in an
attempt to deny her commodification. Feminine enjoyment-
jouissance-remains silent, because the nun-like owner never
leaves her cell to have social intercourse.
C. RADIN'S THEORY AS AN ALTERNATE JURISPRUDENCE OF
EXPANDED BODILY INTEGRITY
An alternative, and I believe potentially more successful, re-
interpretation of Radin's theory is that it is not a theory of prop-
erty at all. Rather, it may be more fruitful to view her theory as
a jurisprudence of expanded bodily integrity.
Radin focuses on the rights that human beings should be
accorded with respect to their bodies and other body-like ob-
jects.49 This is a worthy project, but it has limited utility for the
analysis of the "private law"50 of property. In this view, Radin's
insistence on couching her analysis in the vocabulary of property
law threatens to obscure and confuse her primary concerns and
may actually be detrimental to her project. She wishes to refute
the utilitarian approach of law and economics, which reduces all
human interrelations to contract. Yet, she concedes one of law
and economics' central propositions-that all object relations
are property relations. Consequently, Radin's potentially pow-
erful critique of utilitarianism can be absorbed into utilitarian-
49. See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text (describing Radin's theory
of protecting property rights in body-like objects).
50. I am referring to the traditional classification of law into private law
(contract, tort, private property, commercial law, and the law of the market
generally) and public law (constitutional law, administrative law, and the law
of public policy generally). From a political perspective, so-called private law is
as political, and public, as so-called public law, but I believe the distinction it
captures is useful for my purposes.
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ism and reduced to trivial nitpicking as to the details of the
positive law of property and contract.
Her analysis would, therefore, be much clearer and much'
stronger if it expressly restated that the legal regime tradition-
ally governing object relations-property law-is not appropri-
ate to all object relations. 51 In this light, Radin would be seen as
developing a new legal regime to govern relations with body-like
objects as an alternate to property law. I call this alternate re-
gime the jurisprudence of expanded bodily integrity.
An adequate theory of the subject and the object, as ex-
pressed through our legal relations and interrelations with ob-
jects, cannot be created exclusively from the traditionally
Hohfeldian, masculine, intersubjective analysis of property.
Conversely, Radin's attempted feminine objective theory of ex-
panded bodily integrity is incomplete as written today and can-
not serve as a substitute for the existing property regime. Thus,
to develop a human theory of the legal person, we need to recog-
nize that property is a necessary, but insufficient, aspect of the
legal regime of object relations. To demonstrate this, we need to
return to Hegel's theory of property and reconsider and preserve
the intersubjective masculine theory of property at the point
where Radin made a wrong turn. From there, we can turn to
Lacan's rewriting of Hegel to explore the implications for femi-
nist theory.
Before beginning this daunting task, it may be helpful first
to lay some groundwork. I will begin by discussing Radin's the-
ory using her own terminology and contrasting the Hohfeldian
and Radinian theories of property. I will try to explain more
fully why I think that Hohfeld only privileges the intersubjective
aspect of property while denying the objective aspect. Next, I
proceed to examine Radin's account of personal versus fungible
property more thoroughly to explain how property for per-
sonhood privileges the objective aspect of property while dispar-
aging the intersubjective. I argue that, although Radin's theory
gives great dignity to a concept of expanded bodily integrity, it is
incomplete and offers an inadequate account of the legal institu-
tion of property, generally. I then explore Hegel's theory of prop-
erty, as set forth in Philosophy of Right, and contrast this to
Radin's misreading of his theory. I next compare the Hegelian
51. Radin has, herself, recognized this point. She notes that "the charac-
teristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when it is put forward as




theory of property with the Lacanian theory of sexuality as lin-
guistic positions to show how Radin's theory of property for per-
sonhood relates to the psychoanalytic position of the Feminine.
I conclude by suggesting a starting point for the development of
a more adequate approach to property that recognizes that
human subjectivity as intersubjectivity requires the mediating
objectivity of the law of property, as well as a jurisprudence of
expanded bodily integrity.
H. RADIN'S DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
A. HOHFELD AND RAD N CONTRASTED
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld articulated a theory of property
that all legal relationships are in fact interrelationships in his
justifiably acclaimed work, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning.52 For purposes of this critique, I
divide his analysis into two general projects: the development of
a precise taxonomy of fundamental legal conceptions arranged
in a scheme of jural opposites and correlatives 53 and, less suc-
cessfully, an analysis of the traditional legal distinction between
in personam and in rem rights.54 Hohfeld's exclusive focus on
the relational aspect of law led him to insist on the non sequitur
that because property is intersubjective, property rights are not
also object relationships (in the sense of being relationships of
subjects with respect to a res, to use traditional legal terminol-
ogy).5a This confusion, in turn, caused Hohfeld to rewrite the
52. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24. To
Hohfeld, rights only exist as legal rights insofar as they are enforceable by one
legal actor against one or more legal actors. In my terminology, Hohfeld clari-
fied that relationships that might at first blush appear to be objective are al-
ways intersubjective. Many legal writers assume that this insight was novel
with Hohfeld. Hohfeld's contribution was to emphasize and clarify the inter-
subjective aspects of law through the use of careful vocabulary. See generally
Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975 (analyzing Hohfeld's place within
specific jurisprudence tradition).
53. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
54. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
55. Hohfeld's non sequitur seems to spring in large part from his miscon-
ception that the jurisprudential concept of the res must refer to a tangible phys-
ical thing. Hohfeld asserted that intangible objects cannot be objects of
property. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 75,
78,85. Some modem commentators accept Hohfeld's misconception. Grey, Dis-
integration of Property, supra note 25, at 70; Vandevelde, The New Property,
supra note 25, at 332, 360. But see Alan Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, 4
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traditional dichotomy of in personam versus in rem rights as
rights of a legal person against a specific person (or identifiable
group of persons) versus rights of a legal person against the
world, respectively. 56 Almost seventy-five years later, his pro-
posed terminology distinguishing in personam and in rem rights
remains unused not only by practitioners, but even by legal aca-
demics.57 This is stark testimony that Hohfeld's scheme has
proved to be unworkable, not only in theory, but even in prac-
tice. His unhappy vocabulary lumps property together with
tort 58 and, therefore, fails to provide a tool for analyzing distinc-
CANADIA J.L. & JURis. 3, 36 n.82 (1991) [hereinafter Brudner, The Unity of
Property Law] (calling Hobfeld's view "influential (but erroneous)").
56. Hohfeld noted:
Any person... is likely, first, to translate right in personam as a right
against a person; and then he is almost sure to interpret right in rem,
naturally and symmetrically as he thinks, as a right against a
thing.... Such a notion of rights in rem is, as already intimated, crude
and fallacious; and it can but serve as a stumbling-block to clear think-
ing and exact expression.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 74-75.
In contradistinction to Hobfeld, who argued that both in personam and in
rem rights are in fact really in personam, Hegel argued that the common de-
nominator between in rem and in personam rights was that they were both, in
fact, in rem:
Here this much at least is clear: it is personality alone which can con-
fer a right to things and thereforejus adpersonam in its essence isjus
ad rem, rem being taken here in its general sense as anything external
to my freedom, including even my body and my life.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 39.
By this Hegel meant that both in rem and in personam rights are enforcea-
ble against persons, but only with respect to something external to personality.
All relationships must be mediated if they are to further and maintain the sepa-
rate personhood of both parties. In an unmediated relationship, one of the par-
ties is subjugated and subsumed into the other. A claim with respect to
another's personhood would not be a legal right, but a legal wrong-slavery.
57. Hohfeld proposed the terms "paucital" and "multital" rights as alterna-
tives to the traditional distinction between in personam and in rem rights, re-
spectively. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 72.
These terms are so obscure that I have been unable to find them in any diction-
ary, including The Oxford (English) Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary.
THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (James A.H. Murray et al. eds., 1933); A Sup-
PLE ENT To THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (R.W. Burchfield ed., 1976);
BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
58. Among the in rem rights that Hohfeld itemizes are:
1. Multital rights, or claims, relating to a definite tangible object: e.g.,
a landowner's right that any ordinary person shall not enter on his
land, or a chattel owner's right that any ordinary person shall not
physically harm the object involved,-be it horse, watch, book, etc. 2.
Multital rights (or claims) relating neither to a definite tangible object
nor to (tangible) person, e.g., a patentee's right, or claim, that any ordi-
nary person shall not manufacture articles covered by the patent; 3.
Multital rights, or claims, relating to the holder's own person, e.g., his
[Vol. 79:55
RADIN'S PROPERTY THEORY
tions traditionally recognized in our legal practice and economic
system.5 9
The distinction between Hohfeld and Radin can perhaps be
most simply demonstrated by comparing their respective uses of
the word "property." They each concentrate on only one of the
two meanings given to the word "property" by contemporary
American usage.60 Hohfeld speaks of property in the sense of
legal rights. 61 Under Hohfeld's theory, I have a property right to
exclude most uninvited persons from my apartment. Radin uses
the word property in the sense of the thing owned.62 Under Ra-
din's theory, my apartment is my property.
right that an ordinary person shall not strike him, or that any ordinary
person shall not restrain his physical liberty, i.e., "falsely imprison"
him; 4. Multital rights residing in a given person and relating to an-
other person, e.g., the right of a father that his daughter shall not be
seduced, or the right of a husband that harm shall not be inflicted on
his wife so as to deprive him of her company and assistance; 5. Mul-
tital rights, or claims, not relating directly to either a (tangible) person
or a tangible object, e.g., a person's right that another shall not publish
a libel of him, or a person's right that another shall not publish his
picture,-the so-called "right of privacy" existing in some states, but
not in all.
HoHFELD, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 85.
Note that Hohfeld includes the rights of men over female sexuality-specif-
ically, the rights of a father in his daughter's chastity and the rights of a hus-
band in his wife's consortium-within the types of rights that are
indistinguishable from property. This resonates with the psychoanalytic identi-
fication of the subject as masculine and the object as feminine as well as the
structuralist anthropological theory of woman as the primal commodity.
59. See Vandevelde, The New Property, supra note 25, at 362 (noting that
Hohfeld's concept of property includes "virtually all valuable interests" and "can
include all legal relations" so that it loses "its meaning as a category of law").
Vandevelde does not recognize this expansive concept of property rights as a
weakness of Hohfeld's analysis, but rather believes it shows that property can
have no meaning as a category of legal analysis. Id.
60. The two meanings are the legal rights associated with ownership and
the object or res to which those rights relate. Originally, "property" was a legal
right with respect to a res, which could be tangible and intangible. See WLUAm
BLAcESToNE, ComNrENTAms ON THE CoMmoN LAw (1979) [hereinafter BLAcK-
sToNE, Co _NTARIEs] (using word "property" to define legal rights of owner-
ship). Later, "property" became associated with the underlying object owned.
The change in the meaning of the word property arguably reflects historical
changes in both politics and the economy. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Fu-
ture of the Concept of Property as Predicted from its Past, in NoMos XXII, supra
note 25, at 28, 31-32 (describing evolution of multiple rights in property in feu-
dal era to consolidation of rights in property in capitalist era).
61. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 65-
115. Thomas Grey identified the Hohfeldian definition as that generally ac-
cepted today by lawyers, economists, and other "specialists." Grey, Disintegra-
tion of Property, supra note 25, at 69.
62. For example, Radin observes:
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Hohfeld and Radin both miss the point that lawyers and lay
people vacillate between the two definitions out of an intuition
that the duality and ambiguity of the definition of property co-
gently expresses the dual aspect that distinguishes property re-
lations from other legal relations. Property is, of course,
intersubjective-it is a form of legal relationships among legal
persons. Property, however, is also objective. To constitute
property, the legal relationships must also concern some res, an
object recognized as being other than or separate from the per-
sons. Accordingly, I have a property right to exclude others from
my apartment, which is my property.
' To be more specific, as Hohfeld's second project concerned
the separate identification and explication of each possible type
of legal right and obligation in the abstract, it is no surprise that
he concentrated on the rights and liabilities that comprise prop-
erty as a legal conception. Like a chemist, he tried to develop a
sort of periodic table of legal elements as a tool for analyzing
more complex molecular legal relationships, such as property.
Radin's analysis, in contradistinction, does not start with
consideration of abstract legal rights per se. She concentrates
on what it means to be a full individual located within a specific
community. Reacting against the Hohfeldian tradition, she fo-
cuses on the relationship between the person and the physical
world, which includes things, as well as persons. She states, "In
order to be differentiated human persons, unique individuals,
we must have relationships with the social and natural world."63
The ordinary connotations of property as external objects reflect our
perception of the world in terms of certain aggregations of stimuli. To
carve out of all personhood rights a subcategory of personal property
suggests that to say that property is a property of persons may be more
than just word play. The attachment to "things" may be different from
other necessities of personhood, and it may be worth noticing the dif-
ference sometimes, even though, by itself, it would not determine ques-
tions of just distribution.
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 990.
Grey, writing before Radin promulgated her theory of property for per-
sonhood, identified this as the naive lay persons' definition. Grey, Disintegra-
tion of Property, supra note 25, at 69. Ackerman ascribes a view similar to what
Grey calls the ordinary lay approach to a creature called the "Ordinary Ob-
server." See BRUCE AcKERmAN, PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1977). Ackerman argues that many legal academics find U.S. Supreme Court
takings cases to be inconsistent because academics are looking for strictly logi-
cal, abstract, and consistent rules, whereas the court has generally adopted the
more flexible, practical, contextual, and fact-intensive "Ordinary Observer" ap-
proach. Id. at 113-56.
63. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1904; see also Radin,
Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 957 ("The premise underlying the
[Vol. 79:55
RADIN'S PROPERTY THEORY
She also states, "One's surroundings-both people and things-
can become part of who one is, of the self."6 Radin, then, ana-
lyzes legal relations with respect to this broader political and
philosophical project.65 To understand Radin's approach, let us
look more closely at the history of her research project.
B. PERSONAL PROPERTY AS THE ACTUAL OR FIGURATIVE
FEMAE BODY
1. Radin's Theory of Property for Personhood
Radin begins her project by asking, what would a complete
person in society look like? What are the minimum material cir-
cumstances necessary to enable one to become a complete per-
son?66 Radin states that human beings are, first, embodied: we
relate to each other through our bodies. Consequently, it seems
necessary to make some form of identification of the person with
her body and to compare the relationship of the individual to her
body and the relationship of the individual to other physical
things.67 According to Radin, "If it makes sense to say that one
owns one's body, then, on the embodiment theory of personhood,
personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development-to be aper-
son-an individual needs some control over resources in the external environ-
ment. The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights.").
64. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1906.
65. Radin states:
It intuitively appears that there is such a thing as property for
personhood because people become bound up with "things." But this
intuitive view does not compel the conclusion that property for per-
sonhood deserves moral recognition or legal protection, because argua-
bly there is bad as well as good in being bound up with external
objects. If there is a traditional understanding that a well-developed
person must invest herself to some extent in external objects, there is
no less a traditional understanding that one should not invest oneself
in the wrong way or to too great an extent in external objects. Property
is damnation as well as salvation, object-fetishism as well as moral
groundwork.
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 961.
66. For example, Radin begins one of her articles by stating:
But if property for personhood cannot be viewed as other than arbi-
trary and subjective ... to argue for their recognition by the legal sys-
tem might collapse to a simple utilitarian preference summing. To
avoid this collapse requires objective criteria differentiating good from
bad identification with objects in order to identify a realm of personal
property deserving recognition. The necessary objective criteria might
be sought by appeal ... to the concept of person itself. Taking the
latter route, this Part approaches the problem of developing a standard






the body is quintessentially personal property because it is liter-
ally constitutive of one's personhood. If the body is property,
then objectively it is property for personhood."68 But, a simple
body/non-body dichotomy does not satisfy Radin.69 She contin-
ues a few sentences later: "Certain external things, for example,
the shirt off my back, may also be considered personal property
if they are closely enough connected with the body."70 According
to Radin, people identify with, and are identified by, physical
[Miarket rhetoric conceives of bodily integrity as a fungible object....
To speak of personal attributes as fungible objects-alienable
"goods"-is intuitively wrong. Thinking of rape in market rhetoric im-
plicitly conceives of as fungible something that we know to be personal,
in fact conceives of as fungible property something we know to be too
personal even to be personal property. Bodily integrity is an attribute
and not an object.
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible ob-
jects is threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person
that which is integral to the person .... For someone who conceives
bodily integrity as "detached," the same person will remain even if bod-
ily integrity is lost; but if bodily integrity cannot be detached, the per-
son cannot remain the same after loss.
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1880-81.
68. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 966.
69. Indeed, in one of Radin's early works she expressly includes in her cate-
gory of personal property colloquially recognized objects of property rights in-
cluding the home, cars owned for personal use, and other "things" that have
personal significance, such as wedding rings and furniture. Id. at 959-61. She
discusses the body in terms of her background assumptions as to what is neces-
sarily personal:
On the other hand, a few objects may be so close to the personal end of
the continuum that no compensation could be "just." That is, hypothet-
ically, if some object were so bound up with me that I would cease to be
"myself" if it were taken, then a government that must respect persons
ought not to take it. If my kidney may be called my property, it is not
property subject to condemnation for the general public welfare.
Id. at 1005; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's
distinction between non-body objects that are justifiably bound up with a per-
son and those that are unjustified fetishes).
It is only later that Radin expressly addresses the body-specifically the
female body-as an object of personal property. See, e.g., Radin, Market-Ina-
lienability, supra note 1, at 1921-36 (discussing alienability of female reproduc-
tive capacity). Even then there is a tension in Radin's analysis on this issue.
See supra note 67 (quoting Radin's comments on bodily integrity). At some mo-
ments, she recognizes the body as property, see Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, supra note 1, at 966, but at other moments she expresses the concern
that there is something anti-intuitive and alienating in this analysis. Radin,
Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1880-81. Rather than concluding from
this that her theory does not reflect traditional property categories at all but is
concerned with rights of bodily integrity, Radin suggests that some things (such
as the body) might be both property and inalienable. Specifically, the more an
object of property is located on the personal end of the spectrum of relation-
ships, the more market-inalienable it should be. Id. at 1903.
70. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 966.
[Vol. 79:55
RADIN'S PROPERTY THEORY
things other than their bodies.7 ' This argument has some ap-
peal. Human adults rarely come into contact with other humans
without symbolic, concealing, identifying, medical, useful, beau-
tifying, and other objects. Even in our most intimate moments
with our lovers, we are rarely ever truly naked. We wear rings
to symbolize our relationship. We don makeup, jewelry, per-
fiune, hair implants, lingerie, and other clothing to stimulate the
relationship. We use diaphragms, condoms, and other barriers
to protect ourselves from our relationship. The display of objects
such as clothing, jewelry, homes, and automobiles in part estab-
lishes economic and social status. One of the first things we ask
a new acquaintance is "Where do you live?" We feel a mixture of
pity, horror, and contempt for the homeless.
Radin concludes from this that we can relate to objects ex-
ternal to our bodies in a way that is not merely closely analo-
gous, but substantially identical, to the way we relate to our
bodies. She considers this to be intuitively self-evident.
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of them-
selves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because
they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal
entities in the world. They may be as different as people are different,
but some common examples might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an
heirloom, or a house.
7 2
71. For example, Radin notes:
A person cannot be fully a person without a sense of continuity of self
over time. To maintain that sense of continuity over time and to exer-
cise one's liberty or autonomy, one must have an ongoing relationship
with the external environment, consisting of both "things" and other
people. One perceives the ongoing relationship to the environment as
a set of individual relationships, corresponding to the way our percep-
tion separates the world into distinct "things." ... In order to lead a
normal life, there must be some continuity in relating to "things."
Id. at 1004. This argument assumes that all things one owns and perceives as
part of her continuing environment are to some degree personal.
72. Id. at 959. I do not agree with the intuitiveness of Radin's observa-
tions. Instead, I believe identification with the object of property is anti-intui-
tive-a combination of sentimentality and fetishism-as well as destructive to
human freedom. Although I cannot imagine my self as separate from my body,
I do not feel that my self-hood is reducible to my body. Rather than intuitive, I
believe my understanding of my self-hood results from my strict Roman Catho-
lic upbringing, which stressed the fundamental tenet of Catholicism that
humans are not souls trapped in bodies-rather, we are both spirit and flesh.
See generally CAROLINE W. ByNUM, FRAGMENTATION AND REDEMPTION: ESAYS
ON GENDER AND THE HUMAN BODY IN MEDIEVAL RELIGION (1991) (accounting for
importance of the flesh in traditional Catholicism).
Whatever my personal identification with my body, I do not feel that I iden-
tify with other objects that I own. I have some sentimental attachment to my
wedding ring in the sense that I usually wear a ring as a reminder of my hus-
band, not because I identify it with my self, but because I identify it with my
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Radin argues that object relations can serve the same posi-
tive function as body relations in enabling an individual to
achieve personhood, because we cannot draw a bright line be-
tween those objects that are our bodies and other objects.73 Ra-
din, consequently, claims that her theory is not based on a
liberal notion of negative freedom, which posits "an absolute
conception of property as sacred to personal autonomy,"7 4 but
that it reflects "an affirmative notion of an individual being
bound up with an external 'thing.'" 75
Radin does not believe that this intuition leads to the con-
clusion that all object relations are the same or good. She ar-
gues that we, as a society, also share the intuition that some
relations with some objects are inappropriate and fetishistic. 76
We need, therefore, to distinguish between the objects of prop-
erty that "become justifiably bound up with the person"77 from
those that do not. Radin defines that class of objects bound up
with the personhood of their owners as "personal property."78
husband. Wearing a wedding ring only relates to my self because, in American
society, a gold ring worn on the third finger of a woman's left hand is a symbol
of her status as a married woman. If I consider this status to be part of my
personhood, wearing a ring may be important to my sense of self-but I do not
see how or why I would identify any particular ring with my personhood.
73. Radin notes that although "the boundary between person and thing
cannot be a bright line, still the idea of property seems to require some percepti-
ble boundary." Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 966.
74. Id. at 957-58.
75. Id. at 960.
76. Id. at 968-70.
77. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1687; see also Radin, Property
and Personhood, supra note 1, at 961 (discussing distinction between personal
property and "object-fetishism"). The mere fact of being bound up is not suffi-
cient to constitute an object as personal property. Radin's definition of personal
property can differ between different subjects, but it is not purely subjective.
Id. at 960. No one is more bound up with an object than a fetishist is with his
fetish. Nevertheless, Radin deems this relationship to be unjustified and de-
structive of personhood. Id. at 961.
78. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 959-60. I reluctantly
adopt Radin's terminology for the purposes of this Article. The terms "personal"
and "fungible" property already have very well recognized meanings in private
law that differ significantly from Radin's usage. Generally, "personal" property
refers to objects that are not "real" property, such as chattels and intangibles.
BLAcK's LAw DICTioNARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990). The terminology originally re-
flected the distinction between property disputes adjudicated in the king's
courts (real property) and those adjudicated in other courts (personal property).
See A.W. Brian Simpson, Introduction to 2 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIs, supra
note 60, at v (stating that the king's courts were primarily concerned with the
law of real property). "Fungible" property refers to objects that are practicably
indistinguishable from others. In conventional terminology the same item-
such as a grain of wheat-can be both personal and fungible. See BLAces LAw
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She describes property that people hold for purely instrumental
reasons as "fungible property."79 One way to distinguish be-
tween the two is by comparing
the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss.... [1f a wedding
ring is stolen from a jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the
jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the price
of a replacement will not restore the status quo-perhaps no amount of
money can do so.
8 0
Radin's theory, to date, has primarily concerned identifying
and distinguishing objects that are personal property from those
that are merely fungible property and explicating the protec-
tions that the law should accord her favored category of personal
property. She also claims that her categorization of objects is
an either/or dichotomy only as a theoretical matter. As an em-
pirical matter, she argues, her dichotomy becomes a continuum
locating the most personal objects at one end and the most fun-
gible objects at the other.81 She correspondingly argues that
there is no single class of rights with respect to objects that
should be privileged for constitutional takings analysis and
other public law purposes.8 2 Rather, we should accord different
legal treatment to different rights with respect to different
classes of objects.
Property and Personhood provides the earliest published ex-
plication of Radin's theory that proper development of per-
sonhood requires individuals to be bound up with external
things.83 In this article, she examines competing theories of the
person to determine which object relationships are proper and
DICTIONARY, supra, at 675 (describing fungibles as "[g]oods which are identical
with others of the same natures, such as grain and oil"). Indeed, under tradi-
tional equitable principles only personal property is fungible in the sense that
individual parcels of real estate are thought to be so unique as to justify specific
performance of real property contracts.
79. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 960. Radin recog-
nizes that her dichotomy has similarities with, but is not identical to, Marxs
dichotomy between objects held for use value and objects held for exchange
value. Id. at 982, 987-89.
80. Id. at 959. Radin further maintains that "[object-loss is more impor-
tant than wealth-loss because object-loss is specially related to personhood in a
way that wealth-loss is not." Id. at 1004. As discussed below, although Radin's
theory of property for personhood begins with Hegel's theory of property, this
statement is nonsensical within the Hegelian paradigm. This is because in He-
gelian vocabulary, "wealth" is every bit as much an "object" as physical things
are. See infra notes 307-309 and accompanying text (describing Hegelian
theory).
81. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 986-87.
82. Id. at 1002.
83. Id. at 957-62.
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which are improper or fetishistic.8 4 She then presents a "selec-
tive survey" of certain issues relating to her dichotomy: first, the
legal treatment of two examples of personal property (the home,
including residential tenancies, and the personal automobile);
second, the implication of her dichotomy for "takings" jurispru-
dence; and third, the resolution of conflicts between certain non-
property personhood rights (such as free speech) and rights in
fungible property (such as the right of shopping mall owners to
exclude others).8 5
In The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, Radin expands on her earlier propo-
sal that if the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution should be read to further the goal of personhood,
then we should interpret it to give greater protections to per-
sonal property than to fungible property.8 6 Once again, this re-
quires an analysis of how to determine into which category a
specific object falls. In Market-Inalienability, Radin's identifica-
tion of the body as the archetypical object deserving of protection
becomes more explicit. She argues that to further the flourish-
ing of personhood and prevent "universal commodification," s 7 we
need to recognize that the more personal an object of property,
the more market-inalienable it must be. That is, if certain ob-
jects, such as one's sexual capacity, comprise necessary constitu-
ents of a person's selfhood, then we as a society should prevent
the destruction of personality through the limitation on the mar-
ket alienability of these necessarily constituting objects. This
requires not merely the development of a theoretical personal/
fingible property spectrum, but also requires a pragmatic meth-
odology to locate specific categories of objects on this spectrum.88
84. Id. at 962-86. Radin does not suggest that all close object relations to
fungible property are fetishistic; rather, she presents fetishism as an extreme
example of object relations that society recognizes as not merely inappropriate,
but destructive of personhood. Id. at 970.
85. Id. at 991-1010.
86. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1687-92.
87. In full, Radin states: "I also suggest that to the extent we have already
accepted certain views of freedom, identity, and contextuality, we are commit-
ted to a view of personhood that rejects universal commodification." Radin,
Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1904.
88. For example, Radin recognizes that one's labor is personal and argues
that a radical laissez-faire approach to the labor market may not be appropri-
ate. See, e.g., id. at 1894 (critiquing Hegel's theory that wage labor is external
and therefore freely alienable). She does not, however, adopt a Marxian anti-
commodification approach that condemns all sales of labor. Id. at 1871-76,
1918-21. In comparison, the female body, as personal property, is perhaps even
more personal than our labor, and thus much greater restraints on alienation
[Vol. 79:55
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One can also now glimpse more clearly another related
identification, still only latent in Radin's work. That is, Radin's
inviolate object is epitomized in not just any body, but specifi-
cally in the female body. The two examples she discusses in de-
tail are prostitution (which overwhelmingly involves male johns
and female prostitutes) and surrogate motherhood.8 9 Personal
property is like chastity. The more body-like the object, the
more violative its invasion. I have suggested that Radin's theory
of personhood as identification with the female body as object is
reminiscent of Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, which states that
the Feminine is conceptualized as the object of desire and that
the masculine subject constitutes itself through the exchange
with other subjects of the object as the Feminine.90 If one views
personhood not from the psychoanalytically masculine position
of subjectivity, but from the psychoanalytically feminine posi-
tion of objectivity, then commodification (exchange) can seem
threatening. According to Radin, "Commodification stresses
separateness both between ourselves and our things and be-
tween ourselves and other people."91 Sale of the female body is
not a right, but an un-right, that should be a legal wrong.
In Market-Inalienability, Radin also argues for limitations
on the market-alienability of female sexual and reproductive ca-
pacity, but not paternalistically to protect individual women
from self-destruction though the alienation of their own individ-
ual personality. 92 The primary danger of female prostitution is
not that it degrades the individual "sex worker." Rather, com-
modifying feminine sexuality identifies all women as potential
whores, thereby encouraging the political and psychological ob-
jectification of women as a class.93
will be recognized in the cases of commercial sex and surrogate motherhood. Id.
at 1921-35.
89. Id. Radin discusses the sale of body parts in another article. Margaret
Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETm AND JUSTICE: NoMos
XXX 165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) [hereinafter Ra-
din, Justice and the Market Domain]. Although Radin calls this work a com-
panion piece to Market-Inalienability, it does not expressly discuss selling body
part in terms of property law, which, in my opinion, makes it a much stronger
article.
90. See supra text accompanying note 35 (noting similarity to Lacan's the-
ory of jouissance).
91. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1907.




2. Alternate Jurisprudence of Expanded Bodily Integrity
As I earlier noted,94 a better interpretation of Radin's the-
ory to date is that she may not, in fact, be developing a theory of
"property." Rather, her theory relates to an expanded notion of
bodily integrity.
The idea of property in one's body presents some interesting para-
doxes. In some cases, bodily parts can become fungible commodities
.... On the other hand, bodily parts may be too "personal" to be prop-
erty at all. We have an intuition that property necessarily refers to
something in the outside world, separate from oneself. Though the
general idea of property for personhood means that the boundary be-
tween person and thing cannot be a bright line, still the idea of prop-
erty seems to require some perceptible boundary, at least insofar as
property requires the notion of thing, and the notion of thing requires
separation from self. This intuition makes it seem appropriate to call
parts of the body property only after they have been removed from the
system.9
5
She also states that "the characteristic rhetoric of economic
analysis is morally wrong when it is put forward as the sole dis-
course of human life."96 This suggests that she is questioning
whether property analysis, the rhetoric of the market, appropri-
ately applies to all forms of object relations.
In other words, Radin comes close to saying that it may be
wholly inappropriate to analyze what she has heretofore called
"personal property" in terms of property law constructs. 97 This
leads to the curious situation whereby Radin argues that per-
sonal property should be given relatively greater protection
under the Constitution, not because it epitomizes the form of ob-
jects commonly known as "property," but because it is not appro-
priate to analyze our most intimate object relations in terms of
property rights. This substantially departs from the traditional
liberal position that we should prohibit the state from taking
private property, either because Man has a natural right to
property or because property rights serve as the barrier protect-
ing the autonomous (masculine) individual citizen from oppres-
94. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (introducing interpreta-
tion of Radin's property for personhood theory as theory of expanded bodily
integrity).
95. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 966.
96. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1851.
97. See generally Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, supra note 89 (de-
veloping theory that universal commodification is destructive to personhood,
making it unjust to discuss certain issues, such as surrogacy and baby selling,
in purely market terms).
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sion by the community.98 To Radin, the state should not be able
to take personal property, because it would violate the feminine
self. Moreover, she suggests that property remedies should only
protect personal property, and the owners of fungible property,
the most archetypical types of property objects, should be enti-
tled only to liability rules. 99
Consistent with my interpretation that her concerns really
relate to expanded bodily integrity, Radin writes much about
proper legal relations concerning our bodies and those objects
that are in some ways body-like (i.e., "personal property"). But,
to date, she has said relatively little about proper legal relations
concerning objects that are less body-like (i.e., "fungible prop-
erty"). She argues that where a conflict arises concerning the
respective claims to an object between a person who relates to
the object as fungible property, such as a landlord of a rental
apartment, and a person who relates to it as personal property,
such as the tenant who resides in the apartment, the law should
give greater solicitude to the latter.'00 She argues that it might
be just to place greater restrictions on property rights generally
held by the rich and powerful and increase property rights gen-
erally held by the poor and weak.10 ' She also compares improp-
erly strong relations to fingible property with "fetishism."
0 2
She does not, however, discuss which object relations to fungible
property should appropriately be given legal recognition. In-
deed, given that she defines "fungible property" as property held
primarily for instrumental purposes,' 0 3 and labels the exchange
of such property as "commodification,"10 4 it is hard to see what
affirmative relation Radin thinks one could have to one's fungi-
ble property, other than the non-relation of indifference.
98. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND LIMITS OF AMERICAN CON-
sTrTUTIONALISM: THE MADisONiAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 8-9 (1990)
[hereinafter NEDELSKY, PRIvATE PROPERTY].
99. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 988 (citing Guido Cal-
abresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972)).
100. Radin, Cross-Currents, supra note 1, at 1685-95.
101. Id. at 1693. In recognizing that power over property can result in
power over persons, Radin suggests that property rights should vary by the
identity of the owner. If the owner is rich and powerful, she suggests, a "repub-
lican" vision that allows restrictions of individual property rights for the com-
mon good may be appropriate, but a "liberal" vision that recognizes fuller
property rights makes sense if the owner is poor and weak. Id. at 1692-93.
102. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 968-70.
103. Id. at 960.
104. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1856.
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3. Pluralism, Pragmatism, and Contradiction
Radin calls herself a "pluralist."05 She claims to reject the
notion of universal commodification promoted by such "super-
Benthamites" as Richard Posner, who view all human relations
as market relations. 10 6 She also rejects the universal non-coin-
modification promoted by such radicals as Karl Marx, who be-
lieve that all market relations inevitably alienate personhood.107
She does not, however, suggest an affirmative role for the mar-
ket and the traditional property regime in the development of
personhood. Rather, she remains, at best, ambivalent about
markets. She sees "a normatively appropriate but limited realm
for commodification coexisting with one or more nonmarket
realms.... For a pluralist, the crucial question is how to con-
ceive of the permissible scope of the market."'08
Radin comes close to suggesting that in an ideal world, we
would reject markets and commodification entirely.109 She is
not, however, a utopian or an idealist, but characterizes herself
as a pragmatist, analyzing a real, not ideal, world. 110 In an im-
perfect world, markets and commodification need to be pre-
served as imperfect tools.
One ideal world would countenance no commodification; another
would insist that all harms to personhood are unjust; still another
would permit no relationships of oppression or disempowerment. But
we are situated in a nonideal world of ignorance, greed, and violence; of
poverty, racism, and sexism. In spite of our ideals, justice under no-
nideal circumstances, pragmatic justice, consists in choosing the best
alternative now available to us....
The possible avenues for justifying market-inalienability must be
reevaluated in light of our nonideal world.1 11
Radin argues that commercial prostitution can slide down
the slippery slope, whereby feminine sexuality, and, therefore,
female personhood and human relations, become commodified
105. Id. at 1857-59.
106. See, e.g., id. at 1857 n.38 (criticizing Posner's "tendency to universal
commodification"); see also id. at 1860-63 (discussing Posner).
107. Id. at 1857, 1870-74. Radin states, "Market-inalienability posits a
nonmarket realm that appropriately coexists with a market realm, and this im-
plicitly grants some legitimacy to market transactions, contrary to the non-com-
modifier's premise" Id. at 1875.
108. Id. at 1858.
109. Radin does pull back and suggest, however, that even in an ideal world
the commodification of some products in market relations would continue. Id.
at 1903.
110. Id. at 1856, 1883.
111. Id. at 1915.
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and women objectified."12 But, she also recognizes the "double-
bind" that prohibiting prostitution and criminalizing prostitutes
may rob poor women of their only opportunity to make money
and achieve even a minimal amount of power and per-
sonhood." 3 She concludes that, although it might be unjust to
discuss women's sexuality completely in terms of the market,
there may be a pragmatic argument for allowing some limited
commodification of sexual services, by decriminalizing prostitu-
tion, but prohibiting its commercial exploitation through pimp-
ing, recruitment, and advertisement. 1 4 Consequently, Radin's
theory fails to progress towards a complete law of property per
se, in the sense of legal relationships among persons concerning
external things. Instead, it offers an alternative to property for
a specific favored class of objects that become internalized to the
owner. This is the solution proposed by Hegel."15
According to Hegel, although all external things may ini-
tially be candidates for being objects of property, some objects
become so internalized to the owner as to become part of the
owner's personality."16 Consequently, Hegel would agree with
Radin that alienation of certain intimate objects would be wrong
as destructive of personality, but for a different reason. To
Hegel, the philosophical logic of property is the creation of sub-
jectivity."17 Insofar as Hegel argued that alienation of owned
objects is a logically necessary element of a property regime that
enables the construction of subjectivity, objects that cannot be
alienated without destroying subjectivity cannot correctly be an-
alyzed as objects of a property regime. This is why, for instance,
Hegel insists that despite thousands of years of jurisprudence to
the contrary, it is a serious category mistake to discuss certain
human relations that also involve objects, such as the sexual
union of marriage, in terms of contract and property.118
112. Id. at 1922-23.
113. Id. at 1915-17.
114. Id. at 1934-35.
115. See infra notes 333-349 and accompanying text (discussing Hegers the-
ory that minimum personality is inalienable).
116. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 52-53.
117. See infra notes 308-321 and accompanying text (explaining Hegel's the-
ory of how property creates subjectivity).
118. HEGEL, PmLosopHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 58 (arguing




C. RADIN'S PROPERTY RIGHTs
Implicit in Radin's use of the word "property" to describe the
objects of property is a decision not to specify the rights of prop-
erty. Indeed, she condemns the attempt to articulate a set of
rights as property as "naive conceptualism." 119 Specifically, she
criticizes the elaboration of what she calls the "liberal triad"
120
of property rights (i.e., possession, use, and alienation) as con-
servative, rule-like thinking.121
Unfortunately, for Radin, you can run, but you cannot hide,
from definitions. Express refusals to articulate definitions, and
condemnation of the definitions of others as essentialist, are
subterfuges. Her declaration that the definition of property can
only be developed in context through pragmatic jurisprudence
states, rather than avoids, this problem.
Radin claims to be engaging in a pragmatic analysis of prop-
erty in the context of our specific non-ideal society, rather than
positing an abstract, ideal theory of property. Consequently, she
may not merely choose to reject or accept alternate definitions
on a purely theoretical basis. Nor can she use the word "prop-
erty" as a label for her own private, idiosyncratic conception.
Rather, pragmatism calls on her to recognize that property is
not only a legal theory, but a legal practice and an economic in-
stitution in a specific society. Our society has certain shared un-
derstandings and traditions as to the meaning of property that a
jurisprudence needs to explicate. These shared understandings
may be contingent and fluid, vary in different contexts, and
evolve over time-they may even in some cases be self-contra-
dictory-but that does not mean they do not function. A defini-
tion need not be a rigid black-and-white rule, but can result from
an applied pragmatic methodology.
Moreover,, for Radin to speak of property, she could not
avoid adopting implicit definitions of property rights. Radin is
not only positing that certain object relationships are necessary
for personhood, but also that these relationships should be en-
couraged and protected through the law. This requires some un-
119. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1669. Radin particularly con-
demns Richard Epstein for assuming there is a "real Platonic form" of property.
Id. at 1670-71.
120. Id. at 1668-69.
121. Id. at 1681-82. Radin describes the attempt to give fixed meaning to
the word "property" as used in the Constitution as "semantic reductionism." Id.
at 1669-70. Radin discusses the three traditional elements of property only to
critique a mode of constitutional analysis that would protect all three rights in
all circumstances regardless of the type of object involved. Id. at 1689-92.
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derstanding as to what rights, duties, and other Hohfeldian
legal conceptions should be enforceable by the property owner
against other persons and the state to protect their relationship
with their objects. For example, Radin critiques the Supreme
Court's flirtation with a radical Hohfeldian disaggregated notion
of property that she calls "conceptual severance." 122 This sug-
gests that Radin implicitly accepts an alternate unitary notion
of property rights-that property implies a minimal package of
identifiable legal rights that cannot be disaggregated.12 3 Her
spectrum would give greater solicitude towards rights with re-
spect to personal property, held primarily for use, than to fungi-
ble property, defined as that which is held instrumentally. This
implies an unstated theory as to the extent of legal rights of use
and exchange. To analyze fully Radin's arguments, it is neces-
sary to make explicit these implicit definitions of property.
To be fair to Radin, her refusal to expressly articulate spe-
cific property rights may be understandable in its political con-
text. I have already mentioned how her discomfort with market
relations is partly a reaction against the radical utilitarian
branch of classical liberalism, which she associates with Richard
Posner.124 As I discuss more thoroughly below,125 she is also
reacting to a radically libertarian trend in contemporary consti-
tutional law, which she associates with Richard Epstein.126 In
122. Id. at 1667; see also infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Radin's critique of conceptual severance).
123. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (presenting implicit
rights in Radin's theory).
124. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting Radin's discomfort
with Posner's "tendency toward universal commodification").
125. See infra notes 169-176 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's cri-
tique of radical libertarian view of property rights under the Constitution).
126. Radin believes that Epstein picks the word "property" out of the Tak-
ings Clause of the Constitution and gives it an assumed, ahistorical, and acon-
textual "objective" meaning, rather than reading it in context to determine how
it could further the "framer's intent or [other] values." Radin, Cross Currents,
supra note 1, at 1669-70. Radin quotes Epstein as stating that "'stable and
unique meanings are possible in principle and usually obtainable in face " and
criticizes him for not admitting that "the word 'property' can change over time."
Id. at 1670 (quoting IxcHARD EPsTEiN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EmINTx~r Do mAN 24 (1985)). I believe that Radin's characterization
of Epstein's definition of property is incorrect on at least two grounds. First, I
do not read Epstein as either assuming or concluding that the meaning of the
legal term "property" could not change over time just like any other word.
Rather, I read Epstein as making an empirical claim that in fact the meaning of
the word "property" has remained remarkably stable over time. (A better cri-
tique might be that Epstein asserts, rather than provides any empirical evi-
dence for, his empirical claim.) Second, even if Epstein defines property in the
Takings Clause out of context (because his definition is empirically unjustified),
M-NNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:55
Radin's reading, Epstein progresses from the libertarian prem-
ise that humans have a natural right to property-assuming
that property rights include exclusive and specifically enforcea-
ble rights to possess, use, and alienate objects-to the non se-
quitur that any governmental action that results in anything
less than exclusive and unfettered rights of possession, use, and
alienation of all categories of objects by all owners is a prima
facie constitutional taking.127 Epstein misses, or at least de-em-
phasizes, that in our society, property rights have always been
located along a continuum. 128
Consequently, to avoid Epstein's error, Radin explicitly de-
nies that any specific set of rights should be afforded complete
constitutional protection against violation in all circum-
stances.129 She is wary, therefore, of defining any uncontextual-
ized right as property.
In contradistinction, I believe that it is not essentialism, but
merely an observation, to note that theorists traditionally have
used the phrase "private property rights" to identify legally rec-
ognized rights that are in some respect exclusive to an identifi-
able legal person or group, specifically enforceable against
others, and related to the possession, use, or alienation of the
object. 130 Such a broad definition provides a helpful starting
Radin is in no position to critique his definition. Indeed, Radin's methodology is
substantially the same as Epstein's. They both turn to political philosophy to
identify those rights that an ideal legitimate government should protect and
then argue that the Constitution should be read to protect them. That is, the
word "property" is used as an honorific for 'that which should be protected."
The two approaches differ in that Epstein tries to bolster his argument by con-
tending (or pretending) that the historical consensus of the definition of prop-
erty is equivalent to his philosophical definition of "that which should be
protected," while Radin seeks to develop a consensus definition for "that which
should be protected." In other words, her definition of property disregards both
the historical and contemporary consensus towards property's meaning. Conse-
quently, Epstein's approach to definition is arguably more contextual than
Radin's.
127. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1668-69.
128. At one extreme of this continuum stands ownership in the sense of the
"'highest right that a man hath or can have to any thing; which is in no way
depending upon any other mans courtesie.'" G.E. Aylmer, The Meaning and
Definition of "Property" in Seventeenth Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT
87, 89 (1980) (quoting JOHN COwELL, THE INTERPRETER (Cambridge, 1607)). Of
course, the decision to begin an analysis of property rights with a definition of
the 'highest" right an individual may have with respect to things implies that
the author believes other rights are "lower."
129. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1669.
130. To identify this "liberal trinity" of possession, enjoyment, and aliena-
tion as the minimal elements of property rights I must (like Hegel) use them in
the broadest and most abstract fashion. Other writers who claim to identify
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place for private law purposes. This broad definition recognizes
divisions, both horizontal and temporal, of ownership, as well as
limitations with respect to the rights of ownership. This defini-
tion also accords rights to traditional property claims that are
not so complete as to rise to the dignity of full ownership, such
as leaseholds and hypothecations. 131 Property rights may be ex-
clusive against the world generally, but are shared among co-
tenants, debtors, and secured parties and other property claim-
ants. Rights to possess may be subject to conditions precedent
or subsequent. For instance, in a hypothecation, the relative
rights of the debtor and secured party to possess collateral are
dependent on the debtor's performance of the secured obligation.
Rights to enjoy may be subject to various restrictions, such as
nuisance laws, easements, and waste. Rights to alienate may be
limited generally by rules governing markets and fraud, such as
bona fide purchaser and fraudulent conveyance rules. Equity
may step in to limit alienation of property in the case of uncon-
scionable contracts. The Constitution even authorizes statutory
destruction of property rights through bankruptcy legislation.
more numerous elements and therefore conclude that no specific combination of
rights is necessary to constitute property are writing at a more specific level
than I. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in
NoMos XXII, supra note 25, at 187, 190-91 (identifying thirteen elements of
property). All of these elements are really specific examples or conceptions of
the more general concepts of possession, enjoyment, and alienation. For exam-
ple, Becker identifies a property right to transmit or bequeath, id. at 191, but
this is merely a specific conception of the general concept of alienation. The
more general conception of alienation is appropriate for my philosophical and
jurisprudential purposes, but may not be appropriate for the analysis of specific
questions of positive law.
131. A hypothecation includes rights of possession, use, and alienation that
are exclusive and specifically enforceable even though they are conditional and
limited. Although the secured party immediately obtains a form of possession
(in the Hegelian sense of legal recognition of ownership) of the collateral, the
party only obtains the right to take physical control of or comes into sensuous
contact with tangible collateral upon the debtor's default. The secured party's
right of alienation is not merely conditioned on default, but is further limited in
that alienation (in the form of a foreclosure sale) is mandatory in most cases.
U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1994). Moreover, the secured party's right of alienation
must comply with legal requirements of notice and fairness. Id. § 9-504. The
right of use is even more restricted. The secured party's sensuous use of a phys-
ical item of collateral is conditioned on the legal restrictions of strict foreclo-
sure, which is considered a disfavored exception to the norm of alienation. Id.
§ 9-505. Use in the form of collection or of retention of the proceeds of aliena-
tion is limited to the amount of the secured debt and expenses. Id. §§ 9-502,
504(1). The exclusive and specifically enforceable aspects of the property rights
of a secured party are, of course, the raison d'etre of hypothecations because
they ensure that the secured party does not have to share its rights with other
creditors upon the insolvency of the debtor.
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Despite its flexibility, this broad definition of private prop-
erty rights does not give us much guidance for analyzing predict-
able property rights for constitutional purposes. For instance,
how do the various limitations of property rights fit into the
Fifth Amendment prohibitions against takings of property? On
the one hand, a natural law theory of property tends towards
Epsteinian absolutism, which would inhibit virtually all govern-
mental action. 132 If natural justice demands that property be
defined as the exclusive rights to possession, use, and alienation,
by what grounds can one justly limit them? On the other hand,
if property is merely a matter of positive law, does the Takings
Clause lose all meaning? If property rights are established and
limited by legislation, the government need never take property
because it can redefine it out of existence. 133 Consequently, Ra-
din, who rejects the absolutist notion of property for political or
philosophical reasons, is trying to develop a theory of property
law for takings purposes that is not dependent on positive law
but involves absolutist rights. 34
Let us now examine in more detail Radin's concept of the
rights of property. In Property and Personhood, Radin begins
her analysis of the proper conception of property by positing an
affirmative concept of liberty as "capturing the idea of the self
being intimately bound up with things in the external world."135
This concept of being "bound up" with a thing suggests, of
course, the idea of keeping it (i.e., possession) or consuming or
otherwise enjoying it (i.e., use). It does not suggest the idea of
getting rid of it (i.e., alienation). This implication, that the pre-
ferred property rights relate to sensuous possession and use,
and that the right of alienation be limited, is made more explicit
in her dichotomy between the preferred and the disparaged
forms of property. Radin identifies these forms of property as
"theoretical opposites-property that is bound up with a person
and property that is held purely instrumentally-personal prop-
erty and fingible property respectively."136
132. See infra notes 171-176 and accompanying text (describing libertarian
property theory).
133. See NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 98, at 105, 231 (discuss-
ing the view that government can legitimately arrange property rights).
134. Radin's theory of how courts and legislatures should identify and dis-
tinguish these rights is beyond the scope of this Article, but Steven Schnably
has analyzed Radin's work from this perspective. See Schnably, Property and
Pragmatism, supra note 6 (arguing that Radin's theory contains inherent con-
servative element).
135. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 960-61.
136. Id. at 960.
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In Market-Inalienability, Radin further continues to develop
her distinction between personal property and fungible prop-
erty. She argues, in effect, that the more an object is "personal,"
the less legal recognition should be accorded its exchange value.
That is, for those objects at the extreme, personal end of her per-
sonal/fungible property spectrum (i.e., body parts and female
sexuality), the right of alienation should not only not be specifi-
cally enforced, but the law should affirmatively prohibit market
alienation.137
This possession/enjoyment concept of property rights also
exists in the specific examples of personal property entitled to
particular solicitous attention, which Radin identifies in Prop-
erty and Personhood and Cross Currents. In fact, it is not clear
that Radin even identifies "possession" as one of her property
rights. Because her personal/fungible dichotomy flows from an
enjoyment/instrumental dichotomy, even the right of possession
loses its importance and becomes conflated with, or subsumed
into, the right of enjoyment. For example, in Cross Currents,
her discussion of whether we should recognize a constitutional
right against governmental interference with possession of per-
sonal or fungible property quickly devolves into a discussion of
use. Radin asks us to
[s]tart with physical occupation-possession or the fundamental right
to exclude others.... A normative inquiry would also be required: for
what types of property interests is it ethically appropriate to permit
and foster interconnection with persons? Use of property as one's resi-
137. As I have already suggested, Radin seems to recognize alienability as
inherent in the concept of property, especially in an imperfect world. She in-
tuits that the body and body-like objects should not be freely alienable and it is
wrong to analyze them in terms of property, which implies some degree of alien-
ability. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (noting Radin's reluc-
tance to label things that should not be alienated as "property").
Radin is generally untroubled by non-market alienation. For example, she
would probably agree that the continuation of society as well as human flour-
ishing require some alienation of feminine sexuality-such as in marital sexual
intercourse.
As I have already explained, Radin is also reluctantly willing to accept
some partial commodification of the female body as a second best solution in an
imperfect world. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text (discussing
commodification of female body as one means to support poor women).
Although commercial sex is degrading and destructive to feminine personhood
generally, criminalization of prostitution may further impoverish and degrade
specific women who have limited alternatives to a life on the street. Similarly,
Radin is concerned about the effect of total bans on commercial surrogacy and




dence is more closely connected to personhood than use of property as a
garbage dump for one's factory.1
38
In other words, to Radin, it would seem that possession per se is
not particularly worthy of protection, but only that possession
that is necessary for specific, favored uses.
Another specific, enhanced right that Radin would recognize
is a right of tenants to continue to occupy their primary resi-
dences upon the end of the lease term, limiting the right of com-
mercial landlords to evict tenants at the end of their terms.139
Radin makes the distinction that the apartment is personal to
the tenant, because the tenant's personhood is wrapped up in
her home. The same apartment is fungible to the landlord, be-
cause his relationship to it is purely financial.140 The implica-
tion is that the favored right in personal property, as epitomized
by the tenant and her apartment, is sensuous use as a primary
residence. Not only is the tenant not attempting to alienate the
apartment, Radin would limit the tenant's power to alienate it.
She suggests making all residential leases automatically renew-
able at the option of the lessee, thereby denying the right,
power, or privilege of a tenant to enter into a non-renewable
lease (which would almost certainly entail a lower rent).14'
But, the landlord's rignt in the apartment, which Radin
wants to limit, is also a form of "use"-the collection of its value.
Use as collection, though, is equivalent to alienation in that both
are forms of realization of exchange value. In other words, if the
apartment is fungible property to the landlord, the landlord
should be indifferent between collecting rentals on the apart-
ment or alienating the apartment for a purchase price equal to
his estimate of the present value of the income stream expected
to be generated by the apartment. Use as the realization of
value is presented as fundamentally different from, and inferior
to, use as sensuous consumption.
Radin's discussion of why the object-loss of personal prop-
erty is more significant than the object-loss of fungible property
is based upon her proposition that the loss one feels with respect
to the former is greater, because one feels that one has lost part
138. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1689.
139. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 992-96.
140. Radin notes, however, that some landlords have "personhood" interest
in their rental property, such as duplex owners who rent out one-half of the
building. Id. at 993.
141. Id. at 994.
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of oneself.142 But once again, the rights involved are quiet en-
joyment and the exclusive physical possession necessary for en-
joyment, but not alienation. Indeed, the very fact that one
would consider alienating property seemes to suggest to Radin
that one would not be injured in one's personhood if one were to
be denied possession or use. That is, if one holds goods for ex-
change value, rather than use value, damages should suffice.
Finally, Radin's argument that the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches should be extended to per-
sonal automobiles is, of course, based on the close identification
that Americans tend to have with their cars, as well as the right
to privacy.143 The specific rights protected, however, only in-
clude exclusive possession and quiet enjoyment and do not re-
late to alienation or other rights to earn financial gains through
the use or sale of the car.'
4
Locating the personal automobile on the personal end of the
personal/fungible property spectrum, along with the body and
the dwelling, raises disturbing questions as to how we should
identify the rights "appropriate" for different objects of property.
Radin has argued that alienation of the most personal of prop-
erty is alienation of the self.145 If the consumer's relationship
with her automobile is entitled to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, because the automobile is personal property, should the
142. The example Radin gives to illustrate this proposition is the loss of a
wedding ring. Id. at 1005-06. I find that Radin's account of why we feel bad
about losing a valued object is counter-intuitive. Within the last year I lost a
gem from my wedding band, making it unwearable, and while I felt somewhat
badly about the loss, in no way did I feel any loss of self. Rather, I merely lost a
simple means to make my relationship to my husband and my status as a mar-
ried woman visible to third parties.
143. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 996-1002. The dis-
cussion of the automobile exemplifies the problem of the "pragmatic" approach
to identifying personal property. As Schnably points out, Radin's "consensus"
approach in Property and Personhood risks degenerating into a conservative
preservation of the status quo. See generally Schnably, Property and Pragma-
tism, supra note 6. I am aware that people in most of this country identify with
their automobiles. Like most New Yorkers, however, I am delighted not to own
an automobile. To me, an automobile is the ultimate fungible good-something
to be rented on an as-needed basis. The American "love affair" with the private
car strikes me as fetishistic on the individual level, but also destructive on the
social level given the negative environmental effects of cars and the damage to
inner cities from the commuting culture.
144. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 100 n.159
(noting that many Americans use their cars "as repositories for personal
effects").
145. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's pro-
posal to make female sexual and reproductive capacity inalienable).
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personal automobile also be market-inalienable? Certainly, Ra-
din would not argue that human flourishing requires such iden-
tification with our cars that we should be limited in our ability to
sell them. Presumably, this identification would be precisely
what she calls "fetishism." But, does this suggest that we, in
fact, either do not, or should not, identify automobiles with our
personhood and that they are not personal property within Ra-
din's schema? Radin might respond that the automobile may be
personal for some purposes and fungible for others. But, once
again, the fact that for many purposes we consider the automo-
bile to be fingible suggests that, despite Radin's intuitions, we
do not confuse our cars with our personhood. 146
Perhaps, Radin would argue that because automobiles are
not the most personal form of personal property, they should
only be subject to some, but not all, forms of limitations on alien-
ability. For example, we probably want to recognize the right of
consumers freely to sell and trade in their own cars, but might
decide to limit their ability to transfer them through hypotheca-
tion. That is, we might wish to impose restrictions on the power
of a secured creditor to repossess an automobile from a default-
ing consumer. Indeed, our law imposes many limits on the abil-
ity of consumers to hypothecate their possessions. 147 I would
146. For comparison, let us go back to Radin's own favorite example of a
proper and healthy relationship with personal property-the bride who so iden-
tifies with her wedding ring that its loss would be a loss of self that could never
be replaced. See supra note 142 (describing wedding ring example). Fans of
J.R.R. Tolkien will no doubt recognize the similarity of this relationship to that
of Gollum and the Ring of Power. J.R.R. TOLIUE, THE HOBBIT, OR, THERE AND
BACK AGAIN (1938); J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF m RINGS (2d ed. 1965). Poor
Gollum so identified his selfhood with the Ring that he referred to both his self
and the Ring by the same name, "My Precious." The loss of the Ring was such a
loss of self that it drove Gollum to utter depravity, and eventually death.
For the few readers who somehow escaped adolescence without having read
or seen one of the animated versions of The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings,
Gollum was once a hobbit (or similar creature) named Smeagol. He found the
cursed mystical Ring and became so obsessed with it that he became a murder-
ous recluse who shrivelled to a miserable frog-like creature. When we first meet
Gollum in The Hobbit, he dementedly mumbles his thoughts out loud, address-
ing himself as "My Precious" and referring to the Ring as the "Birthday Pres-
ent." By the end of The Lord of the Rings, however, his identification with the
Ring has become so complete that he now addresses his mumblings inter-
changeably to himself and the Ring which he now also calls "Precious." In the
final scene, Gollum regains the ring which he had temporarily lost and plunges
to his death in the fires of Mount Doom shrieking in ecstasy "Precious, Precious,
Precious!... My Precious, 0 my Precious." J.R.R. TOLKmN, THE LORD OF mu
RINGS, VOL. 3: THE RETuRN OF THE KING 224 (2d ed. 1965).
147. For example, the Bankruptcy Code makes most non-purchase money
security interests in personal and household goods unenforceable in bank-
[Vol. 79:55
RADIN'S PROPERTY THEORY
argue, yet again, that this distinction cannot be grounded in Ra-
din's definition of personal property as being necessarily bound
up with personhood. The right of consumers to replace their
cars reflects the fact that consumers can, do, and should distin-
guish their cars from their personhood. Rather, we restrict cred-
itors out of the same paternalistic reasons that we protect
consumers from themselves in a variety of financial
transactions. 14
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
1. Human Flourishing and the Takings Clause
Why does Radin choose to label to her theory an analysis of
"property"? One answer may be political pragmatism given the
text of the U.S. Constitution.
Although Radin couches her specific goal as developing a ju-
risprudence of property, her more general goal is to develop a
jurisprudence that furthers "human flourishing."149 She de-
scribes this as a notion of personhood in community that reflects
an affirmative concept of freedom that may include, or may go
ruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988). The Federal Trade Commission's
("FTC's") Credit Practices Rules makes non-purchase money security interests
in household goods unlawful as an unfair trade practice. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2
(1994). Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code limits the enforceability of
after-acquired property clauses in security agreements covering consumer
goods and imposes somewhat greater protections of the debtor in the foreclo-
sure of security interests in consumer goods than it does in the case of other
forms of collateral. U.C.C. §§ 9-204(2), 504(2) (1994). Personal automobiles
would not fall within the protected class of collateral under the Bankruptcy
Code or the FTC rule, although they can constitute consumer goods under Arti-
cle 9. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2.
148. For example, the FTC attempts to limit people's ability to alienate their
money by signing promissory notes in consumer sales transactions. FTC Rule
433, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1994). Certainly, we do not do this to foster an intimate
relationship between a fool and her money. Instead, the case law under Bank-
ruptcy Code § 522(f)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988), suggests that Congress
made most non-purchase money hypothecations of household goods unenforce-
able because used household goods typically have substantial use value to the
consumer but low resale value (i.e., exchange value) to the creditor. See David
G. Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property: Their Fate in Bankruptcy, 2
J. BANEm L. & PRAc. 247, 255 (1993). Consequently, creditors take such secur-
ity interests not to obtain sufficient collateral to insure the payment of their
loans, but to obtain hostage power over the debtor. Id. Presumably,
automobiles are not exempt goods like household goods because used cars re-
tain greater exchange value than used household goods.
149. See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1851 ("Instead
of using the categories of economics or those of traditional liberalism, I think
that we should evaluate inalienabilities in connection with our best current un-
derstanding of the concept of human flourishing.").
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beyond, the concept of negative liberties traditionally recognized
by liberal political theories.' 50 If human flourishing should be
the goal of law and political societyi as Radin suggests, it should
ideally also be reflected in, and protected by, the Constitution.151
Insofar as Radin's theory of personal property is a theory of
expanded bodily integrity, this presents a practical problem.
Some notion of bodily integrity might be implicit in certain ex-
press rights in the Constitution. Take, for instance, the rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and cruel and unusual
punishment. One might also glimpse concerns relating to bodily
integrity in the penumbral privacy rights recognized during the
Warren Court era. The Supreme Court, however, has never rec-
ognized a general constitutional right to bodily integrity. 15 2
Given the Court's current conservative majority, with its
concern for originalism and textualism, the Court would be un-
likely to adopt Radin's expansive interpretative theory of ex-
panded bodily integrity in the near future.153 Consequently, for
her theory to have much practical, as opposed to theoretical, ef-
150. Radin states:
The relationship between personhood and context requires the pursuit
of human flourishing to include commitments to create and maintain
particular contexts of individual relationships both with things and
with other people. Recognition of the need for such commitments turns
away from traditional negative liberty toward a more positive view of
freedom, in which the self-development of the individual is linked to
proper social development.
Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1688.
151. Radin comments:
It is time to offer a few thoughts on the ultimate large question: how
should we think about what aspects of property are protected by the
Constitution?... To this pragmatic ethical question the Court should
add another: What conception of human flourishing-of personhood in
the context of community-are we fostering by sustaining or disallow-
ing this legislation?
Id. at 1687.
152. Radin takes issue with the Supreme Court's failure to recognize such a
right, noting:
A constitution is only a constitution if we find "in" it our best concep-
tion of human flourishing in the context of political order, that is, it can
be appropriately constitutive of us as polity only if it embodies our com-
mitments to notions of personhood and community. This is a view of
constitutional interpretation that treats our Constitution as a "norma-
tive hermeneutic object."
Id. at 1688.
153. That President Clinton might have the opportunity to appoint a
number of more liberal justices during his term does not significantly affect this
possibility. Even a "best case" scenario for progressives would not give the
Court a new liberal majority for many years. Even then, I doubt a liberal Court
would move quickly to expand penumbral rights.
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fect, Radin the political pragmatist needs to locate her theory
somewhere within the text of the Constitution.154 In effect, Ra-
din's solution is equivalent to treating the word "property" used
in the Takings Clause as a term of art or honorific for those ob-
ject relations we wish specially to protect. She argues that we
should not try to identify what we mean by property and then
accord it constitutional protection.155 Rather, we should identify
what we to want to protect, and then give this interest the hon-
orific "property."156 This methodology, however, does not neces-
sarily give us much guidance for the analysis of "property" in
other contexts, and is contrary to traditional liberal political phi-
losophy and jurisprudence.
Under traditional liberal political philosophy, property is
the boundary that protects the freedom of the individual from
the oppression of the state.15 7 As Jennifer Nedelsky has so
clearly explicated in Private Property and the Limits of Ameri-
can Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its
Legacy, this notion was fundamental to the thinking of the Fed-
eralists.' 58 This "freedom of property" was, of course, embodied
154. Radin argues that her expansive interpretation is acceptable even
within traditional constitutional interpretations:
Still, why should-or at least can-we find this vision "in7 the Consti-
tution without amending it? The answer here must be that on these
particular issues our Constitution is sufficiently open-ended. The text
we have commits us to protection of property, but not to the classical
liberal conception of property. Property is a contested concept, and so
is justice-as in the "just" compensation required for legitimate exer-
cise of eminent domain. In arguing for my interpretations of those con-
cepts as being the best available to us, I think I am squarely within our
tradition of constitutional argument.
Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1688.
155. Id. at 1668, 1690-91.
156. Id. at 1688-89.
157. There are many variations on this idea. Locke, of course, developed a
labor theory of property. Individuals entered into the social contract to form
the state largely to protect their natural rights to property. See Michel Rosen-
feld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classic Contract Law and So-
cial Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. Ray. 769, 853-59 (1985) [hereinafter
Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice] (describing Locke's property theory). The pro-
tection of property is, therefore, simultaneously the definition of liberty and the
purpose of the state. Hobbes, on the other hand, did not posit that the right to
property preceded the state. Rather, property is the creature of the social con-
tract designed to protect each individual's liberty rights. See id. (describing
Hobbes's property theory).
158. In describing the role of the government regarding property rights,
Nedelsky observed:
The idea of boundaries and of a sharp distinction between law and poli-
tics has been central to the American conception of limited govern-
ment. Property was for 150 years the quintessential instance of rights
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in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If the right to
expanded bodily integrity could be fit into the definition of the
word "property," then government violations of expanded bodily
integrity would be unconstitutional takings.' 5 9
I do not mean to accuse Radin of cynical opportunism.
First, expanded bodily integrity is my term. Second, the class of
objects which she defines as "personal property" include not
merely the body, but many external objects of the type colloqui-
ally considered property, including dwellings, automobiles, and
wedding rings.160 Third, many schools of political philosophy,
including liberalism and Hegelianism, recognize that each indi-
vidual's right in her body is a species of property, even if they
conclude that property concepts alone are inadequate to account
for bodily experience.' 6 ' It would thus not be bizarre to include
Radin's notion of personal property within the rights protected
by the Takings Clause
One must return to Radin's political philosophical theory.
As I have just explained, she believes the purpose of the state
should be the furthering of human flourishing, and, therefore,
the constitution of a state should be interpreted in light of this
goal. If the legal category of "property rights" can be defined as
the legal relationship of a person with respect to specific objects
enforceable against other persons generally, then expanded bod-
ily integrity can be considered a sub-species of property. Ex-
panded bodily integrity is necessary for human flourishing.
Consequently, Radin would argue that the Takings Clause
should be read to protect expanded bodily integrity from
invasion.
as boundaries. It has been the symbol and source of a protected sphere
into which the state cannot enter. Property has also carried with it the
paradox of self-limiting government: it is the limit to the state; it is
also the creature of the state. In property, the state sets its own limits.
NEDELSKY, PRrVATE PROPERTY, supra note 98, at 8.
159. The Takings Clause is arguably a potentially fruitful place to locate a
new right of expanded bodily integrity for practical, political reasons. The pro-
tection of property has appeal to conservatives of both the strict constructionist
school and the more activist utilitarian school. The Takings Clause is also fre-
quently litigated and takings jurisprudence is quite confused. The time may
thus be ripe to propose a new systematic analysis of the takings jurisprudence.
160. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 993-1006.
161. See supra notes 333-362 and accompanying text (discussing Hegel's
theory that the alienability of property must logically be limited at the level of
abstract right to protect minimal personality).
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2. Political Expediency, the Bundle of Sticks, and Progressive
Regulation
Once Radin decided to include a notion of expanded bodily
integrity within her constitutional concept of property, it seemed
to become necessary to limit the protection of fungible property
under the Constitution. I believe two reasons explain her deci-
sion to do this. First, as I discuss later in this Article, she does
this because she fundamentally misunderstands Hegel's theory
of the role that the exchange of property serves in creating sub-
jectivity as intersubjectivity.162 Second, as I discuss in this sec-
tion, I believe she limits protection of fungible property out of
political expediency. This may in part explain Radin's decision
to emphasize the objective and the sensuous possession and en-
joyment of physical property. As we have seen, Radin believes
that "progressive" government regulation should foster human
flourishing. 163 An expansive view of constitutionally-protected
fungible property rights would limit the scope of government
regulation and therefore could actually impede human
flourishing.
As I have discussed, since Hohfeld, there has been a ten-
dency to emphasize the intersubjective aspect of property as a
legal relationship.' 64 Hohfeld's concept of non-objective (or in-
tersubjective) property and his great taxonomy of jural corre-
lates created a vocabulary that influenced the so-called
disaggregation of property into a "bundle of sticks."165 Thomas
Grey has argued that the legal realists picked up the non-objec-
tive concept and the "bundle of sticks" imagery for political rea-
sons. According to Grey, the realists tended to be progressives
at a time when a conservative Supreme Court was using prop-
erty and contract concepts to invalidate New Deal regulation.166
Weakening property, therefore, seemed to further the progres-
sive agenda. 167 Grey, as a progressive, accepts what he sees as
the realists' conclusion that the disaggregation and de-objectifi-
162. See infra notes 228-329 and accompanying text (describing in detail
how Hegel's account of the person in community differs from Radin's
interpretation).
163. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1687-89.
164. See supra notes 23-24, 52-61 and accompanying text (stating that
Hohfeld's theory of property emphasizes rights to exchange rather than prop-
erty as object).
165. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Hohfeld's role in
creating "bundle of sticks" metaphor).




cation of property weakens property and predicted that property
would soon lose its traditional power to inspire us as the symbol
of freedom.' 68
Implicit in Radin's critique of recent takings jurisprudence
is the conclusion that Grey (and the realists) were wrong.
Rather than weakening property law as an anti-regulatory tool,
the "bundle of sticks" metaphor actually strengthened it. That
is, Hohfeld's anti-objective analysis of property denied the dis-
tinction between property and other areas of law. Grey suggests
that because property is now no longer unique, it may lose its
central role.' 69 If property' is like everything, then property is
nothing. 170 Progressive regulation cannot be a taking of prop-
erty, because there is nothing to take. Radin, in contradistinc-
tion to Grey, brilliantly recognizes that there is an alternative,
libertarian response to the collapse of property, contract, and
tort.
Libertarian jurisprudence holds that property is a funda-
mental natural right.' 7 ' If we cannot distinguish traditionally
recognized categories of property from other legal rights, to a lib-
ertarian this can only mean that we must extend constitutional
protection to these other rights as natural rights.
Radin's term for the libertarian constitutionalization of the
"bundle of sticks" metaphor is "conceptual severance," 7 2 which:
consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting
that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus,
this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole
bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the regu-
lation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands
in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.
173
168. Id. Grey, who published his essay in 1980, learned that making predic-
tions is a perilous game. After 12 years of Republican presidencies favoring
economic rights through deregulation and conservative judicial appointments,
property is alive and well. The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe also in
part testifies to the continuing inspirational power of the concept of private
property.
169. Id. at 81-82.
170. Vandevelde, The New Property, supra note 25, at 330.
171. MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFmmArivE ACTION: A PHLosoPmCAL AND CON-
sTrruTioNAL INQuIRY 52 (1991); Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice, supra note
157, at 787-90.
172. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1667. Radin associates concep-
tual severance with Richard Epstein. Id. Although Radin recognizes that Ep-
stein does not expressly call for conceptual severance, she suggests that
conceptual severance is consistent with the extreme Epsteinian-libertarian no-
tion of property rights. Id. at 1668-70.
173. Id. at 1676.
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Under this approach, any regulation that destroys or limits even
one "stick" in the bundle of property, such as a regulation that
interfered with the unfettered use or alienation of property,
could be found to be a taking. It should be fairly obvious that
such a broad application of this approach would be consistent
only with a radically libertarian ideology, because virtually all
regulation could come within its ambit. The bundle of sticks is
"an easy slippery slope."' 74 As I stated earlier, Radin is careful
to note that the Supreme Court to date has resisted wholesale
conceptual severance.17 5 She recognizes, however, signs of a
possible trend in this direction in the language of several opin-
ions, most notably those of Chief Justice Rehnquist.' 7 6
In other words, a complete disaggregation of property as a
simple negation is a mirror image of a unitary concept of prop-
erty. This is not merely a restatement of the Hegelian theory of
the identity of identity and difference. It is true in its practical
effect. Totally unified property and totally disaggregated prop-
erty both fill the legal universe with property concepts so that
simultaneously everything and nothing is property.
Consequently, although at first blush it seems like a logical,
practical, and political choice for Radin to react against
Hohfeldian, disaggregated, intersubjective concepts of property,
a further consideration of Radin's own analysis indicates that
she cannot do this by merely accepting its negation-the uni-
tary, objective concept of property. Rather, she needs a flexible
conception of property that mediates between the two extremes
and recognizes the intersubjective as well as the objective mo-
ments of property.
Ill. THE CRITIQUE OF RADIN'S PROPERTY ANALYSIS
One might be tempted to complain that I am criticizing Ra-
din for not having written the article I am interested in reading,
rather than reading what she has actually written. One should
not criticize Radin, this argument would go, for not yet having
explicated fully her theories of fungible property or of commu-
nity. Jurisprudential theories do not pop out of scholars' heads
fully grown like Athena. It is perfectly reasonable for her to
start with an analysis of personhood, and then proceed to an
analysis of community. Further, by criticizing Radin for label-
174. Id. at 1678.
175. See supra text accompanying note 122 (noting that Radin critiques the
Court for flirting with the notion of conceptual severance).
176. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1671-84.
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ling what I call a jurisprudence of expanded bodily integrity a
"theory of property," I may sound like I am merely quibbling
with Radin's terminology. I defend myself on the following
grounds.
A. Tm SiGNIFICANCE OF RHETORIC
Radin argues that careful terminology is essential to proper
analysis. 177 Indeed, one of her main arguments against the util-
itarian analysis of human relations as market relations is that
rhetoric has substantive effect.178 Although I agree with Radin's
critique of utilitarian analysis, the same critique dilutes her use
of rhetoric and category. In fact, Radin's own terminology re-
flects a fundamental problem with her categorization that utli-
mately defeats her position. That is, her very terminology
precludes a consideration of the role of fungible property in the
development of personality and community as well as an analy-
sis of the positive law of intangible property.
As I argued earlier, by labeling her alternate jurisprudence
of expanded bodily integrity an analysis of property, Radin has
all but given into, rather than successfully challenged, the
super-Benthamite claim that all human object relations are
property relations.' 7 9 This reduces her fundamental critique-
that there is something essentially different about bodily integ-
rity-to a relatively trivial debate over the definition and scope
of property rights. For example, because Radin has chosen to
analyze both bodily and commercial transactions in terms of
property, she tries to downplay the role of traditional property
rights in fungible property in the development of subjectivity.
This strategy, however, can backfire. The super-Benthamite can
agree with Radin's insistence that personal and fungible prop-
erty are located on the same property spectrum, argue that mar-
ket-alienability is not only necessary, but appropriate for
fungible property, and conclude that market-alienability is ap-
propriate for all species of property. Radin, therefore, turns her
back on her initial intuition that certain object relations are fun-
damentally different from commodity relations, and must in-
177. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1878.
178. Id. at 1877-87; see also Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, supra
note 89, at 167-68 (critiquing use of market rhetoric in the analysis of certain
intimate object relations such as sale of organs and body parts).
179. See supra text accompanying note 51 (arguing that Radin's theories are




stead make utilitarian sounding arguments justifying limited
exceptions to the market.
1. Community
Although Radin calls her theory "property for personhood"
and insists that she is locating persons within community, 180
she does not offer an account of property's role in community.
Whether or not she develops a convincing account of how one
takes on individuating characteristics through object relations,
she does not give an account of how individuals relate to other
individuals in the community through objects. That is, Radin's
theory risks being an account of property of pre-social individu-
als, and restating the traditional liberal theory of subjectivity as
atomistic individuality, the precise opposite of her goal. The
likely result of concentrating only on the individual at this ini-
tial stage is the dilemma of classical liberalism-the individual
is seen as authentic, but the community is now a problem that
needs to be explained. And yet, simultaneously, because Radin's
theory of the individual is not naturalistic, but is based on an
observation of individuals situated in a specific, concrete com-
munity, the theory can only be a tool for analyzing the positive
law of property within a specific community, and does not offer a
way of critiquing the community itself.'"'
More specifically, to date, Radin has developed a sensuous
notion of property that is limited in practical effect to the nega-
tive liberty of protecting consumption against violation and the
restrictions of powers over certain types of property, and that
evinces a solipsistic notion of subjectivity. She has not merely
de-emphasized, but she has disparaged, and in some instances
condemned, the intersubjective exchange of property.'8 2 Thus,
Radin leaves us with individuals who claim recognition through
their identification with property, but who do not yet speak to
each other or interact as members of a community.
In so doing, Radin fails to consider that market alienation
may encourage human flourishing in three related ways. First,
180. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing Radin's focus
on community).
181. This may be another way of restating Schnably's critique of the inher-
ent conservatism of Radin's theory. See generally Schnably, Property and Prag-
matism, supra note 6.
182. Although Radin does suggest that, even in an ideal world, markets
would not be abolished, her primary critique of universal non-commodification




market relations enable us to interrelate with other people and
thereby become persons. Second, commodification frees us from
over-dependence on any specific objects. Third, market relations
force us to become dependent on other persons. That is, the
market not only makes community possible, it makes it
necessary.
Let me explain. In Hegelian and Lacanian theory, it is pre-
cisely the exchange of properly externalized objects among per-
sons that leads to the creation of subjectivity. As market society
becomes more developed, it becomes more specialized. In the
words of Shlomo Avineri, "Man produces not the objects of his
own needs, but a general product which he can then exchange
for the concrete object or specific objects of his need." s83 We,
therefore, need to engage in transactions with others even to ob-
tain the bare staples for survival. "The dialectics of civil soci-
ety," according to Avineri, "create a universal dependence of
man on man."
184
As I shall also expand upon shortly, as an empirical matter,
most of our relations with other members in our society are, in
fact, the object relations of commercial law-property and con-
tract. These are, of course, distant, formal, and abstract rela-
tionships that many of us (at least those of us who are not
utilitarians) intuitively believe are fundamentally different
from, and inferior to, the close, affective relationships we have
with friends and family members. Although Hegel insisted on
the importance of commodification and the necessity for the re-
gime of civil society (i.e., the market place), he was also quite
clear that a total market regime impoverished and demeaned
the underclasses, and that totally commodified labor alienated
workers.' 8 5 Civil society contains the contradiction that it is a
regime of complete interdependence of all of its members, but it
is characterized by the universal egoism, whereby each member
considers himself to be the atomistic individual of classical liber-
alism. Consequently, Hegel argued that it is logically necessary
183. AvnuNRi, MODERN STATE, supra note 15, at 91.
184. Id. at 146.
185. Even though Hegel does not present his analysis of poverty at length in
Philosophy of Right, Westphal believes that Hegel's analysis of poverty repre-
sents an important critique of the market and constitutes one of the contradic-
tions that will lead to the sublation of civil society by the state under Hegel's
theory. MEROLD WEsTPHAL, HEGEL, FREEDOM AND MODERNITY 34-35 (1992)
[hereinafter WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY]. As Avineri explains, Hegel
expounds on the idea of the degradation of the "rabble" more thoroughly in his
earlier writings, and only some dim echoes of it found their way into Philosophy
of Right. AvINERI, MODERN STATE, supra note 15, at 98.
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both to preserve, yet limit, commodification.' 8 6 Limitation is
achieved in the family, which is characterized by particular al-
truism, and the state, which is characterized by universal
altruism.'87
In other words, Radin may be correct to chastise Posner and
Epstein for analyzing intimate love relations of family and
friendship in terms of the market. But, Radin herself should be
chastised for criticizing all market relations for not being
intimate.
2. Practical Utility and Fungible Property
Finally, most mundanely, Radin's "property for personhood"
dichotomy does not provide a tool that is useful for analyzing
fungible property.18 8 Even if one accepts her self-characteriza-
tion that she is developing a theory of property per se, rather
than a theory of expanded bodily integrity, her theory is still in-
adequate to her purpose at this time. Radin claims not to be
engaged in the philosophical task of positing abstract human na-
ture. Rather, she claims to be a pragmatist analyzing concrete
individuals located within a specific society-post-industrial
America. This is a society built in large part around market re-
lations and hundreds of years of property practice. An analysis
of property that fails to provide tools for analyzing the market
and the role the market plays in developing the personality of
people in our society has limited utility. So far, Radin's analysis
comes close to a condemnation of the market generally-con-
modification is dangerous to personality-modified by a grudg-
ing realization that some market relations must be preserved as
a practical matter. In an imperfect world, total decommodifica-
tion may also be dangerous to personality because it might fur-
ther disempower the weak. This analysis can be powerful if it
justifies removing some human and object relations from the
market and from property analysis. By labelling as "property"
the objects that her theory instructs should be eliminated from
the legal realm of property relations, however, she not only ob-
186. See infra notes 323-328, 333-349 and accompanying text (explaining
necessity of and limitations on alienation in Hegel's theory of property).
187. AviNE i, MODERN STATE, supra note 15, at 134.
188. It is more useful to recognize that although intimate object relations
may include property aspects, and thereby be entitled to constitutional protec-
tions, they cannot be reduced to property relations. In this view, limitations on
market-alienability of body parts or female sexuality are not justified in terms
of the property aspects of these relations, but in terms of their non-property
aspects and a jurisprudence of expanded bodily integrity.
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scures the analysis, but she also leaves no tool for analysis of
those object relations (what she calls relations with fungible
property) that are appropriately left to the market and the tradi-
tional private law of property.
Moreover, Radin's use of the implicit bodily metaphor for
property and her disparagement of exchange forces her to con-
flate property objects with physical objects, and property rights
with sensuous possession and use. This makes it an inappropri-
ate starting place for analysis of some of the most economically
important types of property in contemporary society, such as in-
tellectual property and other incorporeals, which have no tangi-
ble existence. By justifying property solely in terms of its
constituting function for the natural individual, she is left with
no account of the way the largest aggregations of wealth are
amassed and held in our society-collectively, but not govern-
mentally, by private business organizations.
B. ALIENATION, ExCHANGE, AND CommuNiTY
1. Personhood Interests and Fungible Property Relations
Radin most thoroughly develops her sensuous possession
and enjoyment=good/alienation and commercial exploita-
tion=bad dichotomy in Market-Inalienability.5 9 Of course, her
paradigm for the most personal property, so personal that it is
not even clearly property, is the (feminine) body. Because the
relationship of object to person is one of identification, exchange
of the object is problematical. Consequently, Radin goes a step
further than she did in Property for Personhood, in which she
emphasized enhanced rights of use by one person in terms of
limiting rights of alienation by another.190 She now argues that
with the most personal forms of property, market-alienability is
not merely a lesser right, it might be a legal wrong, an un-right
to be legally restricted. 191 Although I sympathize with the par-
189. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1870-87, 1903-09.
190. See, e.g., Radin, Property for Personhood, supra note 1, at 992-96 (argu-
ig for limits on landlord's rights to alienate rental housing in favor of tenant's
rights).
191. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1921-36. By contrast to
market exchange, alienation in the form of gift may sometimes be appropriately
recognized as a legal right in that it gives literal meaning to the metaphor of
giving oneself to a loved one. Radin states, "To conceive of something personal
as fungible also assumes that persons cannot freely give of themselves to
others." Id. at 1907; see also Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, supra note
89, at 168-75 (discussing whether selling body parts will inhibit altruism and
whether the body should be preserved as completely unmonetized "gift object").
The metaphor of the "gift object" again implies the femininity of the person and
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ticular policies Radin recommends in her article, I am concerned
with the potential contradictions of her analysis.
I would venture that many people actually identify their
personhood partly in terms of economic behavior. Radin argues
that to most people, ideal work is to do what one "would do any-
way, without money, if somehow by other means our necessities
of life were taken care of."' 92 She consequently adopts a dichot-
omy, which she associates with Hannah Arendt, between labor
and satisfying work.' 93 I believe Radin's characterization is in-
correct as an empirical matter. Radin may be accurately
describing the ideal life of a very small group of professionals,
such as law professors, who get paid for their hobbies,' 9 ' but I do
not believe many people really think of work in terms of such
ideals. Indeed, I believe they would not define as work that
which they would do without pay. This does not mean that they
experience their jobs purely in terms of what Radin calls labor;
indeed, many people take great pride and satisfaction in their
work. Yet, they experience work as being fundamentally differ-
ent from their hobbies.
The very examples that Radin gives to illustrate her point
betray her. She refers to people taking satisfaction by working
as "[pilumbers, housecleaners, carpenters, financial advisers,
and clerks," as well as by fixing vacuum cleaners and selling
shoes.' 95 Radin suggests that these people can take pride in
"doing a good job for the sake of pride in one's work, and for the
sake of the user or recipient, and for the sake of one's community
as a whole," or that they may "genuinely care about the needs of
people they are selling to."196 This is both inconsistent with Ra-
din's earlier description of ideal work as paid hobby and, I be-
lieve, inconsistent with commercial experience. I certainly
would not flatter myself by suggesting that the woman I pay to
clean my apartment cares about me or my "needs" (even though
she has performed services for me for over ten years). Nor would
the body-like property involved in Radin's analysis. In the traditional language
of sexual relations, it is we women who give ourselves and men who take us.
192. Id. at 175.
193. Id. at 176.
194. Radin is an academic from an academic family. It is true that law
professors get paid for engaging in their hobby. Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter, law schools cannot fire those who are tenured absent heinous behavior or
economic extremis. As I was a commercial lawyer in New York City for twelve
years prior to entering academia, I think of my academic position as less of ajob
than a racket and am constantly mystified by how we get away with it.




I insult her by suggesting that she thinks that New York City is
better off because I have a clean apartment. Whether or not I
would continue to write law review articles if I were to win the
lottery tomorrow, it is gross elitism to suggest that my cleaning
woman would choose to continue to do my laundry if she had a
meaningful economic alternative. I am, however, willing to be-
lieve that she might take pride in a job well done. But, I would
guess that a substantial portion of this pride and satisfaction
arises precisely out of the commercial nature of the job. She is
working for pay as a responsible member of society to support
herself and her family, not merely acting out of her selfish
desires for pleasure and fulfillment.
Radin suggests that identification with exchange is im-
proper "fetishism"197 but she has not developed an argument as
to why. To begin, Radin expressly tries to avoid an essentialist
theory of human nature (such as Marxism) as a basis for her
personal/fungible distinction.'98 Rather, she purports to make a
situated "pragmatic" distinction in the context of a specific com-
munity.199 I believe that it is true as an empirical matter that
in our capitalist society, property-not merely in the sense of
our sensuous possession of homes, cars, and other consumer
goods, but also in the sense of the opportunity for the accumula-
tion of wealth-has tremendous inspirational value. In Radin's
more recent articles, she has tried to step away from a simple,
conservative, consensus theory of validity.200 I tend to agree
with Stephen Schnably's eloquent argument, however, that her
claims to have avoided this approach ring more than a little
hollow.2 0 ' Specifically, from her situated, pragmatist stand-
point, on what grounds could she proclaim one of the great moti-
vating myths of our society-the myth of private property-to
be improper fetishism? Despite her protests,2 0 2 Radin has not
197. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 968-70.
198. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1881 n.120, 1882
n.121.
199. Id. at 1904 n.208, 1915-21.
200. In an attempt to avoid both essentialism and solipsism, many modem
and post-modern theorists have proposed a theory of validity or objectivity
based on community. That is, "objective" truth is that which the relevant com-
munity agrees upon based on the application of a methodology adopted by the
community. The consensus theory that is probably best known in legal
academia is Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms. See generally
THoMAs S. KUHN, TE STRucTUm OF SCmENTFIc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1972).
201. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism, supra note 6, at 362-75.
202. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social
Theory: A Response, 45 STA. L. REv. 409 (1993) (responding to Schnably).
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yet resolved the dilemma that all anti-essentialists face: how to
develop a standard of validity that simultaneously avoids both
the Scylla of crushing conformity and oppression associated with
Community Objectivity (i.e., consensus) and the Charybdis of ar-
bitrary tyranny and injustice of Individualistic or Idiosyncratic
Subjectivity (i.e., solipsism)? 20 3
Moreover, as I have suggested, Radin's analysis implicitly
adopts the law and economics analysis of property relations for
fungible property, although she rejects law and economics as in-
appropriate for personal property.204 To avoid commodifying
personhood, we must limit the commodification of the most per-
sonal forms of personal property. Radin claims that she is not a
universal non-commodifier, but a pluralist who believes that a
market regime will continue to co-exist with a non-market
realm.20 5 She argues that a Posnerian theory of "universal"
commodification is wrong because it assumes that the subjective
value (in the sense of private or idiosyncratic to an individual
legal subject) and objective value (in the sense of intersubjectiv-
ity determined by a community) of all things, including personal
property, are the same.206 It is precisely because she believes
this assessment is fundamentally incorrect with respect to per-
sonal property that she concludes that discussing all object rela-
tions in terms of the market is not only misleading, but
immoral. 20 7 Radin' argument is that extreme forms of personal
property should not be subject to the market regime, because the
use (subjective) value of personal property is not the same as its
exchange (objective) value, but that it is appropriate to subject
fungible property to the market regime. The implicit corollary
to this argument is that use and exchange value converge as we
approach the fungible end of her property spectrum. This is re-
flected in her proposition that wealth loss (i.e., loss of fungible
property) can be compensated by paying damages equal to mar-
ket value, but that object loss (i.e., loss of personal property) can-
203. I present my taxonomy of the possible definitions of subjectivity and
objectivity in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAhI L. REv 1, 9-53
(1992).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51 (arguing that Radin "con-
cedes" that object relations are property relations, rather than refutes law and
economics approach).
205. Radin admits as much insofar as she "posits a nonmarket realm that
appropriately coexists with a market realm, and this implicitly grants some le-
gitimacy to market transactions." Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1,
at 1875.
206. Id. at 1860 n.44.
207. Id. at 1879-87.
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not be adequately compensated and must be prevented through
equitable remedies. 20
In the terms of the dichotomy developed by Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed, Radin expressly raises the possibility
that the most fungible forms of "property" would never be sub-
ject to a property regime that grants specific performance but
would merely be part of a liability regime.20 9 We are left with
the potential anomaly that the less an object relation is like
traditional property (i.e., the more intimate and body-like), the
more likely the object will be entitled to property law protection,
but the more property-like the relationship, the less property
law protection for the object.
This ignores the possibility that an individual property
holder, such as an investor, may subjectively value her fungible
property differently from the "objective" social valuation of the
market. Property rights may exist, in part, to protect these sub-
jective valuations. Indeed, the driving psychological motivation
behind investment is probably the investor's belief or hope that
her Individually Subjective estimate of the "true" value of the
investment product will prove to be more accurate than the
Community Objective estimate of the market-its price. The in-
vestor buys when the market's objective valuation is lower than
her subjective valuation in hopes that the market will revise its
objective valuation upwards to match her subjective valuation.
In other words, the investor bets that she can beat the market
by buying cheap and selling dear. Thus, even purely fungible
208. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 984-88.
209. Calabresi and Melamed define a property regime as one in which soci-
ety makes a collective decision as to who is to have control over certain entitle-
ments but not as to the value of the entitlements, whereas a liability regime is
one in which society also values the entitlement. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rv. 1089, 1092 (1972). These definitions imply that, in
a liability regime, payment of an objective, societally-determined value to a
claimant destroys his entitlement, while in a property regime specific perform-
ance is the only appropriate remedy because only specific performance can ful-
fill the claimants subjective valuation of the property at issue. Id.
In her analysis of takings jurisprudence, Radin specifically suggests that "if
there were reason to suspect that some object were close to the personal end of
the continuum, there might be a prima facie case against taking it." Radin,
Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 1005. Although she does not suggest
that fungible property should not be protected at all, Radin does suggest that
perhaps only personal property should be protected by what Calabresi and Me-
lamed call property rules, whereas fungible property should only be protected
by liability rules. Id. at 988.
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property, which is held for the realization of its eventual ex-
change value, is also held for the subjective value of the investor.
There is also a potential conflict between Radin's approach
to fungible property and her proposition that human flourishing
and freedom require that individuals have some degree of con-
trol over the external world.210 Radin concentrates on the loss of
self that people feel when they lose control over their bodies or
other intimate objects that are tied to their personalities. It
does not follow from this that people do not feel loss of self when
they lose control over objects they hold solely for instrumental
purposes. The subjective value of property held for exchange in-
cludes not only the objective exchange value that Radin says
should be paid, but also the value of the right to control the
alienation. This right is more than the difference between sub-
jective and objective valuations discussed above. Instead, I am
suggesting that under a Radinian analysis, an affirmative right
to control the alienation of one's property in itself may be an ele-
ment of human freedom, in addition to the negative right not to
have one's right of alienation inhibited.211 If we only cared
210. Radin states that "to achieve proper self-development-to be a per-
son-an individual needs some control over resources in the external environ-
ment. The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights."
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 957.
211. Radin punts on this issue. She recognizes that liberalism has tradi-
tionally protected the rights of owners to control the alienation of their property
and has criticized the complete capitalist who wishes to obtain complete control
over things and persons, but she dismisses these impulses on the grounds that
the relationship between the owner and the specific type of property does not
fall within the scope of the personal property that she favors.
The relationship between personhood and context requires the pursuit
of human flourishing to include commitments to create and maintain
particular contexts of individual relationships both with things and
with other people. Recognition of the need for such commitments turns
away from traditional negative liberty toward a more positive view of
freedom in which the self-development of the individual is linked to
proper. Also, proper self-development, as a requirement of personhood,
can in principle limit the extent to which an individual's desires for
control over things should be fulfilled, and hence limit the traditional
liberal conception of property. On the other hand, when we judge some
category of things to be normatively appropriate to construction of per-
sonhood, then people's control over those things is worthy of greater
protection than is afforded by the mere commitment of the eminent
domain clause to pay the market value.
Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1688 (emphasis added).
My critique is that in her concentration on the object of property, it is she
who is fetishizing the property relation. I am suggesting that an analysis of the
subjective side of property requires that we analyze how the very concept of
control itself, without respect to any particular object, relates to the develop-
ment of personhood through self-expression. Such a concept of control is not
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about negative freedom with respect to fungible property, a lia-
bility regime that compensates an owner for loss may be suffi-
cient. As Calabresi and Melamed have explained, however, the
very concept of property remedies includes the protection of the
affirmative right to control the disposition of one's objects.212 In-
deed, traditional liberal theory, particularly libertarian theory
influenced by Locke, insists that the ability of individuals to con-
trol their property is an essential natural right and that govern-
ment's primary purpose is to protect these rights.213
This is not to suggest that the Radinian theory of human
flourishing necessarily requires unlimited rights to control all
fungible property. As Radin and others have recognized, where
there are large differences in wealth, one person's right to con-
trol her own property can be the ability to control other peo-
ple.214 Unlimited rights of property, therefore, can impede the
human flourishing of the relatively poor. Nonetheless, if we se-
riously consider the role of property in human freedom, we
should account for the subjective experience of empowerment
and satisfaction owners have in controlling fungible property
and the feelings of pain they experience at the loss of control.
Radin fails to account for this.
2. The Market Community
Most important for the sake of this essay, Radin's focus on
personal property risks being subjective to the point of being in-
sular, if not altogether solipsistic and anti-community. That is,
Radin condemns commodification as the source of separate sub-
jectivity, as opposed to subjectivity as intersubjectivity. Accord-
ing to Radin, "Commodification stresses separateness both
between ourselves and our things and between ourselves and
other people. To postulate personal interrelationship and com-
munion requires us to postulate people who can yield personal
things to other people and not have them instantly become fun-
gible."215 This ignores the reality that the relations most of us
necessarily limited to a negative right of non-interference, as Radin suggests,
but can be analyzed in terms of an affirmative right of self-actualization.
212. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 209, at 1092.
213. Locke (whose theory is the basis of libertarian theory) viewed private
property rights as natural, not in the sense of acquired rights, but as a result of
actions and transactions that men undertake on their own initiative and not by
virtue of the operation of any civil framework of positive rules vesting rights in
them. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RiGHiT To PRrWATE PROPERTY 138 (1988).
214. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 979-83 (dis-
cussing property theories of Hobhouse and Marx).
215. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1907-08.
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share with other members of our community involve fungible
property-that is, commercial relationships. Every day, I inter-
act with thousands, if not millions, of other people in society
through the marketplace.
Exchange also serves relationality and community on a
philosophical basis. Radin condemns separateness but cannot
do without it theoretically. For me to have a relationship with
another person, I must first recognize and respect the other as a
subject, not merely as an extension of myself or as a means to
my ends. Slavoj Zizek, a Lacanian who insists on the fundamen-
tal dependence of Lacan's theory on Hegel, explains:
[W]e can recognize the other, acknowledge him as person, only in so far
as, in a radical sense, he remains unknown to us-recognition implies
the absence of cognition. A neighbor totally transparent and disclosed
is no more a "person", we no longer relate to him as to another person:
intersubjectivity is founded upon the fact that the other is phenomeno-
logically experienced as an "unknown quantity", as a bottomless abyss
which we can never fathom.
21 6
Intersubjectivity thus requires a mediator who simultaneously
separates us and serves as a bridge between us. Property is one
such mediator.
As I have already suggested, commodification not merely
enables us to interrelate as subjects, it forces us to do so. The
market, in the name of autonomy, destroys our atomism and
makes us interdependent on each other for our very existence.
Radin is correct in arguing that it is somehow dehumaniz-
ing to analyze my relationship with my husband, family, and
closest friends in terms of market exchange. 217 But, the market
becomes more important to relationships as the circle of ac-
quaintance widens. I have not always had close personal rela-
tions with colleagues, employees, clients, opposing counsel, or
even my former law partners. Indeed, in many cases I did not
want close personal relations due to personal dislike, simple dis-
inclination, or snobbery. Commercial transactions are one of the
ways to maintian cordial relations that are productive not
merely in a financial sense but in an interpersonal and develop-
mental sense as well. For example, I can easily relate to the new
cashier at the grocery store in terms of fungible property rela-
tions even if I am shy, socially incompetent, or merely busy.
Moreover, fungible property serves as a mediator, enabling me
216. ZIZEK, FoR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20, at 198-99.
217. Even these relations are, however, mediated. See infra notes 251-258




to form and to maintain relationships as a member of the same
community with the store's employees and suppliers. One way
in which modern industrial societies are superior to feudal or
other traditional societies is that modem commercial relations
allow us to form relationships and community far beyond our
family or clan. This is the aspect of the Hegelian theory of prop-
erty that Radin needs to reconsider if she is to account fully for
property's relationship to personhood.218 Market relations offer
an important supplement to, not substitution for, the intimate
relations that concern Radin.219
3. Intellectual and Other Forms of Intangible Property
Radin's concentration on body-like property and the right of
sensuous use as consumption implicitly incorporates a notion of
objects of property as physical things.220 This notion of property
disregards some of the most significant objects of property in our
society-objects that are likely to increase in significance in the
future-namely, intellectual or intangible property. As cur-
rently developed, Radin's property for personhood theory does
not adequately account for these forms of property. This obser-
vation is not to criticize Radin for failing to rewrite property law
in just over ten years of writing, but rather to ask whether her
schema holds the promise of being a pragmatic tool for analyz-
ing intangible property. I suspect that her personal/fungible di-
chotomy will not prove useful for this purpose.
At first blush, intellectual property would seem to fit nicely
into Radin's theory of property for personhood. What could be
more intimately connected to a person than her creations? I pic-
ture those who create intellectual property as an artist standing
at her easel, a poet with pen in hand, or a composer seated at his
218. See infra notes 280-287 and accompanying text (arguing that Radin
overlooks property's role in Hegel's theory of social development).
219. As Hegel discussed, expanding market relations may reduce the scope
of the family from the clan to the nuclear family and diminish the role of the
family as a political unit. See Allen W. Wood, Editor's Introduction to HEGEL,
THE PHmOSOPHY OF RiGHT (NiSBET), supra note 19, at xxii-xxiii [hereinafter
Wood, Editor's Introduction].
220. As I discuss elsewhere, the identification of the real with the visible
and of owning with physical holding are classic phallic metaphors. See Schroe-
der, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 8-9; Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix,
supra note 23, at 5-6. Consequently, Radin's identification of personal property
with an expanded notion of the female body is consistent with Lacan's theory
that the male organ and the female body are conflated as physical analogs to
the psychoanalytic concept of the Phallus. See infra notes 398-409 and accom-
panying text (describing Lacan's concept of the Phallus).
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piano waiting for the inspiration of his muse. Sometimes, I see a
computer nerd hacking at a terminal. At closer inspection, how-
ever, most legal rights concerning intellectual property relate to
their exploitation: who has the right to copy, use, or modify an
idea? My experience as a former member of a law firm that spe-
cialized in intellectual property law leads me to suspect that the
overwhelming majority of intellectual property is created for the
purpose of commercial exploitation. I dare say that even artists,
poets, and computer hackers usually seek to enforce their prop-
erty rights in their creations only for the sake of enhancing the
commercial value of those rights. Indeed, possession of intellec-
tual property would mean little without the legal recognition of
commercial rights. Consequently, Radin's theory of property for
personhood might support the so-called moral right, recognized
in certain foreign jurisdictions, of an artist in the integrity of her
artistic creations,221 but her theory seems to have little to say
about the property rights recognized in intellectual property, in-
cluding copyright, patent, and trade secret.222
Radin's property for personhood theory seems to have even
less to say about other forms of intangible property, such as ac-
counts receivable, bank accounts, and other rights to payments
and investment securities. These would seem to be archetypi-
cally fungible property, in that one invests in most forms of in-
tangible property purely because of their exchange value.
Indeed, investment in the financial markets-ownership of the
means of production-is essential to our capitalist society. Ra-
din, of course, belongs to the critical left and specifically attacks
laissez-faire capitalism as dehumanizing. 223 Is disparaging fi-
221. See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CAR-
DOZO ARTs & ENr. L.J. 1, 2 (1994) ("Continental doctrine regards literary and
artistic works as inalienable extensions of the author's personality.").
222. Scholars have recently suggested that current copyright and other in-
tellectual property laws are inadequate because they implicitly rely on a roman-
tic vision of the relationship between an author and her creation, rather than
examining the primarily economic nature of most intellectual property rela-
tions. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992).
223. I would also place myself on the critical left and would probably agree
with her on most political issues, and certainly do not think that every limita-
tion on property rights or financial regulation should be considered an unconsti-
tutional taking. Instead, a primary reason for my critique of Radin's property
theory arises because I approach property from the perspective of so-called pri-
vate law, see supra note 50 (defining traditional private law), whereas Radin
has developed her theory of property for personhood primarily in terms of con-
stitutional law and related public policy and political concerns. Indeed, Radin's
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nancial rights in fungible property intended as a complete con-
demnation of capitalism? Radin claims to be a pluralist.
Nonetheless, her property for personhood theory does not pro-
vide a useful tool for developing a critique of property rights in
financial assets that would lead to a more humane legal-eco-
nomic system.224
IV. HEGEL'S THEORY OF PROPERTY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECTIVITY AS
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
In both Property and Personhood and Market-Inalienability,
Radin acknowledges her debt to Hegel's theory of property while
simultaneously distancing herself from it.2 2 5 I believe Radin's
desire to distance herself from Hegel stems in large part from
misreading him. By misreading Hegel, Radin has forced herself
into a dilemma in which she must choose between humans as
atomistic, automonous, and individually subjective or humans
as victims as submitted to the oppression of the objectivity of
society. I suggest that to avoid Radin's dilemma and to begin to
conceptualize a proper role for property in the development of
both subjectivity and community, we should begin by re-reading
Hegel's theory of property as explicated in Philosophy of
Right.22 6 By doing this, we can return to a point prior to Radin's
decision to label her theory "property" may result from her political views and
her public law perspective.
224. An exception may be investment securities issued by closely owned
businesses that represent the owner's primary livelihood. Having been a part-
ner in a law firm (or to be technically accurate, a shareholder and director of a
professional corporation) I can testify that my sense of personhood was in-
tensely bound up in my property interest in the firm, even though the relation-
ship was largely a financial one.
Radin's property for personhood theory seems to be applicable in this lim-
ited area of corporate law. Although the common law traditionally abhors re-
straints on alienation of common stock, an exception has developed in both the
case law and corporations codes for privately held companies. Radin's theory,
arguably, gives a philosophical justification for society's increasing intuitive
recognition that the reciprocal rights and obligations of shareholders in closely
held corporations should somehow be different from those of shareholders in
large publicly held corporations.
225. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1892-96; Radin,
Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 977-78.
226. HEGEL, PHIOsoPHY OF RiGHT (KNox), supra note 19. Although I use a
re-reading of Hegel in this Article, and will sound like much more of a Hegelian
than I am, I do share the suspicion that, despite Hegel's claims to logical neces-
sity, his political system, with its hereditary monarchy, social estates, and pa-
triarchal families, merely reflects the contingency of early nineteenth-century
German society. As a feminist, I am particularly troubled with Hegel's failure
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fundamental misreading of Hegel and, with luck, avoid her
errors.
A Hegelian understanding of property seeks to avoid the
either/or anxiety of Hohfeld and Radin, who argue respectively
either that property is intersubjective or objective.227 Property
properly understood has both intersubjective and objective as-
pects. Hegelian analysis offers a basis for recognizing the funda-
mental role that market relations and abstract property rights
play in the overall development of society and acknowledges
that market relations and property rights are inadequate to de-
scribe other human relations. In other words, this understand-
ing allows us to account for community by recognizing
subjectivity as intersubjectivity, achieved through objectivity,
and to avoid Radin's dilemma.
A. RADIns AccouNT OF HEGEL'S THEORY OF PROPERTY
In this section, I emphasize those aspects of the Hegelian
theory of property that Radin has de-emphasized. What is frus-
trating about Radin's characterization of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right is that it is highly accurate in detail, but incorrect in
whole, because Radin's account of Hegel is partial and
decentered. By concentrating only on certain elements of a ho-
listic theory, a theory in which each element is claimed to be
logically necessitated by every other, Radin unintentionally
achieves what Marx intentionally strove for: she stands Hegel
on his head.
Radin argues that Hegel's view of the person was "the same
as Kant's-simply an abstract autonomous entity capable of
holding rights, a device for abstracting universal principles, and
by definition, devoid of individuating characteristics." 228 Radin
to account convincingly for sexuality in the development of individuality. I fear
that his dialectical circle may be drawn in such a way as to preclude such an
analysis. See infra notes 371-373 and accompanying text (discussing Hegers
failure to address sexuality). Hegel, of course, recognized that any philosophy,
including his, is a by-product of the philosopher's era. HEGEL, PHLoSOPHY OF
RiGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 11. Hegel's theory, however, requires that
Geist be embodied in actual, concrete existence. The question is, therefore,
whether the reasoning and insights of Hegel's theory can be developed and
modified to account adequately for contemporary social structures without be-
coming so malleable as to lose its analytical power.
227. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining Hohfeld's "in-
tersubjective" view and Radins "objective" view of property).
228. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 971. Radin notes
that the Kantian person "is a free and rational agent whose existence is an end
in itself." Id. at 962. Radin argues that Hegel accepted this Kantian view of the
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recognizes that Hegel departed from Kantian liberalism in Phi-
losophy of Right when he argued that the abstract will and soci-
ety eventually develop through higher forms until they reach
the "final ideal unity of individuals and the state."229 Radin also
recognized that Hegel "implicitly claims that personhood in the
richer sense of self-development and differentiation presupposes
the context of human community."230 And yet, she declares
that, like Kant, Hegel "treats [the Kantian abstract personality]
as both logically and developmentally prior to any relationships
of right arising from the person's interaction with others in
society."23 1
Radin claims that her theory of property is superior to
Hegel's because she bases her theory on a richer notion of the
individual than the autonomous, abstract will on which Hegel
relies, ignoring Hegel's later notions of the individual in commu-
nity.2 32 Radin argues that Hegel had a not-so-secret agenda of
justifying market relations. 233 She criticizes Hegers theory of
alienability of property as arising from a strict subject/object dis-
tinction.234 She claims that Hegel's definition of "object"
fall[s) back on the intuition that some things are 'external' and some
are 'internal.' This answer is unsatisfactory because the categories 'ex-
ternal' and 'internal' should be the conclusion of a moral evaluation
and cannot be taken as obvious premises forming its basis.... Hegel's
solution is also unsatisfactory because (at least from our present van-
tage point) we can see that the external/internal distinction is a contin-
uum and not a bright-line dichotomy. 23 5
Radin contrasts her flexible personal/fungible property spec-
trum against what she sees as a hard-edged, either/or Hegelian
dichotomy.
person as the completely abstract, autonomous, individual will. Id. at 971-72,
977.
229. Id. at 975.
230. Id. at 977.
231. Id. at 974-75.
232. Specifically, Radin states:
Hegel departs from classical liberalism in discussing these other kinds
of property relationships. For Hegel, individuals could not become
fully developed outside such relationships. They are important in com-
paring Hegel's theory to my theory of personal property, because the
concept of person in the theory of personal property refers to the fully
developed individual.
Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 974; Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1888-89,
1894.
234. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1892-94.
235. Id. at 1908-09.
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Very briefly, what Radin takes from Hegel is, first, his insis-
tence that the autonomous individual of classical liberalism is
not a satisfactory account of the free human being and, second,
his recognition that personhood requires both the ownership of
property and a community for complete development.
B. HEGEL RECONSIDERED
1. Some Introductory Remarks About The Person
By comparing her theory of property for personhood within
community to the Hegelian person and Hegel's initial analysis of
the subject and property, Radin violates the pomo-citric incom-
mensurability principle-i.e., she attempts the famously impos-
sible task of comparing apples to oranges. Instead, Radin
should compare her property for personhood theory to the Hege-
lian notion of the fully-developed individual and the role of prop-
erty in the fully-developed community, as embodied by the state.
In the circular Hegelian dialectic, however, these fully-devel-
oped concepts cannot be understood without first understanding
their logically prior, more abstract, and undeveloped
manifestations.
Specifically, Radin recognizes that in Hegelian theory the
complete individual does not exist naturally but must be devel-
oped.2 3 6 This is precisely why Radin explores the role that prop-
erty plays in this development and claims to be analyzing the
individual within community. But, her analysis assumes that a
specific community already exists. 237 This assumption is prob-
lematic if, as Radin agrees, personhood (subjectivity) is not a
pre-existing abstraction, but is a human creation, and if, as I
suspect Radin would agree, community is also a human crea-
tion. As human creations, personhood (subjectivity) and com-
munity are probably mutually constituting. Radin concentrates
on the aspect of Hegelian property theory that relates to the cre-
ation of personhood (subjectivity), but she ignores the aspect of
property that relates to the creation of community, which then
relates back to the full development of personhood (as individu-
ality). As we will see, Hegel started his analysis of property
with the abstract, pre-social person because he believed that the
individual and the community were mutually constituting-de-
236. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 972.
237. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting that Radin's theory
assumes existence of community).
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veloping together-and that primitive property relations were
an important step in this development.238
As I said earlier, Radin presents Hegel as justifying the lib-
eral market agenda and promoting separateness. 239 This is a
serious misstatement. In fact, Hegel simultaneously explains,
justifies, and subverts the simple, liberal market agenda;240 it is
Radin who implicitly adopts the liberal understanding of the
market. Radin and classical liberalism understand or justify the
market in terms of the separateness of individuals. Radin un-
derstands the utilitarian branch of liberalism as interpreting all
human relations in terms of market transactions between sepa-
rate, self-standing autonomous individuals.241 Radin argues
that we should remove certain object relations from the market
to prevent separateness, 242 but this presupposes the existence of
community from which the market separates individuals. In
Radin's view, submission to the market regime inexorably leads
to commodification of all human relations. Thus, despite her de-
nials, Radin implicitly accepts the strength of the utilitarian ar-
gument that once the market is introduced, the market is the
only form of analysis possible.243
Hegel, in contradistinction, explores the logic of community
itself. He justified the market because it is a way of bringing
people together and, therefore, lessening separateness.2 " In a
proper Hegelian analysis, it is the Radinian person who is bound
up with her things and refuses to come to the market, thus iso-
lating and separating herself. Such chaste virginity, perhaps in-
itially necessary for integrity, withers over time to lonely
sterility. Radin's person is not free. Like Gollum, in The Lord of
the Rings,245 or the genie of the lamp, she is a slave to an ob-
ject-bound by the chains of property. If Radin's person is
bound up with objects, Hegel's subject owns objects only so that
she may become bound up with other subjects. For Hegel,
although the intersubjective relation of the market is logically
238. See infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text (explaining why Hegel
began his analysis with abstract will ).
239. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (noting Radin's criticism
that Hegel tried to justify liberal market agenda ).
240. See WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 34-35.
241. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1861-70, 1883-87.
242. Id. at 1907-08.
243. See supra text accompanying note 51 (arguing that Radin "concedes"
utilitarian argument that object relations are property relations).
244. See infra notes 318-321, 326-329 and accompanying text (describing
Hegers view on alienation as source of intersubjectivity).
245. J.R.R. TOLmEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS (2d ed. 1965).
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prior to other relations, the experience changes the subjects and
enables them to have more complex moral and ethical
relations.246
Consequently, Radin is correct that Hegel justified the
existence of the market. Whereas the utilitarian justifies all
human relations in terms of the market, however, Hegel would
justify the primitive relations of the market only in terms of
their role in the development of more fully-developed social rela-
tions. Market relations embody the sphere that Hegel calls
"civil society,"247 but civil society does not constitute all of soci-
ety, let alone the highest stage of society.248
Before going any further, let us discuss terminology to avoid
a potential source of confusion for the reader. As I have sug-
gested, Radin and Hegel use the term "person" in two different
ways that are not directly comparable.249 Radin uses the words
"person" and "personhood" to describe her concept of the filly-
246. See infra text accompanying note 329 (arguing that intersubjectivity
enables more complex social relations, including morality and ethics); see also
infra notes 363-370 and accompanying text (describing positive law and the ul-
timate development of the state).
247. "Civil society" for Hegel includes the market, although it is not com-
pletely limited to the market. See Wood, Editor's Introduction, supra note 219,
at xviii-xix.
248. Under many forms of liberalism-excluding, perhaps, super-
Benthamite, Posnerian utilitarians, see, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, SEx Am) REA-
SON 36 (1992) (equating familial and business relationships)-individuals can
take refuge from the harsh world of the market in the intimate world of the
family. See Wood, Editor's Introduction, supra note 219, at xxiii. But, unlike
the limited public/private distinction of traditional liberalism, the Hegelian
state eventually overcomes the public realm of civil society and harmonizes the
public and the private. See infra notes 280-287 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the state and property).
249. Radin is aware of this distinction. Radin states that "even though
Hegel does not use the word person for the entity described as the person in the
theory of personal property, Hegel's theory can be seen as consistent with the
idea of personal property." Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at
972. Radin's view is consistent with both T.M. Knox's well-known English
translation and H.B. Nisbet's more recent translation, which use the words
"person" and "personality" to describe the abstract will as soon as it begins to
interact with property. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note
19, at 40 (discussing "person"); HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBEr), supra
note 19, at 489 (indicating that Nisbet used the English word "person" in trans-
lation for the German word "Person").
Of course, Radin also criticizes Hegel's property theory because the Hege-
lian "person" is not fully developed. See supra note 232 and accompanying text
(arguing that Radin wrongly claims that her conception of person is much
broader than Hegel's). But, Hegel presented the "person" as merely a logical
step in the development of the "individual." See infra notes 250-258 and accom-
panying text (describing how abstract person is Hegel's logical starting point).
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developed, integrated, and mature human being in community.
She contrasts this to Hegel's use of "person" in Philosophy of
Right, in which Hegel began with the most minimal, abstract,
and immediate concept of what a person could be: self-con-
sciousness as absolutely free will. For the sake of argument, I
accept Radin's characterization of the Hegelian will as essen-
tially the same as the Kantian construct. 250 To say, however,
that Hegel initially develops an inadequate concept of property
based on a primitive, abstract, negative, and inadequate concept
of the person is not a critique of Hegel. It is precisely Hegel's
point: the initial concepts of the abstract person and the later
concepts of subjectivity and private property at the level of ab-
stract right are necessary building blocks of the full individual
and full human relationships. As mere building blocks, how-
ever, these concepts are inadequate by definition.
Hegel explained the minimal concept of the abstract person
as follows:
The universality of this consciously free will is abstract universality,
the self-conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of it-
self to itself in its individuality, and from this point of view the subject
is a person....
Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights and consti-
tutes the concept and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of ab-
stract and therefore formal right. Hence the imperative of right is: "Be
a person and respect others as persons."2 5 1
This minimal concept of "personality," like its liberal cousin
the autonomous individual, is totally negative. The free person
can only be defined in terms of what it is not. "The uncondi-
tional commands of abstract right are restricted, once again be-
cause of its abstractness, to the negative: Do not infringe
personality and what personality entails.'"2 52 But, the Hegelian
"person" does not stand, as Radin implies, in quite the same nor-
mative position as the autonomous individual of Kant or other
liberal philosophers. Radin describes Hegel as believing that
the abstract person is both logically and developmentally prior
250. Scholars widely share Radin's characterization of the Hegeian will.
For example, Avineri believes that Hegel's imperativie of abstract personality-
"Be a person and respect others as persons"-is "consciously modelled on
Kant's categorical imperative." AviNERi, MODERN STATE, supra note 15, at 137.
But, by doing so, Hegel was attempting to react to and critique Kant. What
differences exist between Hegel's and Kant's respective theories of the abstract
person, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
251. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 37.
252. Id. at 38.
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to the more complex individual in society.253 Once again, this is
misleading. Although Hegel started his logic with the abstract
person, the abstract person in Hegels view is not developmen-
tally prior in any empirical sense. In most traditional liber-
alism, the authentic human being is the autonomous individual
supposedly encountered in a hypothesized state of nature. This
liberal tenet means that negative freedom is all that the state
and other individuals should offer. To Hegel, however, this cate-
gorical imperative is merely the bare minimum that human be-
ings owe each other, and fails to describe the more complex
interrelations of which individuals are capable within families
and communities.
To have no interest except in one's formal right may be pure obstinacy,
often a fitting accompaniment of a cold heart and restricted sympa-
253. According to Radin, Hegel "treats [rights and abstract personality] as
both logically and developmentally prior to any relationships of right arising
from the person's interactions with others in society." Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, supra note 1, at 974-75 (emphasis added). Radin's description of the
way an individual puts her will into an object reveals that that Radin actually
believes Hegel's developmental priority is empirical. For example, Radin cri-
tiques Hegel for assuming that development takes place "overnight," while her
theory accounts for development over time. See Margaret Jane Radin, 7ime,
Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 748 (1986); see also id. at 741
(stating that the "claim to an owned object grows stronger as, over time, the
holder becomes bound up with the object").
Although Hegel argued that logic is always actualized in the world, this is
not a matter of simple empiricism. Hegel's theory of abstract right is one of
logic, not empirical fact, and, therefore, is atemporal. He did not argue for the
ridiculous idea that human beings actually are born as abstract Kantian per-
sons with no individuating characteristics and develop to adulthood through
acquiring objects, which Radin's argument above seems to imply. Rather,
Hegel argued that the abstract person in his logical process will objectify itself
through the ownership of objects. See infra notes 310-329 and accompanying
text (discussing property as source of intersubjectivity when people exhange ob-
jects). This logical process does not imply an element of time, nor does Hegel
address how actual people come to own actual things and engage in actual mar-
ket transactions, which do take place over time. Unlike liberals and unlike Ra-
din, Hegel did not argue that a specific individual should have a specific,
contingent property right based only on that person's occupation of property.
Who was first to occupy an object or has occupied it longest cannot justify at the
level of abstract right. Instead, Hegelian analysis of abstract right seeks to jus-
tify a whole system of private property, not questions of individual property
rights-the latter depends on the practical judgments of positive law. As Hegel
said, once Plato began counseling nursemaids to rock their babies, he had left
the realm of philosophy. HEGEL, PHILOSoPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19,
at 21. In other words, Hegel only addressed what he thought could be strictly
logically proved without presuppositions in his definition of philosophy.
Although in modern discourse we tend to include pragmatism as a school of
philosphy, in the Hegelian system pragmatism is a mode of reasoning separate
from-and perhaps supplemental to-philosophy.
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thies. It is uncultured people who insist most on their rights, while
noble minds look on other aspects of the thing. Thus abstract right is
nothing but a bare possibility and, at least in contrast with the whole
range of the situation, something formal.2
5 4
In other words, Hegel would totally agree with Radin that
the economic man posited by law and economics theory does not
accurately describe a human being. It is a caricature that
grossly overemphasizes one feature. In this case, the feature
may be seen as a lowest common denominator of human rela-
tions. It should not be disparaged in its proper context in that it
not only allows us to have formal relations with those who are
distant from us but also serves as a building block in more com-
plex relations. But, the contentions that all human actions are
economically instrumental "belittle and disparage all great
deeds and great men."25 5 Consequently, Hegelian theory can be
read as a rejection of liberal theories that see society as merely
an aggregate of isolated individuals and utilitarianism that
seeks merely to maximize the aggregated wealth of those indi-
viduals at the expense of the freedom of any one individual.256
Although Hegel introduced the abstract person early in Philoso-
phy of Right,2 57 the rest of the book logically demonstrates the
inadequacy of both the abstract person and abstract right (i.e.,
property) and presents a theory of society that could enable the
development of a full individual within community. According
to Hegel, the market regime of civil society is necessary for the
development of the state but is not itself the state.258 In other
254. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 235.
255. Id. at 84. As Avineri explains, "Hegel is aware that this tendency of
civil society concepts to arrogate to themselves all other spheres of life is very
strong; but he speaks against it when civil society encroaches on the realm of
the family as well as when it encroaches on that of the state." AVINERI, MODERN
STATE, supra note 15, at 139.
256. See Wood, Editor's Introduction, supra note 219, at xvi ("Hegel is not an
enemy of freedom, but his agenda regarding freedom is not a liberal one.").
Utilitarian justifications for private property are based on maximizing the hap-
piness (or wealth) of society as a whole. Hegel, in contradistinction, based his
argument solely on the logic of personhood without regard to its implications for
the satisfaction of needs or the creation of happiness or wealth. See, e.g.,
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 73 ("The rational as-
pect of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the super-
seding of mere subjectivity [i.e., solipsism] of personality."). As I have
discussed, Hegel was well aware that the regime of abstract right in civil soci-
ety may actually lead to impoverishment and alienation. See supra note 185
and accompanying text (discussing Hegel's view of poverty).
257. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 37.
258. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 220.
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words, the person encountered at the beginning of Philosophy of
Right is not what we in New York would call "a real mensch."
25 9
Radin does recognize that Hegel's analysis of the individual
goes far beyond this initial theory of the person. 260 I criticize
her for not fully understanding its implications. To understand
this criticism, it is necessary to consider briefly Hegel's dialectic
because it is inextricably linked to his theory.
2. The Retroactive Method of the Dialectic
Perhaps the biggest problem Americans have in under-
standing Hegel is that we tend to view political philosophy
through the lens of our liberal philosophical tradition. Most
schools of classical liberalism follow natural law or intuitionist
philosophies.26 1 They start from a presupposition of the state of
nature or an intuition of the good and then posit a linear, logical,
and developmental progression from this originary point.
Human nature in its hypothesized natural state is conceived as
"authentic" and normatively superior to "artificial" states.
2 62
259. The familiar Yiddishism captures Hegel's point that to be a fully-devel-
oped human being is a great accomplishment. Neither the "abstract will"
presented at the beginning of Philosophy of Right nor the Hegelian person, the
"legal subject" who is created by property and contract in the realm of Abstract
Right, are yet individuals. Rather, they are merely moments in the creation of
a full individual. As one scholar explained:
Just as the individual whose behavior and attitudes are defined en-
tirely in terms of rights is pathetically less than a real person, so the
society implicit in the meeting of legal persons is abstract, immediate,
formal, and false, because it is "only as owners that these two persons
exist for each other."
WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 30 (quoting HEGEL, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF RIHT 1 40). Another scholar states:
The abstract person is not yet a full person as she is severed from,
among other things, all concrete family relations, the attributes of citi-
zenship, and all roots in historical reality. Nevertheless, the abstract
person who possesses an individual will and is a bearer of rights dis-
plays a sufficient identity to count as a subject of recognition.
Rosenfeld, The Dialectics of Contract, supra note 12, at 1230 (footnote omitted).
260. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 971-72.
261. Radin claims to write within the pragmatic, rather than the classical,
liberal philosophical tradition. Although she does not appear to base her theory
on natural law, she is taldng a self-consciously intuitionist approach. See Ra-
din, Cross Currents, supra note 1, at 1680. Thus, she appears to have much in
common with such contemporary intuitionist liberal philosophers such as John
Rawls. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
262. Most schools of liberalism start with presumptions concerning natural
rights in the "original position." See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 261, at 12 (starting
from "original position" behind "the veil of ignorance"). From such a position
any move away from the original position (or the state of nature) can only be
justified if authentic natural rights are protected.
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Deviations from this authenticity must be explained and justi-
fied. Specifically, if the free individual is posited as existing in
the state of nature or is intuited as the authentic mode of being,
the community and the state pose problems by definition. One of
the most familiar ways to solve this problem is by theorizing
that free individuals agree to live under the state through a so-
cial contract. In other words, the very ordering of the liberal ar-
gument has essential normative significance for what
constitutes a good or just community.
Hegel would claim that his theory is neither naturalistic nor
intuitionist.263 Hegelians criticize liberalism precisely because
it relies on a hypothesized or intuited state of nature that pre-
supposes a concept of human nature. To Hegelians, philosophy
should explain human nature rather than presuppose human
nature.264 Liberal philosophers are like the magician who is
caught sneaking the rabbit into the hat. The abstract will in
Hegel cannot, therefore, serve the same function of authenticity
as the state of nature in liberalism. To Hegel, the complete indi-
vidual is artificial in the sense of a human creation. But, being
artificial in no way implies being unreal, let alone being
inauthentic.
Hegelian analysis starts with abstract will rather than with
a full individual in developed society because, even as Hegelians
criticize presuppositions, one has to start somewhere as a logical
and practical matter. One must temporarily identify a presup-
position to put the dialectic in motion. Hegelians do not criticize
liberals for beginning with a presupposition but for adopting a
linear logic that does not enable them to return to critique their
presupposition. 265 The Hegelian dialectic, unlike liberal reason-
ing, claims to be a circling, or spiraling, as opposed to linear,
logic. 266 The application of the dialectic is always to circle back
263. As Radin recognizes, Hegel's property theory is intensely anti-natural-
istic. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 971-73. Unlike liberals,
who base their theories of property on human need, Hegel's theory depends on a
theory of rational freedom. See WEsTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note
185, at 22.
264. Avineri observes that Hegers concept of human freedom "is not to be
found in any legendary state of nature, but evolves precisely out of his effort to
dissociate himself from his state of primeval savagery." AvINERI, MODERN
STATE, supra note 15, at 132.
265. See Richard D. Winfield, The Method of Hegel's Science of Logic, in Es-
SAYS ON HEGEL'S LoGIc 45, 51-52 (Georg di Giavanni ed., 1990).
266. Hegel explained:
Philosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point-for it
must begin somewhere-a point which is not demonstrated and is not
a result. But the starting point of philosophy is immediately relative,
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to the initial, temporary presupposition, such as the abstract
will, to allow us to analyze it such that it is no longer a presup-
position. Thus, one should theoretically be able to start at any
point in the system and derive the entire system.
The Hegelian dialectic is easily misconstrued as a crushing
teleological necessity that inexorably leads humanity forward
towards union with Geist. In the political context, the result is
seen as union of the individual citizen with the state. Hegers
metaphor for the totality of the state, "the march of God in the
world,"2 67 can suggest pictures of goose-stepping stormtroopers
to a late twentieth-century reader. Hegel's notorious formula-
tion of the necessity that logic be objectified in the world-"what
is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational 26 8-can
sound like a depressing combination of grim determinism and a
Panglossian defense of the status quo. These are serious
misconceptions.
The progression of the dialectic is logically, but not empiri-
cally, necessary. The logic of intellect-Geist-works its way
through the world, but not necessarily in any specific, pre-
ordained way. Any number of events, including, most impor-
tantly, the free acts of human subjectivity, can affect the
course.26 9 The necessity of the dialectic is retrospective rather
than prospective-it looks backward rather than forward.
for it must appear at another end-point as a result. Philosophy is a
sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immedi-
ately, but is rounded off within itself.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 26 (footnote omitted).
267. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 279. This un-
fortunate connotation is partly a matter of translation. Knox chose to translate
the word Gang as "march," and Nisbet followed his lead. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 279. Although one meaning of Gang is to
walk or to march, it is not equivalent to these English words. For example,
Walter A. Kaufman insisted that the translator should interpret the phrase as
the "way of God." AvInEPi, MODERN STATE, supra note 15, at 176-77 (citing
WALTER A. KAuFmANN, HEGEL'S POLITIcAL PHILOSOPHY 279 (1971)). Avineri
himself argues that the meaning of the statement is not to justify any specific or
existing governmental system, but "that the very existence of the state is part of
a divine strategy, not a merely human arbitrary artefact." Id- at 177.
268. Avineri provides an excellent explanation of the meaning of this phrase
based on Hegel's concepts of "rationality" and "actuality." AvnERI, MODERN
STATE, supra note 15, at 126-27 (noting that Hegel distinguished actuality from
"all that exists").
269. Taking a risky plunge into analogy, I find it interesting to compare
Hegers distinction between logic and events to the laws of physics. The laws of
gravity as initially abducted by Galileo tell us that, as a logical matter, a
feather and a ball of different weights should fall at the same speed. As an
empirical fact, however, they do not because other factors, such as air pressure
and friction, affect the rate at which they fall. Thus, the old canard from ele-
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The retroactivity of the dialectic is reflected in Hegel's fa-
mous metaphor in his preface to Philosophy of Right: "the owl of
Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk."270 Only
at the end of the day can we retrospectively examine events. No
external "natural" standard exists by which one can judge the
truth of Hegelian totality. In Hegelian philosophy, truth claims
rest on the explanatory power of the resulting whole.271
The implication of the circular nature of the Hegelian dia-
lectic, which Radin de-emphasizes, is that the order of the logi-
cal presentation is important but does not have the same
normative import that it has in liberalism. In liberalism, the
state must be justified given the logical and normative priority
of the autonomous individual. To Hegel, the individual is prior
to the state only in the sense that the individual is more primi-
tive.27 2 Hegel therefore discussed the individual first as a tem-
mentary school that Galileo disproved Aristotelian physics by a single experi-
ment, dropping objects from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, is false: if Galileo had
abducted his hypothesis from empirical observation, he would have agreed with
Aristotle.
270. HEGEL, PHrLOsoPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 23. A few
sentences earlier, Hegel wrote that "on the subject of issuing instructions on
how the world ought to be: philosophy always comes too late to perform this
function." Id. Zizek explains, "It is essential to grasp ... this kind of relation-
ship of contingency to necessity, where necessity derives from the retroactive
effect of contingency-where necessity is always a 'backwards-necessity' (which
is why Minerva's owl flies only at dusk) .... " ZiZmc, FOR THEY KNow NOT
WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20, at 130. Hegel's statement also implies that
Hegel thought he was writing at the end of a particular era of history. "[This
new world, which Hegel heralded.., is already reaching its maturity and is
somehow, slowly but surely, on its way out." AVNERI, MODERN STATE, supra
note 15, at 129.
271. For example, Hegel accepted the concept of the absolutely free will as a
moment in the individual, but unlike liberalism, he claimed not merely to posit
it, but attempted to prove it. "The proof that the will is free and the proof of the
nature of the will and freedom can be established... only as a link in the whole
chain [of philosophy]." HEGEL, PmLosoPHY OF RiGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at
21.
272. As I discuss extensively in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra
note 10, Hegel's procedure in each of his major works was to start with the
simplest, most primitive concept and to work up to the most complex. As West-
phal explains:
Now, because property is the first embodiment of freedom (in the Hege-
lian sense of logical priority), his theory is also a critique of liberalism's
(formalist) tendency to define freedom without paying sufficient atten-
tion to questions of morality, the family, the political community, and
severe poverty. When Locke makes property rights first, it is because
they are the end to which everything else is means. When Hegel puts
them first it is because in their immediate form as the minimal mode of
human freedom they are in radical need of correction and completion
through contextualizing.
RADIN'S PROPERTY THEORY
porary presupposition. Hegel expressly denied, however, that
the progression he presented, from abstract will to family to civil
society to state and from abstract right to morality to ethics, is
developmentally true as an empirical fact.27 3 Hegel said that
the "logical order" was not the "time order." Thus, for example,
he addressed property before the family even though we are
born into the family before we encounter property.2 7 4
This does not mean that the abstract, inadequate concepts
that begin Hegel's analysis lack all normative significance. I
have only said that logical priority does not have the same nor-
mative import in Hegel's philosophy as it does in liberal
philosophy.
To call a subject matter or discussion abstract rather than concrete,
immediate rather than mediated, or formal rather than substantial is
to say that it is part of a complex whole that has been isolated from its
proper context. In its isolation it can neither be, nor be seen to be,
what it in truth is; for "the truth is the whole." Only in the totality of
their relations to the whole can any of the parts (moments) either be,
or be understood to be, what they truly are.275
Hegel purported to prove that the Kantian autonomous per-
son is inadequate and contradictory and is always already be-
coming the individual within the state.2 76 Nonetheless, the
WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 31.
273. For example, Hegel wrote:
But it is to be noticed that the moments, whose result is a further de-
termined form of the concept, precede it in the philosophical develop-
ment of the Idea as determinations in the concept, but they do not go in
advance of it in the temporal development as shapes of experience.
Thus, for instance, the Idea determined as the family, presupposes the
determinations of the concept from which the family will later on in
this work be shown to result. But the explicit existence of these inner
presuppositions as shapes of experience also, e.g. as the right of prop-
erty, contract, morality, and so forth, is the other aspect of the develop-
ment, and it is only in a higher and more complete civilization that the
development has gone so far as to endow its moments with this appro-
priately shaped existence.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 35 (footnote omitted).
274. Id. at 233.
275. WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 29.
276. Stilman observes:
For Locke, Kant, and Rawls, not only is the state of nature primary, in
the sense of coming first in order either historically or conceptually,
but conclusions derived from it are also primary, in the sense of coming
first in predominance. Or, as Dworkin would have it, institutions, and
ideas that come later in order than those derived from the abstract
original condition are always to be tested against, subjected to, and
vulnerable to being "trumped" by the principles derived from the ab-
stract original condition.
Given the structure of Hegel's thought, his abstract right functions
in the exact opposite way. Abstract right being first or primary in the
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earlier moments of the dialectic are true moments in, and neces-
sary building blocks of, the latter. As such, they deserve respect
and preservation.
Hegel used the untranslatable German word Aufhebung to
describe his dialectical logic. 2 77 This term, which refers to both
negation and preservation, is often caricatured as the trinity of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. That is, a thesis is presented,
an internal contradiction in the original thesis is identified, and
the two are resolved in a harmonizing synthesis, which serves as
a new thesis, starting the logical process over. This incorrectly
suggests that sublation destroys all difference and deviation by
converting them into an oppressive compromise. 278 Rather, as
the German term implies, sublation preserves, as well as ne-
gates, the prior concept. Sublation is not merely tertiary. There
always remains an unmediated moment, a phantom fourth, the
logical order of the major parts of Hegel's political philosophy, is there-
fore the least adequate part of "objective spirit."
Peter Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in The Philosophy of Right, 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 1031, 1038-39 (1989) [hereinafter Stillman, Hegel's Analysis].
Rosenfeld explains Hegel's view this way:
Actually, Hegel's abstract person is very much like Hobbes's individual
found in the state of nature. There is, however, an important differ-
ence between the two conceptions. Hegel calls his counterpart to the
Hobbesian individual in the state of nature the "abstract person," indi-
cating that this person is a construct who has been cut off from many of
the diverse concrete determinations of the real historical person.
Thus, whereas the free willing subject who is the protagonist of the
Philosophy of Right may at first view herself as embodying the charac-
teristics of the abstract person, Hegel is well aware that the abstract
person provides only a partial representation of the subject of legal and
political relations. Hobbes, on the other hand, presents the abstract
atomistic individual of his state of nature as the true representative of
a universal and ahistorical conception of the human nature.
Rosenfeld, Dialectics of Contract, supra note 12, at 1209 (footnotes omitted).
277. Translators sometimes interpret Aufhebung as "sublation." The prob-
lem is that whereas Aufhebung is a relatively familiar German word that Hegel
used because of its ambiguous and seemingly contradictory connotations, "sub-
lation" is an uncommon word that people usually use only in philosophical dis-
cussions. Nisbet uses a range of English words (to apprehend, to interpret, to
supersede, to cancel, to annul, to dissolve, to overcome) to translate Aufhebung
in context. H.B. Nisbet, Translator's Preface to HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF Riwur
(NIsBE), supra note 19, at xiii. Nisbet's choices, however, do not capture
Hegel's insistence on the necessary interrelationship and identity of these
concepts.
278. Even as brilliant a philosopher as Charles Sanders Peirce criticized
Hegel for subsuming "secondness" (awareness of distinctions) into "thirdness"
(interrelations). See John E. Smith, Community and Reality, in PERSPECTIVES
ON PEIRCE 92, 96, 103 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1965). Other scholars, how-
ever, recognize a cross affinity between Peircean secondness and thirdness and
Hegelian sublation. See, e.g., Paul Weis, Charles S. Peirce, Philosopher, in PER-
spECTIVES ON PEIRCE, supra, at 120, 133-34.
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trace or differance of deconstruction, that resists mediation.279
Separateness, and the need for mediation, always remains.
Even though Hegel claimed to prove that the abstract person is
inadequate and is destined to be superseded, it simultaneously
retains a moment of validity to which the system continually
returns.
Radin repeats another common and related critique of
Hegel:
For Hegel, the properly developed state (in contrast to civil society) is
an organic moral entity, "the actuality of the ethical Idea," and individ-
uals within the state are subsumed into its community morality.
Hegel's theory of the state thus carries the seeds of destruction of
all liberal rights attaching to individuals (because in the state particu-
lar arbitrary will passes over into willing the universal).2 80
Radin's statement is once again incorrect because it is par-
tial. The Hegelian concept of the state would potentially crush
the individual if Radin were correct that the dialectic "sub-
sumed" all prior contradictions in the sense of obliterating them.
But, sublation preserves, as well as negates and mediates, dif-
ference. The negative freedom of the arbitrary will and the
primitive concept of property that Hegel introduced at the begin-
ning of his political philosophy are elements of the more complex
individual citizen of the state. In the dialectical logic of subla-
tion, if the state supersedes civil society, it also preserves it. For
individuals to exist who can be citizens of the state, there must
be a moment when these individuals are separate from the
state.28 ' Thus, the state must preserve these liberal elements to
some extent. As we have seen, Radin, the pragmatist, would
grudgingly preserve some market relations for pragmatic and
utilitarian reasons in an imperfect world.28 2 Hegel, the idealist,
would preserve market relations, even in a perfect world, be-
cause they contain an important moment in the actualization of
freedom. The Hegelian theory of the identity of identity and dif-
ference by definition requires that the unity of the complete citi-
zen and the complete state requires a moment in which they are
not unified so that the completion can be actualized.28 3 The re-
279. See ZzEs, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20, at 179.
280. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 976 (emphasis
added).
281. HE:GEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNOx), supra note 19, at 161-62.
282. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1903.
283. Hegel described the rationality of the state as "the unity and interpene-
tration of universality and individuality [Einzelheit].... [Ilt consists in the
unity of objective freedom (i.e. of the universal substantial will) and subjective
freedom (as the freedom of individual [individuellen] knowledge and of the will
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lationship between individuals and the state never becomes to-
tally immediate and always requires a moment of mediation.
Property, the mediator that allows individuation and relation-
ship, is a step in the movement.28 4
Radin is also unclear as to Hegel's theory of why it is neces-
sary for private property to continue after the development of
the state, and as to the possibility of collective property. Radin
writes that "there is in Hegel's theory a foundation for the com-
munitarian claim that each community is an organic entity in
which private property ownership does not make sense. Hegel
does not make this claim, perhaps because he is too firmly
rooted in his own time."28 5
Once the workings of sublation are internalized, however, it
is clear that there can be no communitarian claim for the total
withering away of private property in Hegel's theory. A moment
of private property must be preserved to allow for the constitu-
tion of intersubjective individuals as citizens. This moment of
private property, however, does not preclude the possibility of
collective property or limits on private property. Hegel men-
tioned in passing various types of collective ownership, includ-
ing family and corporate ownership, throughout Philosophy of
Right.28 6 Hegel did not concentrate on collective ownership,
however, presumably because he did not believe they serve the
same logically necessary constitutive role for the family, corpo-
ration, or state that private property serves for the abstract per-
son. This does not imply that collective property cannot or
should not exist. Although collective property does not play a
in its pursuit of particular ends)." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET),
supra note 19, at 276. For this unity to come about, the individual, subjective
will must remain at one moment separate-otherwise, it would not be unified
with universal objectivity; it would be replaced or crushed by it.
Although I find Hegel's theory useful in critiquing Radins writings on
property, Hegel's totalizing dialectic, which identifies necessary negations and
contradictions and insists on the identity of identity and difference, concerns
me: it is so universal that it arguably contains everything and therefore noth-
ing. For example, even though Philosophy of Right analyzes the political phi-
losophy of ethical life, one can argue that it is not much help in developing a
normative guide for developing the good life, let alone in developing a specific
positive law of property. This concern explains why pragmatism grew from
German idealism as a method of making specific normative decisions.
284. Avineri explains, "Since property is to Hegel the prime condition of per-
sonality,... the abolition of private property ... spells for Hegel the disappear-
ance and emasculation of personality...." AvINER, MODERN STATE, supra note
15, at 171.
285. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 977.
286. By "corporation" Hegel meant certain nineteenth century fraternal and
social organizations, not contemporary business organizations.
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necessary constitutive role, collective property may be a contin-
gent, empirical fact of life, a creature of positive law in any given
society, so long as individuals hold some private property.28 7
3. The Starting Presupposition of Personality
It is now possible to understand why Hegel started with the
abstract person, even though his logic is circular. The clearest
and most logical way to understand the complex and concrete
manifestation of intellect, Geist, and individual freedom in the
state is to start with the simplest, most primitive, universal, ab-
stract, and immediate concepts, building upwards to the most
complex concepts. Hegel argued that self-consciousness as free
will is the bare minimum conception of what it could be to be a
person.2 88
Radin recognizes that one of the central concerns of Hegel's
theory is that the individual and society develop together, but
she does not internalize the spiralling, retrospective nature of
the dialectic. Specifically, Radin mistakenly describes the choice
of the abstract will as a starting place for analysis as "assuming
away" the attributes of personhood. 28 9 To Hegel, individual
characteristics are "abstracted" away, not "assumed" away. The
distinction is subtle, but crucial. Hegelian analysis retrospec-
tively applies the dialectic to the individual human being in the
state and abstracts to the most universal, only to circle back to
show how individuating characteristics necessarily and logically
develop from the abstraction. In other words, the initial ab-
straction does not assume away individuating characteristics
but rather presupposes that individuating characteristics are al-
ways already imminent.29 0 Abstraction is an attempt to explain
287. Hegel thought that philosophy could not give definitive answers to
practical questions of positive law and thus did not address the proper scope of
collective versus private property. But, Hegel thought that the logical process,
including abstract right, did impose some limits on property rights. See infra
notes 333-362 and accompanying text (describing how abstract right makes per-
sonality inalienable and limits unconscionable contracts).
288. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 21-22.
289. For example, Radin writes, "The intuitive personhood perspective on
property is not equivalent to Hegelian personality theory, because that perspec-
tive incorporates the attributes of personhood that Hegel initially assumes
away." Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 977; see also id. at
971-72, 974 (stating Radin's criticism that Hegel assumed away attributes of
personhood).
290. A good expression of the retroactivity of Hegel's logic is his description
of the logical ordering of civil society and the state:
Civil society is the [stage of] difference which intervenes between
the family and the state, even ifits formation follows later in time than
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individuation and community.291 For example, when an engi-
neer considers the characteristics of a brick, she does not "as-
sume" away the building, but rather presupposes the brick's
eventual function in the finished building.292
Consequently, the concept of the abstract person as free will
immediately presupposes other persons and in turn presupposes
property. "A person by distinguishing himself from himself re-
lates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that
these two persons really exist for each other."293 Similarly, in
the dialectic, private property will not merely be a creation of
positive law, as in Hobbes,294 but abstract property will presup-
pose that a more determinate positive law of property will even-
tually be written in a later stage in the development of society.
Conversely, law will not be created to protect property, as in
that of the state, because, as [the stage of] difference, it presupposes
the state; to subsist itself, it must have the state before its eyes as
something self-subsistent.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 266. This passage
shows that the logically earlier stage presupposes the later stage, rather than
the later presupposing the earlier.
291. See supra note 276 (quoting Rosenfeld's excellent description of the dif-
ference between Hegel and liberalism's use of the autonomous individual).
292. To give an analogy from physics, it is incorrect to say that the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle initially "assumes away" determinacy merely
because it posits that exact position and momentum do not exist simultaneously
at the subatomic level. Rather, as Norwood Russell Hanson explained,
Heisenberg's theory of indeterminacy at the subatomic level presupposes deter-
minacy (i.e., exact position and momentum) at the macro level. NORWOOD R.
HANSON, PATTEP s OF DiscovERY 136-49 (1965). The theory was abducted pre-
cisely to explain the logical necessity of determinacy in that one cannot explain
the presence of an element at one level by reference to the presence of a factor
at a lower level without devolving into a bad infinity of "turtles all the way
down." It is necessary to posit a level that does not contain the element to be
explained to develop a theory of the building blocks to that element. Before the
uncertainty principle, determinacy at the macro level depended on determinacy
at the molecular level, which depended on determinacy at the atomic level, and
so on. Heisenberg posited a level at which determinacy stopped, not to argue
that determinacy did not exist, but to explain how determinacy comes into be-
ing. The uncertainty principle is not merely the layman's vulgarized simplifica-
tion that observation affects the thing observed, making simultaneous
measurement of momentum and velocity impossible. Rather, the uncertainty
principle stands for the proposition, absolutely fundamental to quantum
mechanical theory, that momentum and velocity do not exist simultaneously,
and perhaps do not exist, unless we observe and measure them. See id. at 119-
120, 136-49.
293. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 38.
294. See Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and its Contempo.
rary Significance, in NoMos XXII, supra note 25, at 3, 18 [hereinafter Minogue,




Locke, 295 but will presuppose it. Or, more precisely, although
property will logically precede law, law and property will be mu-
tually constitutive. The moment of the creation of law will be
the moment of the recognition of property.2 96 Determinative
positive law (Gesetz) will be logically posited, not within the
realm of abstract right, but in the later more fully-developed
civil society.297
4. Introduction to Hegel's Theory of Property in Abstract
Right
Radin correctly states that Hegel's property theory includes
elements of possession, use, and exchange, but she wrongly sug-
gests that Hegel thus celebrated liberal, autonomous individual-
ity and was an apologist for the market economy.298 Rather, to
Hegel, these elements (especially exchange and the development
of contract) are a logically necessary bridge between the concept
of abstract will and the development of the person into an inter-
subjective subject.29 9 Property rights and market relations are
not absolute but are limited at the level of abstract right and,
more significantly, at the more complete levels of societal devel-
opment.300 As abstract wills, we are indistinguishable. Prop-
erty serves as the initial mediator that allows us to develop
simple relationships and to separate. Property gives us individ-
uating characteristics, creating concrete subjects-i.e., crea-
tures who are identifiable and recognizable. Having made
subjects recognizable, property then serves as the bridge of rec-
ognition between the subjects.
By positing the theory of minimal personhood as abstract
will, Hegel takes liberal theory seriously by taking the concept of
the autonomous individual to its logical extreme. If the person
295. See Minogue, The Concept of Property, supra note 294, at 17; Rosenfeld,
Contract and Justice, supra note 157, at 787-90.
296. Similarly, under Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, sexuality and the law
could be said to be mutually constituting. The declaration of the law as prohibi-
tion (i.e., the incest taboo) creates sexuality, but law as prohibition already
presumes the pre-existence of the sexuality it creates. In other words, the dec-
laration of law is the creation of sexuality, and the recognition of sexuality is
the creation of law. See infra notes 393-397 and accompanying text (describing
Lacan's theory of the development of law as prohibition).
297. HEGEL, PHiLOSoPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 128, at 134-37.
298. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1894-95.
299. See infra notes 310-329 and accompanying text (describing Hegel's the-
ory that property is necessary for intersubjectivity).
300. See infra notes 333-369 and accompanying text (discussing limits on
property at levels of abstract right and positive law).
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is truly free and autonomous, it must be free from all restraint
and all contingency. This means that it cannot have any con-
tent.30 ' Radin fails to recognize this key difference between
Kant and Hegel. True liberal freedom must be truly arbitrary.
If there was reason to a person's actions, the acts would be com-
pelled rather than free in this ultra-liberal sense.302 Because
the free person is defined as what it is not-as the lack of con-
straints and contingency-it can only be pure negativity.303
There is a hole in the center of human nature.
The abstract will is in contradiction, therefore, in that it
claims to be positive, in the sense of existing as self-conscious-
ness, yet it is pure negativity because it can only be described in
terms of what it is not.30 4 Moreover, the will is totally univer-
sal-it has no idiosyncratic or individualistic characteristics-
but is also totally subjective and solipsistic because it has no re-
lationships. 30 5 In other words, to say that the person is pure
negativity is to say that personality is pure potentiality or capac-
ity. The logic of personality, therefore, demands that the indi-
vidual realize her potential and fulfill her capacity by obtaining
positive content. The will seeks content and determinate exist-
ence by objectifying itself. It does this by expressing itself
through objects.30 6
Radin criticizes Hegel for presupposing a strict subject/ob-
ject distinction,307 so let us explore the notion of object. Hegel
defined the will as that which is an end to itself and not a means
to another's end.308 This starting definition implies a correlate,
301. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 37.
302. Id. at 48 (stating that "[tlhe freedom of the will... is arbitrariness").
303. Id. at 38.
304. Id. at 40.
305. According to Hegel,
The will is the unity of both these moments-particularity re-
flected into itself and thereby restored to universality. It is individual-
ity .... the self-determination of the T, in that it posits itself as the
negative of itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same
time remains with itself... , that is, in its identity with itself and
universality; and in this determination, it joins together with itself
alone.
Id. at 41; see also id. at 42, 44, 54-57, 70 (describing will as both universal and
individual).
306. Id. at 70 ("Personality is that which acts to overcome... this limitation
[of subjectivity] and to give itself reality .... Right is primarily that immediate
existence... which freedom gives itself in an immediate way,... as possession,
which is property .... ").
307. See supra notes 290-291 and accompanying text (quoting Radin as in-
terpreting Hegel as offering "bright line dichotomy" between subject and object).
308. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 37.
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namely, the thing that is a means to another's end-the object.
At the level of abstract right, the subject/object distinction is a
strictly logical truism: if the self is abstract self-consciousness
as pure negation, everything not capable of self-consciousness
and everything that has positive existence are objects in the
sense of being Other or separate from the subject. Hegel's con-
cept of the "object" is not empirical or limited to physical objects,
nor even an intuitive understanding of that which is internal to
the self. Rather, objects are defined as anything other than the
extremely abstract concept of will, which includes talents, ideas,
and personal characteristics, as well as wealth and physical
things.30 9
The first moment of property for Hegel is possession, by
which the will seeks to embody itself.310 Unlike Locke,311 Hegel
did not present possession of specific property by specific individ-
uals as being normatively justified but only as a logically re-
309. Hegel explained:
[Wihen 'thing' is contrasted with 'person' as such, not with the particu-
lar subject, it means the opposite of what is substantive, i.e. that whose
determine character lies in its pure externality....
Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiasti-
cal (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), in-
ventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a
parity through being bought and sold, with things recognized as
things.... Attainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are, of course,
owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it,
but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in something ex-
ternal and alienate them.., and in this way they are put into the
category of 'things.'
Id. at 40-41. Benson explains the objectification of intangible things:
Rather, "thing," like personality, refers to a mode of being and, more
specifically, to one that is defined in contrast to the self-relatedness of
personality. A thing is anything determinate-whether a capacity, an
action, or an object in the external environment-insofar as it can be
conceived as immediately different from free personality. Because a
thing is essentially external, its notion is not contradicted if it is given
a purpose from the outside. In other words, what is essentially exter-
nal can be used merely as a means: its end can be given to it by some-
thing that is other than it.
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Concep-
tion of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDozo L. Rxv.
1077, 1164 (1989) [hereinafter Benson, Contemporary Contract Theory].
310. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NiSBTr), supra note 19, at 76-88.
311. Locke argued that, although in the state of nature the object world be-
longs in common to all men, an individual is entitled to such property with
which he has intermixed his labor so long as one leaves "enough and as good" in
common for others and with some limitations against waste. JOHN LOCKS, Two
TREATISES ON GOvR mENT 288 (Peter Lashelt ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698).
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quired starting point for the abstract person.3 12 By possession,
Hegel insisted that he meant more than sensuous holding.
Rather, the purpose of possession is objectification-the taking
on of individuating characteristics to enable the abstract will to
actualize its freedom confirmed through recognition by other
persons.3 13 At all times, even at this earliest abstract moment,
the Hegelian concept of the person is always already implicitly
driven by the erotic desire to be desired. The individual cannot
exist except through concrete relationships with other individu-
als. Sensuous holding is the most determinate mode of posses-
sion, but also the most contingent and least adequate, because
the thief or the bully may easily defeat it. Marking the thing
owned to make it recognizable as one's own is less determinate
but more adequate as a mode of possession.3 14
The Hegelian notion of possession contains a contradiction
in that it is solipsistic but can only be understood in terms of
other persons. To possess something is to exclude others and
thus possession seems to separate us. But, insofar as the will
was totally free of contingency, it was already separate. Posses-
sion, therefore, reflects rather than causes separation. At the
same time, possession is dependent on other persons. The ele-
ment of possession-the intersubjectively recognizable identifi-
cation of an object to a subject-therefore presupposes the
existence of another subject who can recognize this identifica-
tion. This means that possession is separate but contains the
promise of relationship. The logic of property is the creation of
subjectivity as intersubjectivity.
Hegel's second moment of property in abstract right is the
use, or enjoyment, of the object of property.3 15 By using the ob-
ject, the will actualizes the fact that the object is a means to the
person's ends, Enjoyment is mastery of the object. Use, which
seems similar to Radin's concept of being bound up with an ob-
ject,3 1 6 is probably the most individualistic and separating of the
three Hegelian elements of property. But, once again, intersub-
312. At this early stage in his analysis, Hegel only purported to explain the
fact of property, but not the right to property. Brudner, The Unity of Property
Law, supra note 55, at 18, 32.
313. HEGEL, PmLosoPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 45; Benson,
Contemporary Contract Theory, supra note 309, at 1180; Brudner, The Unity of
Property Law, supra note 55, at 20-21.
314. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 47, 49, 239.
315. Id. at 49-50.
316. See supra notes 66-88 and accompanying text (describing Radin's the-
ory of being bound up with property).
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jectivity is latent in use. To enjoy property, one must be able to
exclude others from its inconsistent use. Different persons also
must not use their property in a way that interferes with one's
own enjoyment.3 17 Thus, enjoyment implies others through the
latent possibility of conflict or cooperation with others. Once
again, the separation of property looks forward towards relation.
Finally, Hegel described alienation as the third fundamen-
tal element of property.318 Radin incorrectly states that "[f]or
Hegel, alienability... was not inherent in the concept of prop-
erty, but rather followed from the premise that the presence of a
person's will makes something property."3 19 It is true that
alienation is not inherent in the object of property, but unlike
Radin, Hegel identified property as the interrelationship of per-
sons with respect to the object, not as the object itself. To Hegel,
this relationship creates subjectivity as intersubjectivity. As
such, he argued that alienation was a logically necessary ele-
ment of the rights that constitute property, albeit not the logi-
cally first element.
Alienation does not represent the ultimate in the individu-
alistic concept of the person nor does it represent self-alienating
commodification, as Radin argues. Radin suggests that aliena-
tion (i.e., commodification) separates persons because she as-
sumes a starting place of people already in community.3 20 This
is not the case in Hegel, because he began with abstract per-
sonhood outside of community and sought a logical method to
bind persons together so that they become subjects capable of
community. As we have seen, the Hegelian person started as
separate.321 Possession and enjoyment, Radin's favored prop-
erty rights, reflect this separation of persons, because they (like
the form of bodily integrity as chastity) implicitly depend upon
exclusion of others. It is only in alienation (or exchange) that
persons, who have been separated to be individuated, come to-
gether to have expressly intersubjective relations, in addition to
object relations.
317. For example, as I try to draft this paragraph, someone in an apartment
across the street from mine is using stereo equipment and Grateful Dead CDs
in an extremely loud manner inconsistent with my use of my apartment, my
word processor, and my ears.
318. Benson, Contemporary Contract Theory, supra note 309, at 1183.
319. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1892.
320. See supra notes 87, 91-93 and accompanying text (presenting Radin's
view that commodification threatens personal property).
321. See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text (discussing why
Hegel's analysis began with the abstract will).
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Up to now, property is subjective and objective and contra-
dictory. Standing alone, possession and enjoyment can be seen
as miserly, grasping, solipsistic relations of the will to her ob-
ject-they simultaneously deny the other, even as they presup-
pose the other. Alienation is the moment in property that allows
the implicit intersubjectivity of property, latent, in possession
and enjoyment, to become actualized. It is the moment when
the abstract person becomes an intersubjective subject who is
able to desire and interrelate with others.
One specific contradiction within the notion of property as
possession and enjoyment, according to Hegel, is that although
property is the attempt of the will to be recognized as an end for
itself through its objectification, the will is now dependent on
property for its recognition.3 22 The will no longer conforms to its
own definition as a free end for itself but is now, in Radin's
words, bound by and to things. Radin's image of the blushing
bride and her wedding ring withers into Miss Havisham and her
rotting wedding cake and finally shrivels down to the grotesque
specter of Gollum and the Ring-chastity at its extreme be-
comes sterility. In addition, the abstract will has objectified it-
self to be recognized by others, but in possession and enjoyment
the will has excluded others. Possession and enjoyment of ob-
jects are the abstract will's first steps to make itself recognizable
because possession and enjoyment are the ways by which the
will takes on individuating characteristics. But, the virgin will
cannot yet be recognized, because she still chastely wears the
veil separating herself from others. Like Miss Havisham, she
remains forever bride, never wife.
The will can only demonstrate its independence from the ob-
ject, and relate to other subjects, by alienating the object. Mere
abandonment is unsatisfactory because it destroys objectifica-
tion.323 Gift is a better form of alienation.3 24 By receiving a gift
from another person, the donee recognizes the donor's act of will.
By contrast, the donor is not treating the donee as a will but as a
means to the donor's ends of recognition. Consequently, gift is
still inadequate to the purpose of recognition. The donor is rec-
ognized, but not by someone whom the donor recognizes and
treats as a full person.3 25 In gift, the giver remains separated
and in control.
322. Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra note 55, at 31.
323. Id. at 34.
324. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 59.
325. Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra note 55, at 34.
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The most adequate form of alienation is contractual ex-
change. As in gift, when I exchange an object with another, the
other, as recipient, recognizes both my objectification in and in-
difference to the object.326 In exchange, however, I am not only
a giver but also a recipient who simultaneously recognizes the
other's objectification in and indifference to the object I receive.
In other words, I see her as someone who has her own ends
rather than merely as a means to my ends.3 27 I recognize her as
a subject whose recognition counts and she in turn reciprocally
recognizes me as a subject. This is the first moment at which I
can truly know myself as "I." Upon exchange, we cease to be
bound up with things and instead extend our arms to bind our-
selves to each other. The moment of exchange is the moment in
which the abstract will becomes a subject who recognizes and is
capable of being recognized.
But it is also an existent as an embodiment of the will, and from this
point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the will of an-
other person. This relation of will to will is the true and proper ground
in which freedom is existent.-The sphere of contract is made up of
this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means of a thing
and my subjective will, but by means of another person's will as well
and so hold it in virtue of my participation in a common will.
3 2 8
It is the act of contract itself that creates legal subjects capable
of contract. Contract recognizes a moment in which two persons
are united in that they are bound together in a common will at
the same time that they recognize each other as separate indi-
viduals having specific rights and duties. Because we share a
common will (i.e., the intent to exchange objects), we can simul-
taneously serve each others' ends without being reduced to the
mere means to each others' ends. The parties to contract are
simultaneously the same and different, actualizing the identity
of identity and difference.
The concepts of property, contract, and legal subject who is
capable of contract are mutually self-constituting.32 9 This is
also the moment of the creation of law as right (Recht). As I
have said, to Hegel, law does not positivistically create the insti-
326. According to Hegel:
Contract is the process in which there is revealed and mediated the
contradiction that I am and remain the independent owner of some-
thing from which I exclude the will of another only in so far as in iden-
tifying my will with the will of another I cease to be an owner.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 58.
327. Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra note 55, at 34.
328. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 57.
329. Id. at 38.
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tution of property. Instead, law is the moment of recognition of
property and the concept of property presupposed its recognition
in law. The person and property necessarily always look for-
ward to the subject and law, even as the subject and law neces-
sarily look back to the will and property. The relationship is
circular.
The relationships of abstract right are the most primitive
and therefore the most minimal, abstract, and inadequate rela-
tionships that two persons can have. But, the pitiful relation-
ships of abstract right are essential to establishing more
complete, satisfying relationships and ultimately to disproving
liberal theory. We have not even begun to speak of morality, let
alone ethics. Consequently, although the abstract right of prop-
erty must be preserved as a necessary building block of subjec-
tivity as intersubjectivity, it is not absolute. Property has its
limitations.
5. Limitations on Property
Hegel argued that the "liberal triad" of possession, use, and
alienation are logically necessary for a complete "property."
This argument does not imply that all instances of empirical
property must always be a logically full property or that by logi-
cal necessity all objects of property must be fully alienable. Ab-
stract right itself limits property rights, including the right of
alienability,330 and the logical necessities of the more developed
forms of social life, morality, and Sittlichkeit (rather inade-
quately translated as ethical life) further limit property rights
within the family, civil society, and the state.331 As society de-
330. Stillman explains:
In addition to the logical status of abstract right in his political philoso-
phy as a whole and to the characterization of the person as dynamic
and developmental, Hegel's ability to preserve and transcend property
also depends on his careful differentiation between the person's aliena-
ble property in things and his inalienable property in his life and lib-
erty. He makes this differentiation by following consistently and
rigorously his definition of property, and especially by insisting that
the object that is to be the property must be a single external thing,
"something not free, not personal, without rights."
Stillman, Hegel's Analysis, supra note 276, at 1042.
331. According to Stillman,
Generally, what allows and requires Hegel to limit the scope of
paradigmatic private property (the will in the thing, full and complete,
with free use, alienation, and contract) and to introduce other forms of
owning are three concerns. First is his sense that property, primarily
in logical order, is therefore primitive and less developed than later
attitudes and institutions in contributing to mature human freedom.
Second is his idea of the person as dynamic and developmental, acting
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velops into these higher stages, positive law may also govern ac-
tual, empirical instances of property.3 32
a. Limitations Within Abstract Right
Although Hegel's theory of free will identified all logically
external things as potential objects of property, not all objects
that the will appropriates for possession and use can become
subject to full property relations, including alienation. First,
one cannot have an unlimited right of alienation over one's
personality.
Therefore those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which
constitute my own private personality and the universal essence of my
self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is imprescrip-
tible. Such characteristics are my personality as such, my universal
freedom of will, my ethical life, my religion....
... Examples of the alienation of personality are slavery, serfdom,
disqualification from holding property, encumbrances on property, and
so forth. Alienation of intelligence and rationality, of morality, ethical
life, and religion, is exemplified in superstition, in ceding to someone
else full power and authority to fix and prescribe what actions are to be
done (as when an individual binds himself expressly to steal or to mur-
der, &c., or to a course of action that may involve crime), or what duties
are binding on one's conscience or what religious truth is, &c.
33 3
Radin criticizes Hegel's definition of the objects of alienable
property as relying on a hard subject/object distinction, based on
in and learning from the world. Third is the careful, logical, and con-
textual distinctions Hegel draws in his analysis, especially of aliena-
tion and contract abstract rights, and the attention to circumstances
(of things, individuals, and institutions) throughout all of ethical life.
Here, Hegel focuses on the matters that are the media of human rela-
tions for different institutions of Sittlichkeit; the social roles that the
individuals play in the different institutional settings, the demands
and purposes of the institutions themselves, and the relation between
individual and institution-between what is required for the full de-
velopment of individuals and the rational ordering of institutions.
Wh * en combined with his first concern, the primitiveness of full
and complete private property, the result is that in the major institu-
tions of Sittlichkeit, only the system of needs and the administration ofjustice directly actualize private property; in civil society, public au-
thority and corporations limit private property; and the crucial institu-
tions of family and state contain very little of private property and free
contract.
Id. at at 1065-66; see also supra notes 286-287 and accompanying text (describ-
ing Hegel's philosophy regarding collective property as contingent facts of life).
332. See infra notes 364-370 and accompanying text (discussing possible
limits on property within positive law).
333. HEGEL, PHLosOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 52-53; see also
Stillman, Hegel's Analysis, supra note 276, at 1044-45 (summarizing Hegel's
argument that personality is inalienable).
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her intuitive sense of what is internal and external to the self.334
Radin tries to explain Hegel's analysis as follows:
Hegel also cast the argument against alienation of personhood as a
"contradiction." To alienate personhood is itself contrary to per-
sonhood, in that ifI can relinquish my personhood, then no "I" remains
to have done the relinquishing. If I treat "the infinite embodiment of
self-consciousness" as something external and try to alienate it, Hegel
argued, one of two things results: if I really possess these substantive
attributes, they are not external and hence not alienated; if they are
alienated, I did not possess them in the first place. Hegel might have
been trying to say that substantive personhood is simply not capable of
objectification. The "contradiction" consists in supposing that one
could give up that which, "so soon as I possess it, exists in essence as
mine alone and not as something external." If this interpretation is
correct, then the contradiction poses the same subject/object problems
as Hegel's general view of property and alienation: Why is it that per-
sonhood cannot be objectified while at the same time personhood re-
quires objectification (in things)? Exactly what items are permanently
"inside" the subject and incapable of objectifications?
If the person/thing distinction is to be treated as a bright line that
divides the commodiflable from the inalienable, we must know exactly
which items are part of the person and which not. The person/thing
distinction and its consequences seemed obvious to Kant and Hegel,
but such is not the case for many modern philosophers. 3 35
Radin states further:
From the view that attributes and characteristics are separate posses-
sions, it is an easy step to conceptualize them as lying on the object
side of the subject/object divide. This eliminates inalienabilities based
on things internal to the person, because nothing is internal to the per-
son.... [lt is not difficult to see them as fungible and bearing implicit
monetary value.
3 3 6
In other words, Radin assumes that because Hegel started
with a sharp subject/object distinction, it is an "easy step" to uni-
versal commodification. She thinks it is logically inconsistent
from this starting point for Hegel to conclude that some "things"
become "internal" to the person and inalienable. Note that once
again Radin is applying a linear, liberal logic to Hegel. Because
the subject/object distinction and the autonomous will are logi-
cally prior to potential property limitations, she assumes that
they are also empirically and normatively prior and must set the
limits of inalienability.
Radin's is the reverse of Hegel's logic. Using the dialectic,
the strict subject/object distinction cannot characterize all object
relations in abstract right by definition. As I have already dis-
334. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1893-95.
335. Id. at 1896.
336. Id. at 1897.
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cussed, the subject/object distinction is a necessary logical corol-
lary of the definition of the abstract person as free will.337 We
have already seen that the abstract person contains its own con-
tradictions and is overcome and superseded by the legal subject
at the level of abstract right.338 If the abstract person goes
under, its logical corollary must also.
Let us examine Hegel's argument in more detail. Radin is
correct that Hegel started from a subject/object distinction and
used an internal/external metaphor, but she wrongly states that
Hegel's starting point is a simple intuitive sense of inner and
outer.33 9 Ifthe will is totally free from all contingency, all con-
tingency is "other" with relation to the will. The will is its own
end. Anything that does not have consciousness or can serve as
the means to the will's end is an object.340 Individuating charac-
teristics of personality start out as external to the "abstract per-
son" by logical tautology. They are not "objectified," as Radin
suggests, but rather are objects by definition. Hegel's "internal/
external" terminology is dictated by the German language. As
H.B. Nisbet explains in a note to his recent translation of Philos-
ophy of Right, the English word "alienation" does not satisfacto-
rily capture the connotations of the German equivalents
Entaeusserung and Veraeusserung because these words also
mean "to externalize."341 In other words, when Hegel is trans-
lated into English as saying that one cannot "alienate" that
which is "internal" by nature, he may merely be stating the
truisms that one cannot alienate that which is inalienable by
nature or externalize that which is internal by nature. Hegel
may not have intended his internal/external distinction to carry
the implications of mind/body that the English translation sug-
gests to Radin.
The inalienability of minimum personality at this stage is,
therefore, merely one of definition. If the minimum definition of
the person is the free will, one must not alienate one's capacity
for freedom. Because the German word for alienation is to ex-
337. See supra notes 307-309 and accompanying text (explaining subject/ob-
ject distinction).
338. See supra notes 302-306 and accompanying text (describing contradic-
tion between abstract will as pure negativity and as self-consciousness).
339. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1896-97.
340. See supra notes 388-392 and accompanying text (defining how the ab-
stract will seeks to embody itself through objects, including personality).
341. Nisbet particularly bemoans that the English translation makes it "im-
possible to reproduce the resulting network of etymological assocations."
HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 95 (translator's note).
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ternalize, this is expressed in terms of not externalizing that
which is internal. This does not mean that one cannot alienate
one's capacity for freedom as an empirical matter-one can be
enslaved, sell oneself into indentured servitude, or commit sui-
cide. But, if the goal of the will is to actualize its freedom and to
have this actualization verified through the recognition of other
free subjects, any act that destroys the will's capacity for free-
dom cannot be an abstract right; it must be a wrong in the sense
of an un-right (Unrecht).
Hegel also went beyond this logical truism that one cannot
split the atom of personhood without destroying personhood. At
the moment the abstract person begins to impose its will on ob-
jects, it begins to cease to be the abstract person and the subject/
object distinction begins to dissolve. Hegel could not have based
a notion of inalienability at the level of abstract right solely on
this dissolving distinction. Among the objects that the will ap-
propriates as part of its objectification are the individuating
characteristics of personality. These characteristics started out
as "objects" (i.e., external things) because they are contingent.
Once these former objects are internalized, they become inalien-
able as a matter of abstract right, not empirical fact. This con-
clusion is based on Hegel's theory of the internal rationality of
property-recognition by other subjects. He was, in effect, ask-
ing what absolute minimum3 42 objects a subject must retain to
remain recognizable as a specific individual by other subjects
and called these minimum objects "personality."343 For exam-
ple, Hegel concluded, not surprisingly, that one must be living to
be recognizable. Thus, suicide cannot generally be a right and is
usually a wrong.344 Slavery is wrong because it is the legal dec-
laration that a human being is not a person, but a thing, and
thereby denies the slave the human goal of recognition.3 45 Any
342. Speaking at the level of abstract right, we must ask what is minimally
necessary, not what is moral, ethical, or best to further human flourishing. We
have not yet even developed the concepts of morality and Sittlichkeit, which we
need to answer these important questions. See infra notes 363-370 and accom-
panying text (discussing Hegel's account of positive law).
343. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 95 ("Those
goods, or rather substantial determinations, which constitute my own distinct
personality and the universal essence of my self-consciousness are therefore in-
alienable, and my right to them is imprescriptible.").
344. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 241-42.
Hegel wrote that there is no "unqualified right" to suicide, hinting that there
may be a qualified right. Id. at 242.
345. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 96. Hegel did
not address the positive law of slavery and thus, as logical and empirical ques-
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status higher than slavery that gives minimum recognition to
the humanity of a person, as miserable as it may be, satisfies the
limited goals of abstract right even if it will not satisfy the goals
of morality and ethics.346
Thus, in contradistinction to Radin's assertion, Hegel
started with, but did not maintain, a simple subject/object dis-
tinction. Sublation overcomes and preserves the subject/object
distinction in property through the object of sublation. The dis-
tinction will continue to exist as an abstract logical moment that
captures the experience of separateness and distinction,3 47 but
must break down as a logical and an empirical matter as the
person becomes more determinate.
Hegel's subject/object distinction also does not lead to uni-
versal commodification, in contradistinction to Radin's asser-
tion, even at the level of abstract right. It is true that Hegel
believed that alienability is a necessary element of a full prop-
erty.348 It is also true that the development of the person-
which is the internal rationality of property-requires that cer-
tain minimum characteristics of personality be inalienable. 349
Consequently, the very rationality of abstract right necessitates
that property analysis exclude certain object relations. Prop-
erty-commodification-is self-limiting by its own logic.
Despite her criticisms of Hegel, Radin bases her own theory
on a simple and naturalistic internal/external distinction and on
an intuition as to what is internal or external to the person.
Moreover, it is literally, rather than figuratively, an internal/ex-
tions, did not answer whether certain slave-like positions-serfdom, peonage,
untouchability, forced prostitution-were philosophically equivalent to slavery.
346. Id. at 97 ("I can alienate individual products of my particular physicial
and mental... skills... for a limited period, because, provided they are subject
to this limitation, they acquire an external relationship to my totality and
universality.") (emphasis omitted).
347. Charles Sanders Peirce called this logical moment of separateness and
distinction "secondness." See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, REASONING AND THE LOGIC OF
THINGS 146-64 (Kenneth L. Ketner ed., 1992) (defining three categories of logi-
cal forms-firstness, secondness, and thirdness). Specifically, Peirce wrote:
A Secondness may be defined as a modification of the being of one
subject, which modification is ipso facto a mode of being of quite a dis-
tinct subject, or, more accurately, secondness is that in each of two ab-
solutely severed and remote subjects which pairs it with the other....
But though the secondness is secondary to the firstness, it constitutes
no limitation upon the firstness. The two subjects are in no degree one;
nor does the secondness belong to them taken together.
Id. at 147-48.
348. See supra notes 318-321 and accompanying text (describing Hegel's ar-
gument that alienability is necessary element of property).
349. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 52-53.
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ternal distinction based on the human body. As we have seen,
she chooses to base her analysis of property rights and in-
alienabilities precisely on a theoretical dichotomy between per-
sonal and fungible property, whereby the epitome of personal
property is the female body.350 Her very concern with universal
commodification reflects an intuition that some objects are so in-
ternal to personhood that their market alientation is destruc-
tive. Conversely, her concern with fetishism reflects an
intuition that some objects are so external to personhood that
overattachment to them is destructive. She expressly states
that she believes this is a useful theoretical dichotomy. 351 She
tries to deny this duality by calling her distinction a "contin-
uum," but this is an empirical distinction, not a logical one.
Hegel would agree with Radin that the internal/external dichot-
omy-or in her terminology, the personal/fungible dichotomy-
is logical rather than empirical. At the level of contingency (i.e.,
the concrete individual), this inner/outer distinction is gradual.
We have seen that Radin believes that the person/thing dis-
tinction is not as obvious to us moderns as it was to Hegel and
Kant.3 52 By criticizing Hegel for "objectifying" (i.e., externaliz-
ing) certain aspects of personality, Radin implies that these
things start out as not being other to the personality. She em-
phasizes her intuition that once we are "bound up" with things,
we cannot draw a line between our things and our self. She
points to the loss of self we can feel upon the loss of intimate
objects.353
Unfortunately, Radin's very language gives her away. That
Radiii speaks of the self as "bound up" with personal property
and insists that this process occurs empirically over historical
time reveals that she recognizes personal property as a thing
other than the self, even though she simultaneously argues that
certain things are internalized into the self. Furthermore, Ra-
din's whole analysis of expanded bodily integrity as "property"-
as a form of ownership, possession, and use of objects-reflects a
continuing subject/object relation. For example, Radin always
350. See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text (explaining Radin's the-
ory of property for personhood).
351. Specifically, Radin states, "If a dichotomy telescoping this continuum to
two end points is to be useful, it must be because within a given social context
certain types of person-thing relationships are understood to fall close to one
end or the other of the continuum .... " Radin, Property and Personhood, supra
note 1, at 987.
352. See supra text accompanying note 235 (quoting Radin).
353. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 1, at 959.
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speaks of the rights one has in and to one's own sexuality and
reproductive capacity, indicating an implicit distinction between
the self and the owned object. Whereas Hegel sees the subject/
object distinction as a theoretical one, Radin sees it as a physical
and empirical one based on literal internal/external distinctions.
Radin is correct that Hegel's limitation on the alienability of
personality at the level of abstract right is less than it seems.
Hegel argued that if abstract right does not allow us to sell or
destroy our lives as a whole, it does permit the sale of our pro-
ductive labor on oppressive terms.35 4 Thus, Radin's observation
merely reflects the validity of Hegel's theory that abstract right
standing alone is minimal, abstract, negative, and inadequate.
Hegel did not expressly develop a theory of whether ab-
stract right limits the partial physical alienation of personality,
such as in the sale of body parts. It is somewhat unfair to criti-
cize Hegel for this given that he was writing in the early nine-
teenth century,3 55 when the issues Radin raises with respect to
the sale of body parts are largely a result of twentieth-century
medical technology.3 56 Hegel also did not believe that philoso-
phy could offer prudential advice as to positive law. Hegel saw
such advice as the job of common sense or, in modem terms,
pragmatism.
A more justifiable criticism of Hegel might be that he did
not consider the alienation of personality in the context of prosti-
tution. This may be part and parcel of a more general critique of
Hegel: that he did not adequately deal with the issue of sexual-
ity in establishing identity. I would partially defend Hegel, how-
ever, even at this point. The ultimate question, from a
jurisprudential or a political philosophical standpoint, is not
whether Hegel personally gave an adequate account of the body,
sexuality, or property, but instead whether Hegel's philosophy
provides an adequate structure to analyze these issues. As we
have seen, he argued that any status that accords minimal rec-
354. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NiSBET), supra note 19, at 97.
355. Hegel recognized that "whatever happens, every individual is a child of
his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just
as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it
is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age.... ." HEGEL, PILOSO-
PHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 11.
356. Hegel may have thought that the possible issues in his time, such as
the sale of hair for wigs or teeth for dentures, were interesting but not central
philosophical issues, but rather matters for positive law. Radin notes that
Kant, in contrast to Hegel, discussed prostitution and the sale of teeth. Radin,
Market-Inalienability, supra note 1, at 1893 n.161.
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ognition as a human being can be justified in abstract right.35 7
This means that the legal wrong of slavery is not defined as a
specific legal or social regime but as any legal or social regime
that does not accord the minimum recognition of humanity to a
person.3 58
Alan Brudner argues that there is a second limitation on
property rights implicit even at the level of abstract right.35 9
Sometimes the very nature of property requires its own limita-
tion as a logical moment in the development of
the effective self-determination of the person.... Property itself was
constituted by a reciprocity of respect for persons; but since an absolute
property may become an external power, its own objectivity as a right
requires that it be limited by a deeper reciprocity of concern for the
subject's effective autonomy.360
In other words, the concept of property leads to mutual recogni-
tion of persons in exchange and contract. At first blush, it would
seem that at the level of abstract right, the "common will"
formed by exchange exists even if the contract is so one-sided,
because of duress or other circumstances, as to be unconsciona-
ble as a matter of equity. Brudner argues that, upon further
consideration, equitable limitations on legal property rights are
not in tension with rights but inherent in them. Unconscionable
contracts rob the exploited party of full personhood because the
party has lost its ability to be an end for itself. The exploited
party is merely a means to the exploiting party's ends. In an
unconscionable contract, the exploiting party might be recog-
nized by the exploited party, but the exploiting party cannot rec-
ognize the exploited as fully human. The exploited's recognition
does not count, and does not constitute the exploiter as a legal
357. See supra notes 342-346 and accompanying text (discussing Hegel's
view of slavery).
358. Hegel did not explicate which empirical legal regimes constitute slav-
ery. Under this definition, slavery could include the most degraded streetwalk-
ers or the most exalted courtesans. Radin and I might believe that any
commodification of feminine sexuality in prostitution necessarily, although im-
plicitly, accords less than human status to all prostitutes (or even all women)
and thus falls within the legal wrong of slavery.
359. Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra note 55, at 35-47. A com-
plete analysis of Brudner's interpretation of Hegel is beyond the scope of this
Article, but (despite my admiration for his work) I tend to think that he goes too
far in trying to argue the logic of certain rules of positive law, such as the doc-
trine of adverse possession. In my view, only pragmatic consideration can jus-
tify the doctrine of adverse possession. In other words, I agree with Brudner
that the internal logic of property demands limits to property rights, but logic
cannot demonstrate what limits it requires.
360. Id. at 46.
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subject.3 61 A "right" is something that furthers development of
the person. For property rights to fiflfill, rather than destroy,
the purpose of this will, they must be self-limiting.
Since it is only in so far as the will has an existence in something deter-
minate that it is Idea or actually free, and since the existent in which it
has laid itself is freedom in being, it follows that force or coercion is in
its very conception directly self-destructive because it is an expression
of a will which annuls the expression or determinate existence of a will.
Hence force or coercion, taken abstractly, is wrong.
3 62
Consequently, it is misleading for Radin to argue that Hegel
merely restates liberal laissez-faire economic theory, even at the
level of abstract right. Many of the concerns that Radin seeks to
address in formulating her theory of property for personhood
can be addressed even at the level of abstract personhood. What
is more, a proper Hegelian analysis opens up the possibility,
which is currently precluded in Radin's theory, of formulating a
more complete theory that can account not only for what Radin
calls "personal property" but also "fungible property." Law and
property, along with the individual and society, develop into
more adequate forms. Hegelian analysis also opens up the pos-
sibility of understanding the concrete individual in community
because it accounts for both community and individual.
b. Limitations of Positive Law
Hegel does not stop his analysis of property law at the level
of abstract right. For Radin to compare her theory of property
for personhood to Hegel, she must consider the role that prop-
erty plays not only at the level of abstract right but also in terms
of the individual in the state. Positive law and the administra-
tion of justice, as opposed to abstract right, are developments
associated with the level of civil society. Hegel adds affirmative
rights, such as rights for the satisfaction of needs, at this
level.3 63 Equity alleviates the harshness of strict application of
the law. Shared ownership through the family and corporations
is recognized. Limitations on property for the sake of the com-
munity may become appropriate. The Hegelian state, guided by
ethics (Sittlichkeit) rather than abstract right, will impose fur-
ther limitations on property to alleviate the degradation of the
361. Brudner's analysis reflects Hegel's famous master/slave dialectic.
362. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 66-67.
363. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (NISBET), supra note 19, at 227-31.
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poor, which is likely to result from the laissez-faire, abstract re-
gime of civil society.36 4
Hegel implied various limitations on rights and insisted on
the development of positive freedoms and duties at the more
complex levels of human interrelationships. Because he wrote
at a general level, however, he did not specify precisely what
these limitations would be or try to write the correct positive law
of property. Hegel insisted that any philosophy is a creature of
its own time because Geist and individuals are always manifest
in specific, concrete situations. Each society must develop its
own specific, positive law of property.3 65
Even though Hegel derived what Radin calls the "liberal
triad" of property rights (possession, use, and alienation), his
theory is not merely an apologia for the laissez-faire market.
Hegel did not believe that the harsh, inhuman world of Abstract
Right, in which he located his analysis of property and contract,
is the be-all and end-all of human society.36 6 Morality and eth-
ics are superior to right. It is not merely "impossible" to speak of
higher stages of social life in terms of abstract right, it is
"shameful."3 6 7 In the family, civil society, and the state, which
are fuller manifestations of social life, restrictions on full prop-
erty rights are appropriate.368 Unlike the Lockean tradition of
liberalism, the state in Hegel's view does not exist to protect
property rights. Rather, we protect property rights because they
are necessary for the existence of the state. Nor do property
rights serve the Hobbesian liberal function as the barrier that
364. See generally WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 26-
35 (concluding that Hegel's discussion of rational society posits subsistence
rights as general human rights); Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra
note 55, at 56-65 (relating property to theme of dialogic community).
365. Hyland suggests that Hegel "did not dream of dictating to us ... the
resolution of conflicts between the individual and society. Hegel's theory leaves
us free to resolve these issues for ourselves." Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User's
Manual, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 1735, 1741 (1989) (footnote omitted).
366. Westphal explains:
Property is the first embodiment of freedom because it is freedom in its
immediacy, and the logic that determines the proper form of philosoph-
ical thinking.... The property rights of legal persons are the first em-
bodiment of freedom, not because they are the most important form of
freedom, not because they are the causal condition of other modes of
freedom, but because they are the least developed, least adequate,
least rational form that freedom can take without ceasing to be free-
dom. Hegel is very blunt about this.
WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNTY, supra note 185, at 29.
367. See, e.g., HEGEL, PHmLOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 58
(specifically criticizing attempts to analyze marriage in terms of contract).
368. Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, supra note 55, at 42-47.
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protects the individual from the state. Property is, instead, nec-
essary for human freedom and intersubjectivity.369
Hegel did not consider the great disparity of wealth and the
degradation of the lower classes an accidental aspect of the mar-
ket (i.e., civil society) that we could easily adjust. Rather, he con-
sidered degradation of the poor to be an inevitable result of
laissez-faire capitalism. Hegel did not excuse this degradation,
but saw it as a reflection of internal contradictions within the
market. To Hegel, market relations would logically develop to
serve the internally rational goal of the development of human
freedom, but leave a section of society in a sub-human state.
Moreover, although the market requires us to act as radical indi-
vidualists, by coming to the market, we become dependent on all
others who trade in the market. Consequently, the civil society
must eventually collapse and be superseded by the state, which
will not replace but can harmonize the market.370
C. Is HEGEL USEFUL IN A FEMINIST CHALLENGE TO
PATRIARCHY?
Despite my criticism of Radin's reading of Hegel in this es-
say, I wish to re-emphasize my earlier point that Radin, never-
theless, implicitly makes one powerful critique of traditional
Hegelian theory. This critique, when combined with Lacan's
psychoanalytic theory, can form a devastating feminist-Hegelian
critique of patriarchy.
Hegel was empirically and, according to Lacan, psychoana-
lytically writing from the masculine position. Perhaps reflecting
369. See WESTPHAL, HEGEL AND MODERNITY, supra note 185, at 28-31. Spe-
cifically, Westphal states:
Because property is the first embodiment of freedom for Hegel, his the-
ory is a critique of liberalism's (naturalist) tendency to make biological
survival and economic prosperity the end for which political and civil
rights are the means. Now, because property is the first embodiment of
freedom (in the Hegelian sense of logical priority), his theory is also a
critique of liberalism's (formalist) tendency to define freedom without
paying sufficient attention to questions of morality, the family, political
community, and severe poverty. When Locke makes property rights
first, it is because they are the end to which everything else is means.
When Hegel puts them first it is because in their immediate form as
the minimal mode of human freedom they are in radical need of correc-
tion and completion through contextualizing.
Id. at 32.
370. See Wood, Editor's Introduction, supra note 219, at xxiv-xxvi (explain-
ing Hegel's vision of the state as "ultimate end"); WESTPHAL, HEGEL ANID MO-
DERNITY, supra note 185, at 44-45 (discussing Hegel's distinction between the
state and civil society).
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traditional European-Christian misogynist theology, which
identifies the body and sexuality with the feminine and the mind
and personality with the masculine,371 Hegel never attempted
to account for sexuality per se. Specifically, he never reflected
upon whether one's sexuality is so intrinsic to one's personality
as to be inalienable even at the level of abstract right. One pos-
sible Hegelian argument might be that the very concept of "ab-
stract right" deals with "abstract personality," stripped of all
contingent, concrete characteristics, including sexuality. This
would suggest that Hegel has postponed this issue into a later
stage in the dialectic.
Indeed, Hegel did discuss sexual difference briefly in Philos-
ophy of Right. Despite Hegel's claims to logic and to avoiding
unsupported presuppositions, however, as is usually the case
when men talk about women, logic flies out the window. Hegel's
discussion of marriage consists largely of conclusory statements
reflective of nineteenth-century misogyny.3 72 He echoes nine-
teenth-century sexual stereotypes and then claims that these
sexual differences are rational. He does not logically prove the
existence of sexual difference as a theoretical necessity. He
merely declares that because these differences could exist, they
do and must exist. Moreover, he assumes, without proof, that
these "rational" sexual positions are inevitably assigned to the
two biological sexes.373
371. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Lib-
eral Attempt to Neutralize Radical Feminism, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMmmM 123
(1992) (discussing Christian tradition of rewriting man/woman dichotomy as
spirittflesh dichotomy); Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, supra note 29, at
1160-87 (same).
372. My favorite statement by Hegel about marriage is, "Women are edu-
cated-who knows how?-as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather
than by acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is
attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion." HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (KNox), supra note 19, at 264. Unfortunately, Hegel's
viciously misogynist account of women's knowledge is frequently echoed today
by many self-identified feminists who speak of women's concrete knowledge and
women's ways of knowing generally.
373. Specifically, Hegel wrote:
The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has
a rational basis and consequently acquires an intellectual and ethical
significance....
Thus one sex is mind in its self-diremption into explicit personal
self-subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality
.... The other sex is mind maintaining itself in unity as knowledge
and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and volition in the form
of concrete individuality and feeling. In relation to externality, the for-




A combination of Radin's legal theory and Lacan's psycho-
analytic theory opens up the issue of whether the positions of
sexuality are already logically necessitated, even at the levels of
abstract personality and abstract right. As we have seen, prop-
erty leads to recognition of others through exchange.374 As I dis-
cuss below, Lacan, who applied the Hegelian dialectic to the
psyche, argued that recognition requires a sexuated position,
with the masculine taking on the subjective and the feminine
taking on the objective role.3 75 As I shall discuss, from a psycho-
analytic viewpoint, the very concept of being a person who can
recognize another person, even at the most abstract level of con-
tract, requires sexuality. Sexuality, in this view, is not contin-
gent, but is constitutive of subjectivity. The Lacanian insight
supports the feminist insistence that the Hegelian system can-
not fulfill its claim as being a theory of concrete human freedom
in society unless it expands to include both a theory of sexuality,
generally, and a theory of property that deals with the objectifi-
cation of the female body, specifically. In light of Lacan's theory,
Hegelians must address whether sexuality is essential to per-
sonality at the level of abstract right. Is the circle of Hegel's
dialectic drawn so tightly that it precludes a logical analysis of
sexuality? If so, can the circle be redrawn? If not, must we re-
ject it as inadequate?
In the next section I argue that feminism reveals the inter-
nal, logical contradiction of masculinism. The Hegelian/La-
canian masculinist story of subjectivity is partial and
inadequate. But, masculinism cannot merely be rejected and re-
placed by a feminism that is a simple negation. Rather, through
sublation, it should be preserved as having a true moment and
as being an element of an internal critique of masculinism that
is necessary for its being overcome by an inclusive feminism as
gendered humanism.
V. THE LACANIAN REWRITING OF HEGEL
I began this Article by suggesting that Jacques Lacan's psy-
choanalytic theory may provide an insight into Radin's insis-
tence on the objective, and denial of the intersubjective, aspects
of property. Lacan's theory can be interpreted as applying the
Hegelian dialectic to Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Lacan's in-
374. See supra notes 326-328 and accompanying text (presenting Hegel's
theory that exchanging property is necessary for recognition).
375. See infra notes 398-409 and accompanying text (describing Lacan's sex-
uated positions).
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sight that "the desire of man is the desire of the Other"376 owes
as much to Hegel's theory of subjectivity as intersubjectivity as
it does to Freud's theory of the subconscious. 377 In particular,
there are parallels between the role that property plays in
Hegel's theory of the development of the legal subject and the
role that the Feminine, in the sense of the Phallic Woman, plays
in Lacan's theory of the development of the psychoanalytical
subject. Property, to Hegel, and the Feminine, to Lacan, are the
external objects that enable desiring subjects to constitute them-
selves through exchange.378
Feminists who encounter Lacan are split as to whether his
theories are misogynist. Some argue that we should reject La-
can's theories because they are misogynist,3 79 but others argue
that feminists should accept Lacan because his theory that sexu-
ality is not biologically determined means that he is not misogy-
nist.380 I take a third approach. Feminists should not reject or
accept Lacan's theories because the man was or was not person-
376. LAcAN, EcRrrs, supra note 16, at 264.
377. See generally Edward S. Casey & J. Melvin Woody, Hegel, Heidegger,
Lacan: The Dialectic of Desire, in INTERPRETING LACAN: 6 PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE Hurma"rrs 75 (Joseph Smith & William Kerrigan eds., 1983) (discussing
Hegel's influence on Lacan).
Slavoj Zizek is probably the most insightful proponent of a Hegelian inter-
pretation of Lacan. See, e.g., ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra
note 20; SLAvoJ ZIZE, LOOKING AwRy: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN
THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE (1991); SLAvoJ ZmZEy, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDE-
OLOGY (1989) [hereinafter ZIZEK, OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY]; ZIZEK, TARRYING
THE NEGATIVE, supra note 40; see also BENEvENuTo & KENNEDY, WoRxs OF LA-
CAN, supra note 16, at 130 (discussing Lacan's notion of desire and object); ELz-
ABETH GRosz, JACQUES LACAN: A FEmINST INTRODUCTION 64-65 (1989)
[hereinafter GRosz, FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LACAN] ("[Lacan's] notion of de-
sire is remarkably close to that of Hegel."); JEAN-Luc NANCY & PHMLLPE
LACOUE-LABARTHE, THE TITLE OF THE LETTER: A READING OF LACAN 121 (Fran-
cois Raffoul & David Pettigrew trans., 1992) ("he excentricity of the Lacanian
subject is always posited in reference to Hegel."); STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JAC-
QUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO 99 (1983) (same).
378. See Schroeder, The Vestal and The Fasces, supra note 10, at 14-15.
379. See SOMER BRODRIBB, NOTHING MAT(T)ERS: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
POSTmODERNISM 89-118 (1992) (forceful recent anti-Lacan polemic). Other fem-
inists such as Drucilla Cornell, Luce Irigaray, and Elizabeth Grosz are critical
of Lacan and distance themselves from his misogyny, yet remain deeply influ-
enced by Lacan's thought.
380. Jane Gallop has stated this argument very well:
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan takes Irigaray to task for misreading the mean-
ing of the phallus in Lacan: 'Irigaray reads Lacan ideologically and
substantively .... By equating the phallic signifier with patriarchy,
she substantivizes the concept biologically such that Phal-
lus=penis=male.... [She] fail[s] to see that the phallic signifier is in-
trinsically neutral.' Ragland-Sullivan succeeds where Irigaray 'fails.'
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ally misogynistic, although I am inclined to think that he was.
Rather, feminists should consider Lacanian psychoanalytical
theory because it is the most convincing and powerful account
of, and explanation for, misogyny that I have yet found.
A. INTRODUCTION TO LACAN'S PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY
Lacan, having been deeply influenced by Hegel, applied a
retroactive logic. He did not argue that sexuation is inevitable
when viewed chronologically from the point of view of the infant.
Rather, he observed the way sexual roles function in our society,
and abducted a hypothesis that leads logically and necessarily to
this result when observed retroactively.
In Lacan, the myth of the exchange of women among the
community of men allows the infant to recognize and desire
other persons as persons and, therefore, to recognize himself as
a person who is capable of being desired. Law and the Feminine
are mutually constitutive-the moment of the writing of law as
language and as prohibition (i.e., the incest taboo) is precisely
the moment of the recognition of sexuality, even as the very con-
cept of sexuality presupposes the existence of the incest ta-
Probably all Lacan's advocates somewhere make the point that his
detractors misread him by failing to distinguish the 'phallus' from the
'penis.'
GALLOP, READING LACAN, supra note 47, at 134 (footnote omitted); see generally
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual
Difference, in LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49 (E. Ragland-Sullivan &
M. Bracher eds., 1991) [hereinafter Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade]
(discussing neutrality of Lacan's concept of sexuality). Ragland-Sullivan partic-
ularly critiques Jacqueline Rose's view of Lacan's theory.
Rose's Lacan sees the sexual divide as determined by the biological lit-
eralism of having or not having the phallus cum penis. That is, ana-
tomical difference figures cultural interpretation of sexual
difference....
What Lacan actually says in Seminaire XXis that males can make
the error of believing they are whole simply because 'male' signifies
that which opposes itself to female.
Id. at 50; see also Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 88
("The gender types described by Lacan are at least facially consistent with
many contemporary gender stereotypes-many of which are highly
misogynist.").
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boo. 3 8 ' The speaking, psychoanalytic subject is the artificial
creation of law and sexuality.38 2 Let me explain briefly.383
Hegel started his analysis of property with an account of the
abstract will.38 4 Lacan started with the infant, which exists in
the order of the Real.38 5 This is the world of impossibility, limi-
381. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David G. Carlson, The Subject is Nothing, 5
LAw & CRITIQUE 93, 100 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder & Carlson, Subject is
Nothing]; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 15. Grosz
explains, "The father regulates the child's demands and its access to the mother
by prohibiting (sexual) access to her." GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LA-
CAN, supra note 377, at 68. In Lacan's usage, "incest taboo" does not refer to
prohibition of biological incest with actual woman, but to the law of exclusion.
Thus, the incest taboo is not so much a biological 'no,' as it is a strong
cultural injunction to boys to identify away from the maternal and the
feminine, to substitute the name of a lineage to the desire of a
mother.... Indeed, the figure of the male qua male might be called the
cultural lie which maintains that sexual identity can be personified by
making difference itself a position.
Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade, supra note 380, at 50-51.
Benevenuto and Kennedy remark that "Levi-Strauss'[s] symbolic function de-
pends on the law of incest, while Lacan's notion of the Symbolic Order depends
on the law of the father." BENEVENuTo & KENNEDY, WORKS OF LACAN, supra
note 16, at 102.
382. Rose, Introduction II, supra note 47, at 41; see also Juliet Mitchell, In-
troduction I to LAcAN, FE mm SEXUALrrY, supra note 47, at 4 ("[N]either the
unconscious nor sexuality can in any degree be pre-given facts, they are con-
structions ..... ).
383. Lacan's theories are notoriously complex and ambiguous and there is
wide disagreement as to how to interpret them. A thorough exegesis of his the-
ory of sexuality is beyond the scope of this Article. I have compared more thor-
oughly the relationship between Lacan's theory of the Phallic Woman and
Hegel's theory of property in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note
10. For a general introduction to Lacan's theory of sexuality, see LAcAN, FEMI-
NIE SExuALrr, supra note 47; DRUcILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION:
ETHIcAL FEMnImSM, DECONSTRUCTION AND TE LAw (1991) [hereinafter Cos-
NELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION]; Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World:
Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 644 (1990) [hereinafter
Cornell, Doubly-Prized World]; Drucilla Cornell & Adam Thurschwell, Femi-
nism, Negativity, Intersubjectivity, 5 Pmas INT'L 484 (1986); and GRosz, A
FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LACAN, supra note 377.
384. See supra notes 249-260 and accompanying text (explaining how
Hegel's analysis starts with the abstract will as primitive means to establish
abstract rights).
385. The Real is a category of the human psyche and therefore is not the
same as the external world. Lacan's notions of psychic orders are extremely
complex and paradoxical. Indeed, he continually revised them throughout his
life so that "[w]ith the development of Lacanian teaching in the sixties and sev-
enties, what he calls 'the Real' approaches more and more what he called, in the
fifties, the Imaginary." ZIZEk, OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 377, at 162. For
the limited purposes of this Article, however, it is enough to say that the Real
often functions as what we laypeople think of as reality. Grosz explains:
The child, in other words, is born into the order of the Real. The Real
is the order preceding the ego and the organization of the drives. It is
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tations, and necessity. It is that which is beyond the realm of
Symbolic (discussed below) and therefore, by definition, cannot
be captured in language. For some purposes it is useful,
although admittedly simplistic, to say the Real stands in for the
physical or "object" world pre-existing outside of human con-
sciousness and language-i.e., nature. Psychoanalytically, it
also means all other forms of limitation with which we do not
have direct experience, including the gods and death.
In the Real, the infant has no consciousness. Its3 86 relation
to the world is immediate; it experiences itself as one with the
object world including its "mother." It is even misleading to say
that the infant experiences this union because as soon as it
starts becoming aware of experience, it begins to be aware of
itself as distinct. It is entering the mirror stage that will bring it
into Lacan's next order of existence, the Imaginary.
The Imaginary is the order of the image. In this mirror
stage, the child becomes aware of itself as separate through the
mediating function of sexuality.38 7 This is the beginning of the
subjectlobject distinction.38 The infant becomes aware of the
an anatomical, 'natural' order (nature in the sense of resistance rather
than positive substance), a pure plenitude or fullness. ... The Real is
not however the same as reality; reality is lived as and known through
imaginary and symbolic representations.
GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 377, at 34. Later,
Grosz adds:
Need is the experiential counterpart to nature. Need comes as close to
instincts as is possible in human existence. Needs are more or less
universal or constant in human life, they are the requirements of brute
survival: nourishment, shelter, warmth, freedom of movement, a mini-
mal community, and so on.... Need requires real, tangible objects for
its satisfaction .... An instinctually triggered series of impulses and
behaviour, need is always in principle capable of, indeed requires,
satisfaction.
Id. at 59-60; see also Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 23, at 67-69 (analyz-
ing how contemporary property jurisprudence conflates symbolic, legal concept
of property with the real concept of underlying object just as psychoanalysis
tends to conflate the symbolic concept of sexuality with real concept of anatomi-
cal sex).
386. I use the neutral pronoun because sexuality is a Symbolic position and
thus does not exist in the Real.
387. LACAN, EcarTs, supra note 16, at 2.
388. Grosz explains the beginning of the subject/object distinction:
Only at this moment [i.e., the mirror stage] does [the child] become
capable of distinguishing itself from the 'outside' world, and thus of
locating itself in the world. Only when the child recognizes or under-
stands the concept of absence does it see that it is not'one,' complete in
itself, merged with the world as a whole and the (r)other.




Mother as Other-as radical alterity.38 9 This realization is
gain, in the sense that separation, which is necessary for recog-
nition, is the beginning of personality. Yet, this realization is
also experienced as loss, in the sense that the infant imagines
that it has lost a mythic prior state of union with the lost
Mother.3 90 The child is not yet a subject, however. It does not
experience itself as a person, but merely as not-mother. Like the
Hegelian person of abstract will, the infant in the mirror stage is
pure negativity. The M(O)ther is the mirror image in which it
sees itself. On the one hand, it wishes to regain the imaginary
lost union with the Other. On the other hand, it wants to con-
tinue to exist. It both wants to smash the mirror and to sub-
sume the Mother, and fears that it will be subsumed by her.39 '
The empirical analog to this theoretical stage is the aggressivity
that infants begin to display towards their mother starting
around the age of six months.
At this point, the relation between the infant and the object
world, like the relationship between the will and the object of
property in possession and use, is ostensibly dual. Because the
relationship between the infant and the Mother is not yet medi-
ated by a third term, the infant can only imagine union as ab-
sorption and destruction of separate personhood.392 The infant
is solipsistic, greedy, and aggressive. The infant, however, is an
imaginary experience of the world, which does not recognize, but
already presupposes, the addition of the third term to serve as
For Lacan the subject is constituted through language-the mirror im-
age represents the moment when the subject is located in an order
outside itself to which it will henceforth refer. The subject is the sub-
ject of speech (Lacan's 'parle-etre'), and subject to that order. But if
there is division in the image, and instability in the pronoun, there is
equally loss, and difficulty in the word. Language can only operate by
designating an object in its absence. Lacan takes this further, and
states that symbolization turns on the object as absence.
Rose, Introduction II, supra note 47, at 31; see also GALLOP, READING LACAN,
supra note 47, at 38 ("But Lacan posits that the mirror constructs the self, that
the self as organized entity is actually an imitation of the cohesiveness of the
mirror image.").
389. GRosz, A FEMInNE INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 377, at 42.
Grosz explains, "It is by identifying with and incorporating the image of the
mother that it [the infant] gains an identity as an ego." Id. at 43. By Mother,
Lacan does not mean the female parent but a specific role in psychoanalytic
development. Id. at 42. In the traditional patriarchal family, however, it is
usually the female parent who plays this role.
390. Id. at 41.
391. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 112-14.




the mediator that will allow the creation of subjectivity as
intersubjectivity.
In the Oedipal stage, the third term is added and the child
encounters the order of the Symbolic-i.e., the order of law, lan-
guage, and sexuality.393 This movement is dialectic. As in
Hegel, the earlier experiences are not destroyed by sublation,
but are negated and preserved. The three realms of the Real,
Imaginary, and Symbolic remain simultaneously separate and
intact, yet bound together like a Borromean Knot.39 4
This third term comes with the recognition of the function of
the Father. Once again, this is not the actual male parent, but
the role (which is usually filled by the male parent in the patri-
archal family) of the law giver and lover of Mother, sometimes
called the "Name of the Father."395 With the recognition of the
Father, the child recognizes that the world is not divided into
393. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK I, FREuD's PA-
PERS ON TECHNIQUE 1953-1954 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & J. Forrester
trans., 1988) [hereinafter LAcAN, SExMINAR I].
394. A Borromean Knot is three overlapping, rather than interconnecting,
rings.
395. BENEVENUTO & KENNEDY, WoRKS OF LACAN, supra note 16, at 133; see
also Translator's Notes to JACQUES LACAN, THE FoUR FUNDAmENTAL CONCEPTS
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 281-82 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & A. Sheridan trans.,
1981) (noting that "Name of the Father" refers to symbolic father, not real or
imaginary father).
Both Freud and Lacan believed the symbolic Father who imposes the law is
the dead Father in whose name the child writes the law. The child not only
wants to murder the Father as hated rival for access to the M(O)ther, in his
mind he has already done so. Out of guilt for this psychic murder, the child
denies it by writing and then submitting to the Law of the Father, namely, thou
shalt not have access to the Mother and thou shalt not murder the Father. The
child pretends the Father wrote the Law of the Father but, in fact, the child
wrote the Law of the Father in the Name of the Father. Consequently, in La-
canian theory, the Symbolic function of the Father is often called the Name of
the Father. See GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LACAN, supra note 377, at
67-69.
The child's strategy is to say "I cannot have murdered the Father because I
am law abiding and the law says I may not murder the Father," but this strat-
egy is not effective. Indeed, it is the failure of this strategy that makes the law
effective through the child's unforgivable guilt for having broken the law.
The child's strategy shows that Lacan's conception of dialectical necessity,
like Hegel's, is retroactive. Only by prohibiting the murder of the father and
incest with the mother do these unspeakable, impossible acts become speakable
and possible. The child "murdered the Father" before the child wrote the Law
of the Father. The child broke no law and cannot be guilty. The child creates
his own guilt by retroactively writing and applying a law that is always already
broken. "[lWe are able to speak only under the aegis of the paternal meta-
phor-of the dead (murdered) father who returns as his Name." ZIZEK, FOR
THEY KNow NOT WHAT THuY Do, supra note 20, at 105. "In a way, Freud was
already aware of it when, in Totem and Taboo, he wrote that, following the
1994]
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the duality of the infant and the M(O)ther. The Father is the
child's rival. The Law imposed in the Name of the Father is pro-
hibition-the incest taboo. The child may not regain union with
the Mother.396 The child may not murder the Father. This sep-
aration from the Mother is experienced as the psychoanalytic
concept of "castration" or permanent loss of the Phallic Mother.
As recompense for the loss of the M(O)ther, the child is promised
access to other women and entrance into the society of Fathers
through exchange. 397
What does this have to do with the creation of subjectivity
and sexuality? In Lacanian terminology, the term for the object
of desire is the "Phallus." The loss of the Phallus is "castration."
This is not the same as the feared loss of the male organ, but we
will psychoanalytically conflate the two (hence the terminology).
The object of desire can, of course, be the lost Mother with whom
we imagine we were once united in the Real. This mother is not
any actual mother, but the M(O)ther of radical alterity. This
means that the Phallic Mother (i.e., the ideal of the Feminine)
does not exist.398 She is beyond the discourse and interpretation
of the Symbolic realm of language and beyond the imagery of the
Imaginary.399 She is Real in this technical sense-that which
primordial patricide, the dead father 'returns stronger than when he was alive'
•..." Id. at 134.
396. GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 377, at 68. In
Lacan's usage, "incest taboo" does not refer to actual prohibition of biological
incest with actual woman, but to the law of exclusion. See supra note 381 (ex-
plaining parameters of incest taboo in Lacanian theory).
397. GROSZ, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LAcAN, supra note 377, at 68; LA-
cAN, SE MNAR I, supra note 393, at 262. This promise is never kept because it is
impossible to keep. Because the Father does not have the Phallus, he can never
keep his promise to exchange it. Consequently, nothing is every really ex-
changed, there are no sexual relationships, and the subject is nothing. See
Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 133-34; Schroeder &
Carlson, Subject is Nothing, supra note 381, at 100-01.
398. See Cornell, Doubly-Prized World, supra note 383, at 661 (noting "La-
can's infamous assertion that Woman does not exist"); see also CoRNELL, BE-
YoND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 383, at 39 (arguing that woman does not
exist because the ideal of the Feminine cannot be adequately represented in
language). Although scholars frequently quote Lacan as "Woman does not ex-
ist," the precise quote is "The Woman does not exist." This quote does not sug-
gest that anatomical female human beings are less real than males, but that
the feminine per se is beyond the grasps of the symbolic order of language and
consciousness. It defines the feminine as beyond discourse. Jacques Lacan,
God and the Jouissance of The Woman: A Love Letter, in LAcAN, FEnoMNE SEX-
uALrrY, supra note 47, at 144; see also Rose, Introduction II, supra note 47, at 50
(noting that woman is "Other" and cannot be known or represented).
399. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 10, at 144-45.
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serves as the limit and the impossible. We are speaking sub-
jects, however, who only exist in discourse.400
In the Symbolic realm, the Law of the Father imposed in the
Name of the Father preserves the Phallic Mother for the Father.
The child also perceives that the Father is desired by the
Mother. He concludes that Mother must lack, and Father must
have, the object of desire-the Phallus.401
We have also seen that the Name of the Father offers to
compensate the child for submitting to castration under the Law
of the Father by allowing him to become an adult and to possess
other women (i.e., a Phallus) in the future. It is this fiction of
castration and exchange of women that enables the child to rec-
ognize himself as a subject who can be desired by, and therefore
can desire, others. Consequently, the Phallus that the Father is
supposed to have, and that the Mother is supposed to lack, is the
Phallic Mother herself. The Phallus is the universal signifier of
subjectivity. 40 2
This division establishes two possible positions that an indi-
vidual can take: having the Phallus, or being the Phallus.40 3
This is reflected in European languages that divide all predicate
forms into having and being.40 4 In our society, anatomically
male parents generally fulfill the psychoanalytic role of Father
and anatomically female parents generally fulfill the psychoana-
lytic role of Mother. We look to empirical parents to determine
what actual fathers have that actual mothers lack. This is how
we conflate the penis with the Phallus.40 5 Because the man has
the penis, which is conflated with the Phallus, subjectivity is
400. The Lacanian psychoanalytic subject is formed in language. The sub-
ject is the subject of, and therefore subject to, language. See Schroeder, Bundle-
0-Stix, supra note 23, at 9.
401. COmqELL, BEYoND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 383, at 38 ("Woman, as
a result, is identified only by her lack of the phallus. She is difference from the
phallus.').
402. Grosz explains:
Lacan argues that both sexes are constituted as sexually different, as
sexed subjects, only with reference to the phallic signifier. Masculine
and feminine positions are a function, not of biology but of the very
structure of language. In French as in English, the verb is modified by
its conjugation with either being (etre) or having (avoir). The two sexes
are positioned as such in the mode of being (for the feminine), and hav-
ing (for the masculine), the phallus.
GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 376, at 131.
403. Id.
404. Id. Non-European languages may also have this distinction, but I am
ignorant of the grammar of those languages.
405. Id. at 116-17.
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psychoanalytically the masculine. In other words, the position of
having the Phallus, or being the speaking subject, is psychoana-
lytically the position of the masculine. The position of being the
Phallus, or the object of exchange, becomes the psychoanalytic
position of the feminine.406 These positions of sexuality are
therefore not the same as anatomy.40 7 To become sexual adults,
however, we must take on one of these two positions. Although
persons of both anatomical sexes may take on both positions
from time to time,408 we tend to take on the position that more
or less corresponds to anatomical analogs. Sexuality is a fiction,
but it is a fiction that finctions. In other words, to Lacan, wo-
men are not inferior to men, but in our position as objects, we
are subjected.40 9
The Lacanian story is one of emptiness and desire. The
Feminine as Phallic Mother does not exist. The Feminine is
thus perceived as "lack."410 We are, but we do not have. Lacan
argued that those who take on the Feminine position of objectiv-
ity live femininity as a sense of loss. 4 11 This is the Lacanian
rewriting of the Freudian concept of penis envy. Women do not
have an actual desire to have a penis (as Freud sometimes sug-
gested), but have a nostalgic longing for an imagined lost state
of wholeness, experienced from the Feminine position.412 For
Lacan, the Feminine as lack is silent. The position of the speak-
ing subject who has the Phallus and therefore can engage in in-
tersubjective exchange in the Symbolic order of language is
406. Id. at 131.
407. See Rose, Introduction II, supra note 47, at 44 ("[A]natomy is what
figures in the account: 'for me "anatomy is not destiny," but that does not mean
that anatomy does not figure,'... but it only figures (it is a sham).") (quoting
Lacan). But see Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade, supra note 380, at
50 (criticizing Rose for stressing role of anatomy in development of sexual
identity).
408. Rose explains:
For Lacan, men and women are only ever in language ('men and
women are signifiers bound to the common usage.of language'.. .). All
speaking beings must line themselves up on one side or the other of
this division, but anyone can cross over and inscribe themselves on the
opposite side from that to which they are anatomically destined.
Rose, Introduction II, supra note 47, at 49.
409. Id. at 44-45.
410. Cornell, Doubly-Prized World, supra note 383, at 660-61.
411. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOsOPHY OF THE Lnrr 173 (1992).
412. GRoSz, A FEMimST INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 362, at 9; JAC-
QUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUEs LACAN: BOOK II, THE EGo IN FREUD'S
THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1954-55 272 (Jacques-Alain
Miller ed. & S. Tomaselli trans., 1988) [hereinafter LAcAN, SEMINAR Ill.
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perceived as masculine. To speak, psychoanalytic women must
take on, or mime, the position of masculinity.413
This phallocentrism may be misogynist, but it is not pro-
masculine. The Lacanian solution is no more satisfactory to
those of us who take on the masculine position. The masculine
subject is an artificial creation that exists only in language. To
be the masculine speaking subject is to take on the role of hav-
ing the Phallus, but in fact the Phallic Mother does not exist. No
man has the Phallus; he only has a penis and, deep in his uncon-
scious, he knows this.414 Lacan thus rewrote Freud's concept of
castration fear. It is not the actual dread of the loss of the male
organ brought on by the sight of a woman who lacks it, but the
despair of knowing that the Phallus is already lost. There is a
hole, a lie, and a fiction at the heart of subjectivity.415 The sub-
ject is nothing.416 There are no sexual relations, only failed at-
tempts.417 By this, he meant that all human relations remain
mediated. We remain castrated from the imaginary union with
the Phallic Mother and the dream of the breakdown of the sub-
ject/object distinction remains a dream. The masculine subject
desires to have the feminine object, but desire is always the de-
sire of the other-i.e., the subject desires that his lover desire
him. For her desire to count, however, she must be a subject,
but if she attains subjectivity she no longer fulfills her role as
413. GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 376, at 71-72.
414. Zizek explains that in Lacan's understanding of the incest taboo
wherein the infant gives up the Phallic Mother, "I give something in exchange
for nothing-or (and therein consists its fimdamental paradox), in so far as the
incestuous object is in itself impossible, I give nothing in exchange for some-
thing (the 'permitted' non-incestuous object)." ZzEy, FOR THEY KNow NOT
WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20, at 230-31.
415. Gallop suggests:
If we understand the nostalgia resulting from the discovery of the
mother's castration [as a homesickness], then the discovery that the
mother does not have the phallus means that the subject can never
return to the womb. Somehow the fact that the mother is not phallic
means that the mother as mother is lost forever, that the mother as
womb, homeland, source, and grounding for the subject is irretrievably
past. The subject is hence in a foreign land, alienated.
GALLOP, READING LAcAN, supra note 47, at 148.
416. Schroeder & Carlson, Subject is Nothing, supra note 381, at 101 ("'Sub-
ject' is a metaphor-a 'substitution of One for Zero,' or 'something for noth-
ing.'") (emphasis omitted) (quoting ZIzEK, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY
Do, supra note 20, at 50).
417. GRosz, A FEMINIsT INTRODUCTION To LACAN, supra note 377, at 137;
Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade, supra note 380, at 67 ("There is no
sexual relationship. That is, the relation between the sexes is, by definition, a
place where lack and loss play out their effects in all of the orders: real, imagi-
nary and symptom.").
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the object of desire. If the subject/object distinction breaks
down, there is no subjectivity.
If Lacanian theory sounds depressing, that's because it is.
But, there is also a positive side of Lacan, and of Hegel, which
we should recognize. The emptiness that lies at the center of
Lacanian masculine subjectivity and the lack that constitutes
Lacanian feminine objectivity-like the negativity that is the es-
sence of Hegelian abstract personality-enable desire to func-
tion. If we were full and satisfied, we would not desire.
Moreover, because subjectivity is negative, personality is limit-
less capacity and potentiality.41 To be capable of desiring the
Other, we need to become individuated and recognizable as sep-
arate subjects who are capable of desiring.419 As in Hegel, for
recognition to count, we must be recognized and desired by an-
other whom we in turn recognize as a free and equal subject.420
418. Although the Symbolic is constituted by prohibition and separation, it
has the effect of changing the impossible of the Real into possibility. We are
now unable to merge with the Phallic Mother because we believe it is prohib-
ited, not because we perceive it as impossible (as before). If it is prohibited, we
must be able to conceive of it as possible-opening a new field of freedom and
self-actualization. As Zizek succinctly explains:
Thereby we have already produced the formula of the mysterious re-
versal of horror into bliss: by means of it, the impossible limit changes
into the forbidden place. In other words, the logic of his reversal is
that of the transmutation of Real into symbolic: the impossible-real
changes into an object of symbolic prohibition. The paradox (and per-
haps the very function of the prohibition as such) consists of course in
the fact that, as soon as it is conceived as prohibited, the real-impossi-
ble changes into somethingpossible, i.e., into something that cannot be
reached, not because of its inherent impossibility but simply because
access to it is hindered by the external barrier of the prohibition.
Z=ZmK, TARRYING wrIH THE NEGATrE, supra note 40, at 116.
419. Zizek explains that a
reading of Hegel which locates the "reconciliation" of the Universal and
the Particular into the very splitting which cuts through them and
thus unites them, also provides an answer to the eternal problem of
solipsism and the possibility of communication (between different sub-jects or, at a more general level, between different cultures): what begs
the question in the solipsist hypothesis is the presupposed self-enclo-
sure of the individual or society. In other words, communication is ren-
dered possible by the very feature which may seem to undermine most
radically its possibility: I can communicate with the Other, I am
"open" to him (or it), precisely and only insofar as I am already in my-
self split, branded by "repression," i.e., insofar as (to put it in a some-
what naive-pathetic way) I cannot ever truly communicate with myself,
the Other is originally the decentered Other Place of my own splitting.
Id. at 30-31.
420. Although I have presented the Phallus as the object of desire, it is not
the object that is desired, but desire itself. As Zizek explains:
[Olne has to conceive of Lacan's dialectic of desire-his basic thesis
that desire is always desire of a desire: desire is never directly aimed
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It is exchange that enables subjects to recognize each other as
free and equal subjects.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LACANIAN THEORY FOR FEMINIST
PROPERTY THEORY
The Lacanian system, written from the masculine position,
includes two mediating elements-possession and alienation
(i.e., exchange) of the object of desire.421 Where is the element of
use as enjoyment? In feminine jouissance.
Lacan recognized that use as enjoyment, jouissance, reflects
the Feminine position.422 It is a concept of enjoyment that in-
cludes not only pleasure, but obscene delight in pain and
death.423 Jouissance may be thought of as the fulfillment of de-
sire in the sense of the breakdown of the subject/object distinc-
tion. It is the psychoanalytic experience of breaking out from
the Symbolic order of speech and the Imaginary order of im-
agery and of achieving direct, unmediated contact with the Real.
Although anatomical men are capable of jouissance, jouissance
requires one to take on the position of the Feminine 424 as speak-
ing requires one to take on the position of the masculine.425 Ex-
change is Eros. Jouissance is Thanatos. In the masculine story
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the destruction of the subject/object
distinction would be suicidal in the sense that it also destroys
subjectivity, consciousness, and language.
Consequently, according to Lacan, this part of the fiction
must be retold from the Feminine position. Lacan said the story
at some object but is always desire "squared7 .... What we call "valua-
tion" is thus always based in this reflectivity of desire, which is of
course possible only within the symbolic order: the fact that desire is
always-already "symbolically mediated" means nothing but that it is
always the desire of a desire.
Z=ZEK, FOR THEY KNow NoT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 20, at 131-32.
421. See supra notes 395-402 and accompanying text (describing Lacan's
theory of the exchange of the Phallus).
422. The psychoanalyticjouissance is not perfectly translatable because it is
defined as that which is beyond the masculine, Symbolic order of language. The
untranslatable French word means literally "enjoyment" and is both a slang
word for sexual orgasm as well as the legal term for the enjoyment of property.
See BNEVENuTo & KENNEDY, WoRKs OF LACAN, supra note 16, at 179; Ragland-
Sullivan, The Masquerade of Sexuality, supra note 380, at 70.
423. Because enjoyment is a forbidden domain and obscene, pleasure always
involves a certain displeasure. Zizm, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do,
supra note 20, at 239.
424. LAcAN, FEMININE SEXuALrrY, supra note 47, at 144-45; Rose, Introduc-
tion II, supra note 47, at 51.
425. GRosz, A FEMINIsT INTRODUCTION TO LACAN, supra note 377, at 71-72.
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so far remains untold because it is literally unspeakable in a
psychoanalytic sense. Jouissance-the experience of the Real, is
by definition not Symbolic. This, of course, is the untold part of
the story of property that Radin glimpses but unsuccessfully at-
tempts to tell.
Jouissance is the experience of the feminine object for her-
self, as opposed to the feminine object as the object of exchange
of masculine subjectivity. It is the transgression of the law as
prohibition. This understanding ofjouissance parallels Radin's
attempt to protect exclusive use of the object of personal prop-
erty for the development of (feminine) personhood. 426 It is an
attempt to give dignity and meaning to the feminine person as
other than the commodified object of masculine desire.
I agree with Radin's intuition that this moment of feminine
selfhiood as virginity-the ecstatic, unnediated relationship,
and the breakdown of the subject/object distinction-is essential
for an affirmative rewriting of the feminine as other than the
negative of the masculine. Psychoanalytic theory insists that to
become "mature women," we must accept our castration and our
roles as the objects of desire and as negativity and lack.427 But,
Lacan also insisted that the masculine perspective is a lie-a
fiction. The masculine function claims to be universal-to be a
subject is to have the Phallus and to be a man. The feminine
function is not the simple negation of the positivity of the mascu-
line in the sense of nothing (as men insist). The Feminine is not
merely the negative of not having the Phallus, it is the difference
of not being the Phallus. The Feminine is "not-all-a denial of
the crushing hegemony of the false universal of the masculine
and an insistence that the masculinist story of psychoanalysis is
not the truth but a fiction.428 The Lacanian Woman is not the
426. See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text (describing Radiu's the-
ory of enhanced protection for rights in objects that are "bound up" with
personhood).
427. As Luce Irigaray says criticizing Freud's theory of feminine sexual de-
velopment (and thereby implicitly criticizing Lacan's theory), the mature wo-
man is "[to have only one desire-that of being as much as possible like man's
eternal object of desire." LucE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WoMAN 32
(Gillian C. Gill trans., 1985); see also GRosz, A FEmiNIST INTRODUCTION TO LA-
cAN, supra note 377, at 69 ("[T]he girl's oedipus complex... involves the 'discov-
ery' that what the boy has been threatened with-castration-has already
taken place in the girl.").
428. See id. at 138; Ziz=K, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note
20, at 122-25; ZIZEK, TARmYiNG wrrH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 40, at 56.
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simple negative of the masculine subject as his complement.429
Rather, she is his sublation-a supplement. 43 0
What Radin's approach to property glimpses is the possibil-
ity of a feminine role as object that is not passive or silent: she
does not merely allow herself to be commodified in exchange by
an active, masculine principle. The positive moment of the re-
writing of the feminine shows that the masculine nightmare of
castration did not occur precisely because we never were united
with the Phallic Mother. In the moment ofjouissance, the Femi-
nine-the unmediated relationship-is not the "forever lost" or
lack. The prohibition of the Phallic Mother that created the
Symbolic Order moves the Feminine out of the impossible of the
Real and into the possible. The Feminine is messianic, the "not-
all" as the "something more."43 1 It is a "not yet," which might be
briefly glimpsed by taking on the position of the Feminine. In
this view, the Feminine becomes not the simple negation of the
masculine that reinstates the status quo, but instead is the crea-
tive negativity of sublation.
It is important not only to emphasize the positive moment of
feminine objectivity in sexuality and property, but to over-em-
phasize it, because it has been traditionally deprivileged. It
429. In Lacanian thought, such complementary notions cannot characterize
sexuality, because sexuality is Symbolic. As Zizek explains:
What defines the imaginary order is the appearance of a complemen-
tary relationship between thesis and antithesis, the illusion that they
form a harmonious Whole, filling out each other's lack: what the thesis
lacks is provided by the antithesis and vice versa (the idea that Man
and Woman form a harmonious Whole, for example).
Id. at 123.
430. It is easy to misinterpret Lacan's theory of sexuated positions, and
masculine subjectivity and feminine objectivity, in terms of traditional notions
of sexual complements such as the masculine as the active principal and the
feminine as the passive. This is a serious misreading if it suggests that the
sexual complements come together to form a satisfying whole. Complementar-
ity, in this sense, sees both masculinity and femininity in terms of positive char-
acteristics. Lacan (like Hegel) defines personality in terms of negativity. As
brilliantly described by Renata Salecl:
Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual differ-
ence as the relationship of two opposite poles which complement each
other, together forming the whole of "Man." "Masculine" and "femi-
nine" are not two species of the genus man but rather two modes of the
subjects failure to achieve the full identity of Man. "Man" and "Wo-
man" together do not form a whole, since each of them is already in
itself a failed whole.
RENATA SALECL, THE SPoILs OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AF-
TER THE FALL OF SOCIALSM 116 (1994).
431. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 383, at 13, 17; Cornell,
Doubly-Prized World, supra note 383, at 645, 656-57, 686-87, 699. In the multi-
linguistic pun, Mother is always (M)-other and "mere" is always "mehr."
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would be a mistake, however, to forget the positive moment of
masculine subjectivity. To desire and to experience the break-
down of the subject/object distinction, we must first become sub-
jects. To function and to speak, we must submit to the Symbolic
order of language and take on the position of masculine subjec-
tivity as intersubjectivity. To perceive the Feminine as possible,
we must prohibit or deny her creating the temptation of trans-
gression. 432 Like the ancient Goddesses who were simultane-
ously lovers and virgins,433 we should preserve our feminine
objectivity while fulfilling our subjectivity.
But, as we try to describe the experience of jouissance by
speaking it, we re-enter the Symbolic order and lose our jouis-
sance.43 4 It is impossible to sing the dream of the feminine
within the inadequate masculine speech of Lacanian and Hege-
lian theory, but the theory has a true moment as well as its in-
ternal contradiction. It is within this contradiction that one can
locate a powerful feminist moment. Hegel argued that it is fun-
damentally and essentially un-right to deny another person the
status of an equal human subject.4 5 It is wrong at the primi-
tive, minimal level of abstract right, even without considering
morality and ethics. Denying equal status is not merely a wrong
against the person treated as non-human, it is a wrongful de-
struction of the personhood of the person who refuses to recog-
nize the other person because the fundamental desire to be
recognized and desired by others drives persons. We accord
rights to the Other precisely to give her dignity so that her rec-
ognition counts.
Lacan argued that in our patriarchal society, we identify
subjectivity with the masculine position, but we identify the
feminine position with the silent, passive role of the object of
desire that active male subjects exchange. 436 One of Lacan's
432. See supra note 418 (explaining how prohibition creates possibility). La-
can's insight that prohibition itself creates the possibility of and desire for
transgression originated with St. Paul. LAcAN, SEMINAR VII, supra note 19, at
83.
433. See ERICH NEUMANN, THE GREAT MOTHER 3-17 (R. Manheim trans.,
1963) (explaining paradoxical and encompassing imagery of traditional goddess
worship under Jungian approach); see also MARINA WARNER, ALONE OF ALL HER
SEx: THE MYTH AND THE CULT OF THE VIRGIN MARY 273-84 (1983) (discussing
how the cult of the Blessed Virgin incorporated imagery of ancient fertility
goddesses).
434. GRosz, A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION TO LACAN, supra note 377, at 139.
435. See supra notes 342-346 and accompanying text (describing Hegels
theory that denying minimum equal status is unrecht).
436. See supra notes 398-409 and accompanying text (identifying Lacan's
masculine and feminine positions).
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most infamous tenets is that Woman is a symptom of Man-i.e.,
the feminine is a fiction retroactively abducted as a necessary
building block in the construction of men as psychoanalytic sub-
jects.437 For anatomically female humans to speak and other-
wise to function in society, we must occasionally mime the
masculine. Insofar as we are recognized as feminine, we are rec-
ognized as lack of subjectivity. Accordingly, patriarchy is inca-
pable of recognizing feminine subjectivity. This is an abstract
wrong-Unrecht. Within the terms of Hegers own dialective, as
a logical matter, we cannot even begin to speak of creating a
moral family structure, let alone an ethical civil society or state,
without establishing the minimal abstract right of feminine
personhood.
Furthermore, Lacan (like Hegel) argued that the desire of
man is the desire of the Other. Humans are driven by the erotic
desire to be recognized and desired by an equal human being. It
is only this recognition and desire that makes an abstract per-
437. One should not confuse this with a simple misogynist view of the femi-
nine as dependent on, inferior to, or somehow less authentic than the mascu-
line. In Lacan's theory, "symptom" does not have the layperson's meaning.
Zizek explains:
If, however, we conceive the symptom as it was articulated in La-
can's last writings and seminars ... namely, as a particular signifying
formation which confers on the subject its very ontological consistency,
enabling it to structure its basic, constitutive relationship toward
jouissance, then the entire relationship between the symptom and the
subject is reversed: If the symptom is dissolved, the subject loses
ground under his feet, he disintegrates. In this sense, "Woman is a
symptom of man" means that Man himself exists only through woman
qua his symptom: all his ontological consistency hangs on, is suspended
from, is "externalized" in his symptom. In other words, man literally
ex-sists: his entire being lies "out there," in woman. Woman on the
other hand, does not exist, she insists, which is why she does not come
to be only through man. Something in her escapes the relation to Man,
the reference to the phallic enjoyment; and, as is well known, Lacan
endeavored to capture this excess by the notion of a 'non-allfeminine
jouissance.
ZIZmEK, TAmmYING wrm TimE NEGATIVE, supra note 40, at 188 (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, I do not agree with Zizek's implied defense of Lacan from a
charge of misogyny. Even though Zizek argues that it is the masculine that is
dependent for its very existence on the feminine, he only considers the feminine
insofar as she is necessary for the existence of the masculine-the masculine
risks being the destiny or purpose of the feminine. The potential feminist turn
or sublation in this misogyny, of course, is the notion of the feminine as "not-
all." Even though Lacan only retroactively posits the feminine as an explana-
tion of the masculine, he allows for the possibility of some aspect of the feminine
unrelated to this purpose. Of course, Lacan himself remains masculinist be-
cause he posits that this aspect of the feminine cannot be grasped in language.
To Lacan, the feminine that exists outside of explaining the masculine can only
be experienced in mute, unconscious, and idioticjouissance.
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son into a full subject who can in turn recognize and desire
others. Yet, Lacan argued, the masculine subject is constituted
by constituting the feminine position as non-subject. This is not
merely an abstract wrong against those of us who are positioned
as feminine objectivity but renders the desire of the heterosex-
ual, masculine subject in patriarchy impotent. He cannot accord
the woman he desires the full subjectivity that would make her
desire count. The Phallic Mother always escapes from the sub-
ject's embrace. All claims of masculine subjectivity are thus
hollow.
Patriarchy contains its own contradiction and must go
under as a logical matter. But, this end is not predestined
through the impersonal workings of the hypothetical Geist. It
can only happen through the affirmative actualization of femi-
nine subjectivity by women.
CONCLUSION
Radin may be right that exchange reflects separation, but to
love, we must first be separate people who can desire and cher-
ish the feminine hope of reunion. The psychoanalytic function
we call the Feminine cannot be filled by the passive, silent object
of desire of which Hegel and Lacan speak. To actualize human
freedom, a woman must become an active mediatrix who sets
the chain of desire and intersubjectivity in motion.
Radin should be congratulated for implicitly envisioning a
feminine integrity that is not solely dependant for its recognition
on the masculine. This is reminiscent of the Lacanian notion of
the Feminine as "not-all," which cannot be totally captured in
the Symbolic order. Radin also accurately intuits that submis-
sion to the regime of market exchange is related to the corn-
modification of women in some deep and fundamental way.
Nevertheless, the Radinian person who chastely tries to protect
the integrity of her personhood from commodification by pre-
serving her virgin property from market intercourse immures
herself beyond the reach of community. By seeking to protect
herself from the alienation and loneliness of commodification,
she instead separates herself. Trying to avoid objectification,
she so identifies herself with her objects that she recreates her-
self in the image of the traditional masculine fantasy of woman
as passive object who does not actively engage in society as a
subject. The ancient image of the Great Goddess is reduced to
the Christian image of Mary-a mediatrix to be sure, but for-
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ever Virgin, stripped of her godhood, and dependant on the di-
vinity of her Son.
Hegelian theory can enrich feminist legal theory because it
insists that society can never meet the minimum demands of
right until every person-including women acting proudly as
women and not as the reflected image of masculine fantasy-is
recognized as a full subject whose recognition is worthy of de-
sire. Lacanian theory can enrich feminist property theory by re-
minding us that the feminine cannot avoid, but is dependent on,
the Symbolic regime of exchange that creates subjectivity.
Rather than fearfully avoiding the market because it can lead to
objectification that threatens the self, or grudgingly accepting
limited market relations as a necessary evil, feminist theory
needs to recognize that subjectivity and community-love, dig-
nity, and justice-require the person to risk her very self in or-
der to see herself reflected in the eyes of the Other.
Nevertheless, Hegelian theory insists that the very logic of
property means that there must be some minimal objects of
property that cannot rightfully be alienated in the market. La-
canian theory insists that the Feminine can never be reduced to
the role imposed on her by the Symbolic regime-femininejouis-
sance remains uncaptured. Radin is correct, therefore, that
there must be a place in our law for object relations, the femi-
nine position, that are not subjected to the phallic order of the
market. But, this does not require a disparagement of the mar-
ket and traditional property, for even to analyze these object re-
lations in terms of "property" is to subject them to the order of
the market. Rather, we should modify Radin's project and con-
sider the development of an alternate regime that would neither
negate nor complement but would supplement the law of prop-
erty-what I have called a jurisprudence of expanded bodily in-
tegrity. The Lacanian Woman insists on restoring the imagery
of the ancient Goddesses who were paradoxically unabashed lov-
ers, yet always virgin.
1994]

